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ABSTRACT 
This thesis interprets certain passages in Kierkegaard with reference to a problem for the 
theory of judgement. The problem is generated by powerful considerations to the effect 
that rule-governed thought essentially involves spontaneous activity. This goes against 
the grain of many accounts of what thoughts are, and what it means to think. 
Yet the notion of 'constrained spontaneity' is paradoxical- for how can one and the same 
act be both spontaneous and determined by rules? I explore how this puzzle informs 
Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel in ways that both anticipate and can be used to interpret 
Wittgenstein's so-called rule-following considerations. Whilst Kierkegaard's critique has 
often been seen to trade on a crude view of Hegel, I show how in this respect it survives 
the sophisticated 'non-metaphysical' readings developed by many contemporary 
commentators. 
I proceed to examine whether Kierkegaardian conceptions of 'the leap', indirect 
communication and imagination can furnish an understanding of constrained spontaneity. 
In these connections, I (i) advance an 'Inseparability Thesis' about the relation between 
acts and objects of thought; (ii) adumbrate a form of argument I call the rhetorical 
reductio, the aim of which is to elicit spontaneous agreement; and (iii) defend a 'direct 
imagist' account of the role of imagination in rule-following. 
In a Prologue to the thesis, I mediate between 'content-' and 'form-based' approaches to 
Kierkegaard's texts by appeal to the art of caricature. In an Epilogue, I assess parallels 
and disanalogies between judgement and faith in Kierkegaard' s work. 
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General Introduction 
This thesis is not a direct contribution to scholarly work on Kierkegaard's texts. 
Rather, the topic is a problem for the theory of judgement that it is the purpose of Chapter 
One to introduce in quite general terms. In Chapter Two, however, I argue that this 
problem is central to certain criticisms of Hegel advanced in Kierkegaard's work. And in 
Chapters Three and Four, I show further how the pervasive Kierkegaardian themes of 'the 
leap', 'indirect communication' and the imagination are germane in this context. The aim 
is to show that Kierkegaard's work furnishes a distinctive contribution to on-going 
debates about rule-following. 
My primary motivation for appealing to Kierkegaard in this context is therefore an 
external one. I wish to 'use' his texts to clarify and explore what I hope to show are 
genuine and important issues. This does not mean, however, that I wish to abuse these 
texts. On the contrary, it is a secondary aim of this thesis to contribute to an 
understanding of them. For this reason, lowe some preliminary account of how 
Kierkegaard's work can be used without abuse. The following Prologue is an admittedly 
programmatic response to this demand, but its provisional conclusions shall be supported 
by arguments in the body of the thesis. 
Prologue 
Caricatures: 
Form and Content in Kierkegaard 
You have come to a halt at the destrmmg of 
illusions, and since that is something you hav~ do~e 
in all possible and imaginable ways, really you have 
worked yourself into a new illusion: the illusion that 
one can come to a halt there. Yes, my friend, you are 
living in an illusion and you accomplish nothing. 
(Judge William) 
... someone caricaturing another person does not 
originate anything himself but only copies the other in 
the wrong way. 
(Johannes Climacus) 
It is a truth, almost universally acknowledged, that an academic in want of an 
understanding of Kierkegaard is confronted by singularly acute problems of 
interpretation. One is hardly encouraged, for example, by the following entry in 
Kierkegaard's Journals: 
When I am dead there will be something for the university lecturers to poke into. The abject 
scoundrels! And yet, what is the use, what is the use? Even though this be printed and read again 
and again, the lecturers will make a profit out of me, teach about me, maybe adding a comment 
like this: "the peculiar thing about this is that it cannot be taught".l 
What exegetical, hermeneutic or heuristic norms could possibly govern the discussion of 
texts that seem precisely designed to be impossible to teach? What rationale is there for 
so much as perpetuating that discussion? And yet the vast secondary literature is perhaps 
testimony to the fact that an author is never so seductive as when he repels. 
In this essay, I shall offer a simple twofold classification of approaches to 
Kierkegaard's texts. 2 According to the first strategy, which I call the content-based 
approach, the content of these texts is treated as prior to their form. Conversely, theform-
1 jp (Rhode), pp. 147-8. 
-' In this essay, 'Kierkegaard's texts' means the pseudonymous works. Whilst fOf tactical reasons the focus 
shall be on works attributed to Johannes Climacus, the model I shall propose is supposed to shed light on 
Otht,'f pseudonymous texts. I shall have nothing to say about Kierkegaard's 'upbuilding discourses' 
., 
-' 
based approach treats form as prior to content. It is arguable that the bulk of expository 
work could be squeezed into this taxonomic straight-jacket. The burden here, however, is 
the conceptual (rather than bibliographical) task of delimiting and assessing possible 
interpretative strategies. I shall characterise the choice between content- and form-based 
approaches as a dilemma and suggest a way of avoiding it. 3 
I first introduce the two types of approach, illustrating these by special reference 
to the work ofC. Stephen Evans and James Conant respectively (Sections 1 and 2). I then 
outline some general problems with Conant's reading (Section 3). The upshot of this 
discussion is that both approaches tend to over-simplify the complex interplay between 
theory and rhetoric, seriousness and jest, content and form in Kierkegaard' s work 
(Section 4). Finally, I advance a model for capturing this complexity based on an analogy 
with the art of caricature (Section 5). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
properly apply the model sketched here, the aim is to indicate how my work might fit 
within a wider context of debates about Kierkegaard' s texts.-l 
1. Philosophical Treatises 
Content-based approaches take many forms. They range from readings that 
display a crass insensitivity to the formal properties of Kierkegaard's texts, to highly 
nuanced accounts of the theoretical basis that purportedly explains these properties. 5 But 
in order to count as content-based, an interpretation must operate on the assumption that 
certain theories, doctrines, viewpoints, arguments and the like can be extracted from 
Kierkegaard's work. The guiding idea is that the propositional contents of the texts can in 
principle be abstracted from the literary forms in which they are embedded. 
So, for example, whilst exponents of the content-based approach dispute the 
meaning and plausibility of the' doctrine that truth is subjectivity', as this is found in 
3 Compare Patrick Goold's attempt to 'rescue Kierkegaard both from muggings by 'rigorous' philosophers 
and from the morganatic embraces ofPost-Modemists' (Goold (1990), p. 304). 
~ I should emphasise that the present piece is not a preface in the sense th~t a prefac~ .anticipates the main 
body of a text. I have called it a 'Prologue', \\"here this rou~ly me~s a pIece o~ \\ntmg that sets a 
particular context for the main body of a text. It is offered m the spmt of: "Here s a way of lookmg at the 
general landscape that justifies the particular route I shall pursue'. 
5 For a recent c'\ample of the former kind of reading, see Anderson (2000). 
4 
Concluding Unscientific Post'}cript, they share the assumption that there is a doctrine 
here, and that this can be isolated from the formal conditions of that work as a whole.6 Or 
again, whilst there are numerous different takes on what David Swenson once called 'the 
doctrine of the stages', it is presupposed that some kind of theoretical machinery is at 
work behind multifarious uses of the terms, 'aesthetic', 'ethical' and 'religious,.7 
Whilst bluntly doctrinaire readings are customarily polemicized against, the 
content-based approach has long enjoyed the status of orthodoxy. Thus George Connell 
could locate his To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard s Thought (1985) 
within a firm tradition of interpretative practice in the following terms: 
... the method adopted is that most commonly used in current Kierkegaard scholarship: a synoptic 
approach seeking a single anthropology, philosophy, and/or theology that drives the authorship as 
a whole. 8 
The synoptic method is clearly one species of what I am calling the content-based 
approach. And, even whilst attempts to map individual works onto an overarching 
theoretical scheme are increasingly viewed with suspicion, more modest attempts to distil 
the' essential content' from particular texts (or groups of texts) continue to proliferate. 
Now, whilst Connell frankly admits that his synoptic method 'has the great disadvantage 
of failing to take Kierkegaard's employment of pseudonymity seriously,9, many content-
based interpretations go to considerable lengths to give such formal features their due. 
The work of C. Stephen Evans is exemplary in this respect, and I shall briefly illustrate 
the general approach by reference to his Kierkegaard 's Fragments and Postscript: The 
Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (1983). 
Evans proposes to treat the texts under discussion as 'philosophical treatises'. 10 By 
this gesture, he means to distance himself from those who would view them as rhetorical 
exercises in self-conscious nonsense (i.e. form-based approaches - see below). On the 
contrary, Evans attests to the thematic coherence and conceptual clarity of these works. 
6 I present a reading of this 'doctrine' in the Epilogue. 
7 See Swenson (1983), Ch. 6. For a systematic treatment of the 'theory of stages' see Liehu (1990). 
8 -' Connell, (198)), p. XIX. 
9 Idem. 
10 Evans (1983), p. 5. 
) 
Yet Evans also wishes to distance his own work from 'certain other books that have dealt 
with the intellectual content ofKierkegaard's works' - viz. those that neglect formal 
aspects altogether (i.e. crude forms of content-based approach).l1 Noting that Kierkegaard 
explicitly and vigorously distances himself from the views of his pseudonymous authors, 
Evans goes so far as to concede that 'the literary form of his authorship has an essential 
relation to its content'. 12 
Now this latter statement may seem to cast doubt on the classification of Evans' 
work as content-based. But that the kind of 'essential relation' Evans has in mind is 
consistent with - indeed depends upon - the priority of content over form is intimated by 
the programmatic inference he draws from this claim: 'I will therefore try to pay special 
attention to that form, and to the use of humour and irony, so as to see how the content is 
related to, and reflected in, the form'. 13 
As becomes clear in the course of a closely argued and illuminating book, what 
this program amounts to is an attempt to show how the content of Kierkegaard' s thought 
is reflected in the form of his writing. U The relation between form and content is 
essential, it turns out, in the rather minimal sense that the former is not accidentally or 
arbitrarily related to the latter. But in order to show how the content is thus reflected in 
the form, it must be possible to discuss in abstracto the concepts, theories, doctrines, and 
so on that provide the rationale for the literary forms in which they are embedded. 
Thus, for instance, Evans proceeds in his introduction to sketch how 'the theory of 
indirect communication' - a univocal statement of which, he claims, is supplied by both 
the pseudonymous texts in question and, elsewhere, by Kierkegaard himself - is inflected 
in the pseudonymous form of the works. It is, Evans argues, precisely because 
Kierkegaard believes that' existential issues' can only be addressed by means of a 
peculiar form of communication, for example, that his works assume the peculiar form 
they do. The primary interpretative task is therefore to sympathetically reconstruct the 
theory behind the practice. But it is just this commitment to the logical priority of content 
11 Idem. 
12 Idem. Cf. CUP. p. 626. 
13 E\'ans (1983), p. 5. 
14 For man\' nice examples of this kind of form-content relation sec I IotStadter (2000). 
- as providing reasons, explanations, justifications for the fonns ofKierkegaard's 
production - that renders Evans' work a species of the content-based approach. 
6 
Evans' is a sophisticated strategy that avoids many of the stock criticisms of 
cruder forms of the genre. is But there remain prima face grounds for worrying whether 
any such approach is adequate to the peculiar problems posed by the fonn of 
Kierkegaard's works. Consider, for just one example, a footnote in the Postscript, in 
which its author, one Johannes Climacus, discusses a Gennan review of the 'pamphlet' to 
which he now writes a postscript The review is, Climacus says, 'accurate and on the 
whole dialectically reliable, but now comes the hitch': 
... although the report is accurate, anyone who reads only that will receive an utterly "Tong 
impression of the book. .. The report is didactic, pure and simply didactic: consequently the reader 
will receive the impression that the pamphlet is also didactic. As I see it, this is the most mistaken 
impression one can have of it. The contrast of form, the teasing resistance of the imaginary 
construction to the content, the inventive audacity (which even invents Christianity) ... the 
indefatigable activity of irony, the parody of speculative thought in the entire plan, the satire in 
making efforts as if something ganz Auszerordentliches und zwar Neues [altogether extraordinary, 
that is, new] were to come of them, whereas what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in 
its rightful severity - of all this the reader fmds no hint in the report. 16 
The import of this self-commentary seems quite unambiguous: Philosophical Fragments 
is a work that, according to its author, simply cannot be properly understood as a 
philosophical treatise since, as a whole, it embodies a 'parody of speculative thought'. 
And, pace Evans, Climacus insists that, far from the form of this work hannoniously 
reflecting its contents, it involves some kind of 'teasing resistance' between its fonn and 
its contents. l7 But if the 'indefatigable activity of irony' flatly precludes the abstraction of 
transferable principles, doctrines, theories, view-points, arguments and so forth, then it is 
quite difficult to see how a content-based approach to this text, at least, can so much as 
get off the ground. is For how can one show that an ironic fonn is essentially justified by 
the content of a work that is shot through with irony from start to finish? 
15 Roger Poole's dismissal of Evans ' work as exemplifying a 'blunt reading' of Kierkegaard is therefor~ too 
blunt. See Poole (1998), p. 61. 
16 ('UP, fn. p. 276. 
17 Compare Climacus' remark that Repetition involves a 'confusing contrastive fonn' (CUP, p. 2(3). 
18 It ·ght be thouaht that since Climacus is referring here to Fragments, his claims are not to he extended 
ml e- . h gh'h . 
to other works. That Postscript, for one, also involves a 'parody of sp~~lat,l\"e t au t, owever, IS . 
suggested hy il~ suhtitle alone, '.11 Afimetic-Pathetic-Dialectic CompositIOn. The most plausIhle candIdate 
2. Swiftian Parodies 
It is considerations of this kind that have led some commentators to abandon the 
orthodox approach altogether. Again, form-based approaches are diverse, but share the 
descrimen of denying that the content ofKierkegaard's works can be extracted from their 
form. Some exponents of the strategy bite the bullet and deny that these works have a 
meaningful content at all. The exegete is therefore left to focus exclusively on their 
rhetorical or aesthetic features. Others offer 'deconstructive' readings, in which the 
alleged absence of univocal meanings in these texts is taken to licence a kind of 
hermeneutic free-play. 19 Still others restrict their heuristic endeavours to proving that the 
deepest meanings of these texts are untranslatable - that, in a far stricter sense than usual, 
no secondary text can substitute for one's engagement with the primary material. 20 
In a series of seminal articles, James Conant develops a particularly lucid form-
based approach?l Noting that '[i]n our contemporary Anglo-American philosophical 
culture, the prevailing practice of textual interpretation .. .is often simply to cut through all 
the rhetorical dross and to try and extract the central chain of reasoning', Conant's point 
of departure is the conviction that this practice leads to 'disastrous misunderstandings' in 
the case of an author such as Kierkegaard. 22 
Conant is tireless in flagging up these disasters - especially in connection with the 
commonly affirmed parallels between Kierkegaard and the early W ittgenstein, which he 
sees as resting on the mistaken notion that these authors share a 'mystical doctrine of 
ineffable truth' or 'significant nonsense'. Rather, Conant argues, what we can justly 
ascribe to Kierkegaard (and what, if anything, Wittgenstein inherited from his 
f01" what this work 'mimics' is Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit- albeit in inverted fonn. For an 
exploration of this possibility see McDonald (1997). 
19 See, e.g., Norris (1983) esp. pp. 85-106; Bigelow (1987); Agacinski (1988); Agacinski (1998): Derrida 
(1998). 
20 This sometimes seems to be Michael Weston's position. See Weston (1994), esp. Ch. 8. 
21 See Conant (1989a); Conant (1993); Conant (1995). For developments and extensions of Conant's 
approach see Mulhall (1994); Mulhall (1999); Mulhall (200 1 ); Weston (1999). 
22 Conant (1993), p. 195. Compare Kierkegaard's o~ C?mm~ntary: -The reason ~\'hy Concluding 
Postscript is made to appear comical is precisely that. It IS ~enous - and people think th~y C~U1 hdter the . 
- 1 . tak' separate theses and translating them mto PIeces of dogma, the whole thing no douht endmg cause )\ mg ~ . . I d' th b' . 
in a ne\~ confusion where I m~'sdf am treated as a cause, c\'erythmg bemg trans ate mto . C 0 J~ctlvc_ so 
that what is new is that here we have a new doctrine, and not that here we have personalIty (JP X 2 A 130 
1849 (IIannay), p. 436). 
7 
sympathetic reading of these texts) is 'a certain conception of philosophical authorship,.23 
That is, Conant urges an interpretation according to which the fonn ofKierkegaard's self-
styled 'authorship' is treated as conceptually prior to its content. 
In practice, this approach appears to tum largely on the Principle of Charity. 2~ 
Since, on Conant's view, any attempt to extract the doctrinal core from a work such as 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript results in highly implausible doctrines (such as that of 
ineffable truth), we ought to search for a more charitable interpretation. This of course 
lays down the gauntlet to practitioners of the content-based approach to defend the 
substance ofKierkegaard's works against particular criticisms.25 But Conant also makes 
much of passages in which Kierkegaard or his pseudonymous authors comment on the 
form of their own writings, in which, so to speak, form becomes content. Of these, 
perhaps the most striking is the 'revocation' that occurs in an appendix to Postscript 
entitled 'An Understanding with the Reader'. Having declared that 'r have no opinion, 
wish to have none and am satisfied and pleased with that', Climacus writes, 
Just as in Catholic books, especially from former times, one fmds a note at the back of the book 
that notifies that everything is to be understood in accordance with the teaching of the holy 
universal mother Church, so also what I write contains the notice that e\'e~thing is to be 
understood in such a way that it is to be revoked, that the book has not only an end but a 
. b 26 revocatIon to oot. 
Climacus goes on to imagine and eulogise that 'most pleasant of readers' who can 
understand that 'to write a book and to revoke it is not the same as refraining from writing 
it'. 27 So just what is the 'certain conception of philosophical authorship' that Conant takes 
to be the residual import of such self-subverting gestures? 
23 Conant (1993), p. 196. 
24 F d ~ ce of this Davidsonian principle in the context of the interpretation of philosophical te\:ts see, 
or a elen . . . 1 h (In ~ I 
e.g., Carruthers (1989), Ch. 1. Conant does not e~licitl?· appeal t~ thIS, pnncIp~, ~we\"t.~. lact, 1C , 
claims that a bloody-minded commitment to chantable mterpretatIOn 1:-; what blmd:-; man~ commentators to 
the role of parody {see Conant (1993), p. 215)). 
25 Thus, for example, John Lippitt has defended Cl~acu~' use o!'~e ~~st.inc~io~ b,etwe~ pla.~,no.ns~~ 
d 1 t 
'ense by appc'll to the notIon of stages ot rdigIOus dc\ dopmcnt (~u; LIPPItt and 
an mere y apparen nons _ < '. " .••• 
Hutto (1998)), and Anthony Rudd has defended Climacus' conceptIon ot 'paSSIOnate ratIonalIty agamst 
ironic interpretations (see Rudd (2000)). 
:6 CUP, p. 619. 
27 il1id., p. 621. 
~ ". 
9 
According to one formulation, what is undertaken in the Postscript is 'the twofold 
project' of exposing the incoherence or illusory nature of certain philosophical postures 
and 'diagnosing the source of [their] attraction,?8 Now, whatever specifics this project 
turns out to involve, it is evident from this bare schema alone that there is a sense in 
which it is entirely negative. It displaces without replacing; it dissolves without solving; it 
offers diagnoses without remedies.29 Indeed, Conant is relentless in his insistence that, 
appearances to the contrary, the 'literary undertaking' of the Postscript has nothing 
whatsoever to offer by way of positive doctrines, opinions, theories, solutions. 
Conant readily admits that this claim is indeed contrary to appearances. For the 
Postscript can be seen to construct 'an elaborate theory concerning the subjective and 
passionate character of religious faith and the essentially disinterested nature of objective 
reasoning' - a theory that climaxes in Climacus' claim that the very unintelligibility of 
Christianity qua' Absolute Paradox' is precisely suited to maximise religious passion.30 
Moreover, given Climacus' 'thesis' (the label is his) that truth is subjectivity, what we 
seem to be offered, via this theory, is a peculiar kind of apologetic for Christianity. 31 
With an eye, however, to the incessant activity of irony and Climacus' self-
portrait as a 'humourist', Conant refuses to take all this at face value. Instead, and 
following Henry Allison, he proposes that we view the central argument of Postscript as 
'an elaborate reductio ad absurdum of the philosophical project of clarifying and 
propounding what it is to be a Christian,.32 Armed with an independent theory of the 
conditions of sense and nonsense, Conant proceeds to argue that strictly speaking, large 
~8 Conant (1993), p. 196. 
29 Compare Kierkegaard's description of the ironic st.ance ~mbodied by Socr~tesas distinctively negative 
(e .. CA, p. 12). Combined with munerous passages m ~~ch he expressed ~s kinShIP WIth Socrates (e.g., 
JPg46 VII I A 186 (Hannay), pp. 237-8; 50 X 3 A 315 (IbId.), pp. 503-4), thi~ observat1o~ couldbe seen to 
rt 
Conant's reading. However, several of Conant's critics have emphasIsed that Chmacus IS not an 
suppo . . .. K· k d (I.' 'C (1990)· 
'ironist' but a 'humourist', and that humour IS not entIrely negative tor Ier ~gaar . ,Jet: am , 
Li itt (1997); Lippitt (1999); Lippitt (2000a). esp. Ch . .+: Lippitt (2?O?b ):. VIpperman (1999». The model I 
pr~~se below fits naturally with an interpretation of postscript as dIstmct)\'Ciy humourous. 
30 Conant (1993), p. 210. I wrote 'climaxes' because Conant makes great play of the ladder metaphor Sec. 
e.g., Conant (1995), p. 291 and passim; Conant (1989b). 
31 Indeed, the postscript is often mined for an alternative kind ofC~stian apologetic to that provided by 
the Thomistic tradition. See, e.g., Evans (19X2 t Evans (1994)~ HamIlton (1998). 
32 Conant (1993) p. 207. See Allison (1 %7). For another attempt to shu\\ that Post5Cript is an elaborate 
joke, see Pyper (1997). 
swathes of the Postscript are sheer nonsense - rhetoric with an intended psychological 
impact, to be sure, but lacking any' cognitive content' whatsoever. 33 
10 
This, it is argued, is why the book 'not only has an end but a revocation to boot': 
having climbed with Climacus to the dizzy heights of Absolute Paradox, we are let in on 
the conceit and instructed to 'throw the ladder away'. According to Conant, the rhetorical 
te/os of this ironic project is the dispelling of illusions - the illusions of the philosophers 
when they purport to address existential issues, the illusions of the denizens of 
Christendom when they lay claim to a religious form oflife. 3-l In line with Wilde's dictum 
that the best way to resist a temptation is to succumb to it, we are encouraged to indulge 
our attraction to certain forms of illusion in such a way that we come to see them as 
illusory. In short, Postscript turns out to involve a parody of Swiftian proportions. 
3. Self-Subverting Readings 
Conant's penetrating, if provocative, development of this reading raises all 
manner of textual and substantive issues. But a general misgiving is as follows. To take 
seriously the proposal that a text is meaningless is surely to deny oneself any appeal to the 
'content' of that text whatsoever. But then it is obscure how Conant canjustify his claim, 
for example, to find a 'twofold project' of diagnosing and dispelling illusions in 
Postscnpt. (It is surely a minimal requirement of the therapeutic value ofa diagnosis that 
it is meaningful.) For Conant's findings, it might be argued, depend on his having 
assimilated the ideas that support Climacus' characterisation of certain positions as 
illusory - his highly theorised distinctions, e.g., between existential problems and 
philosophical solutions, indirect and direct communication, concrete and abstract 
33This 'independent theory' is based on a reading of~ittgens~eindevdoped most full~' by Cora Diamond .. 
(See Diamond (1991 ); and Diamond (2000». Acco~d~g to thIS \'lew, the concept nonsense does not pennl~ 
fd and arises (not by one's positively combmmg mcompatlble categones but) Just m the absence 01 
~ (F;:~~) sense. On these issues see also Conant (l989b); Co~ant (2~?); ~uo~e (I ~~7); Reid (1998); 
McGinn (1999). Nothing I shall say here depends on the truth lH othen\ lse ot thIS thesIs 
34 Conant's evidence tor this characterisation of the rhetorical teleolog.y of Kil-Tkegaard' S work IS I~gel \ 
dr fi 
Kierkegaru-d's The PointofViewfor.\~v Work as an Author. Conant clk'S Klerkegaard s 
awn -om . h- '11 '(' 199- "73 
remark for c:\.ample, that 'a direct attack only strcngthens a pLTson III IS I USlOll ('- onant ( )), p_ ... -). 
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thinking, Christian Atonement and Hegelian mediation.35 Surely the rhetorical punch of 
the Postscript derives, partly, on the plausibility of the arguments therein to the effect that 
speculative philosophy cannot accommodate the existential significance of Christianity. If 
so, it seems Conant is engaged in the problematic business of arguing on the basis of the 
particular contents of a text that it has, on the whole, no content. 
It is not hard to see that this danger of self-stultification, of cutting the exegetical 
ground from under one's feet, inheres in form-based approaches. For we are surely right 
to demand of a reading of a particular text that it stands in a discursive relation to that text 
- or else there is nothing to distinguish responsible from irresponsible readings. 36 To be 
sure, a sensitive response will appeal to more than the discursive content of a text such as 
Postscript. But the upshot of Conant's refusal to 'chicken out' of attention to fonnal 
structures seems to be that he ought to do no more than confess what psychological 
impact some cleverly disguised nonsense happens to have had on him.37 
Three lines of defence are suggested by Conant's work. Each of these effectively 
qualify the claim that the Postscript is devoid of content, and might therefore be seen to 
establish a discursive basis for Conant's reading. Firstly, he distinguishes between 
'grammatical truths' and 'philosophical doctrines'. As an example of the fonner, he cites 
Climacus' remark that 'an approximation is essentially incommensurable' with the 
'infinite personal interest' that characterises religious faith. Insofar as this remark merely 
calls attention to a certain feature of the life of faith - roughly, that having faith is 
altogether different from forming tentative beliefs on the basis of evidence - Conant 
35 More orthodox readers ofKierkegaard are only beginning to mount a reposte to the challenge posed by 
Conant's work. Alastair Hannay, for one, gives short shrift to commentators who 'read Postscript against its 
own text, a project which may excite today but which assumes quite ar~itrarily that the counter-currents are 
there' (Hannay (2000), p. 3). This is surely unfair to Conant, wh? does rn fa~t?o some way to e~pose the 
counter-clllTents. But the issue is how he can demonstrate that hIS approach IS rndeed grounded rn the texts 
given his apparent commitment to their lack of significant content. 
36 This is true even of parodies such as S\\ift's A .\lodest Proposal, \\hlc? uses language perfectly 
meaningfully, but in order to e'\pose certain r.0siti~ns as absurd or me~gless. O~ cour~ to understand 
, h arody one has to go beyond \\"hat IS gIven rn the te'\t - but a m1ll1mal condItIon ot this IS that one 
suc ap .. K' k ard' l' 11 
understands what the text literally means. Accordrng to Conan~, however. Ier "ega s tc\:ts Itera y mean 
nothing and only seem to mean something. For more on these ISSUes, see below. 
37 I t' e Conant otTers far more than this. The point is that his much-adn~rtlsoo commitment to the 
n prac IC , " ... , th . . . h . 
priority of fonn makes it (as I shall ar~e, unnecessanly) dIffIcult to account tor e Important mSIg h 
afforded 11\ his 0\\ n interpretatIvc practIce. 
seems to approve.38 As mere 'reminders' of what we mean by the concept of faith, 
Climacus' distinctions are meaningful and helpful. Apparently, however, it is the way 
these conceptual truths get transformed into 'theses' that gives the game away: 
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It becomes clear that Climacus' remark about the "essential incommensurability" of faith and 
objective reasoning will be invoked as a thesis, contesting the philosophers' co~nter -thesis that 
ordinary belief and religious faith represent commensurable kinds of cognitive states - different 
points, as it were, along a single spectrum of possible degrees of epistemological certainty. 
Climacus himself is therefore driven in his polemic against the philosopher to insist upon 
something that by his own lights is a grammatical truth ... Rather than simply showing the 
philosopher that he has run the categories together in a fashion that has led him to speak nonsense, 
Climacus offers his thesis in the form of the negation of the philosopher"s claim. But to negate a 
piece of nonsense results in another piece of nonsense. 39 
Now it is very natural to treat Climacus' writings as comprising claims about the relations 
between concepts (I shall consider his treatment of the concept of faith in the Epilogue). 
But it is obscure what mistake is involved in 'insisting' on a conceptual truth. 40 Surely, if 
'the philosophers' need reminding what it means to have faith, Climacus is right to insist 
upon the point. And it is one thing to insist upon a conceptual truth in the face of some 
thesis that embodies a failure to acknowledge it, quite another to assert an antithesis. 
Suppose, for example, some philosopher asserted that faith in Christ is unjustified 
since there is insufficient evidence for his resurrection. To insist that, as formulated, this 
thesis is misguided because it simply assimilates the very different concepts of faith and 
evidence-based belief is not thereby to offer a defence of faith in Christ. And, to my 
knowledge, nowhere in the Postscript or anywhere else does Climacus mount any such 
defence. On the contrary, he prominently and consistently eschews any such substantive 
project, purporting merely to clarify the distinctive roles of ethical and religious 
'}l 
concepts. 
38 Note that this is already in tension with Conant's official position that the Postscript involves a parody of 
any attempt to clarify what it means to have faith. 
39 Conant (1993), p. 210. 
40 C t ~ t' e~ ~ugge:'.1s that the mistake involves treating that which is merely 'truistIc' as though it 
onan some lID s s ., . . . bl di' . .. all 
. t l' al 'dl'sco':er"," ("ee e g idem). Even It thIS IS a sustama e strnctlOn, It IS not at ' were an eplS emo Ogic . v " ., , . ". ,r'" . _ >, 
1 . h t CI'ma"u' 1" ""pposed to !lout It (On the Lontran, he seems \LT\ keen not to reprt:sent c ear m w a sense 1 '" s ".:>U' . ",' , " 
. tn'b u' , ~ ~ul)"tantI'\'e dI'sCoyeries) EYen less clear IS m what sense merely floutmg thIS hIS own con U ons as s ., ',' ' , 
distinction is a sufficient condition of speakmg nonsense 
-11, f' ' t Ie the 'Moral' of Fraf;ments in which the author says that whether the conceptual See, or .Ius one examp , , :'- '" , ,,," , ' , " 
'b'l' h h d t- ed agaI'n"t 'the SocratIc IS trut! IS an altogether dItkTmt qULstIon, ont: that L,mnot POSSI 1 It~' e as e 111 .,. . 
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If Conant's point is simply that Climacus sometimes attaches the label 'theses' to 
his conclusions, these are hardly grounds for suspicion. For there is nothing obviously 
incoherent about formulating a grammatical truth as a thesis. Indeed, Climacus' claim that 
faith is not a kind of belief surely is a kind of thesis about the distinctive role of the 
concept,jaith. At any rate, it is utterly obscure how simply stating the point in this way is 
sufficient to transform a helpful distinction into a piece of nonsense. At a glance, then, the 
distinction between conceptual truths and doctrines fails to provide a clear or plausible 
criterion for distinguishing between serious and ironic parts of the text.-l2 
Secondly, Conant distinguishes between what he calls the 'frame' and the 'body' 
of a text.43 Accordingly, it is in the frame of the Postscript that we receive instructions for 
how to read the main body of the work. So, for example, it is in an appendix that 
Climacus finally revokes the book - and we must take this gesture seriously if we are to 
understand the ironic project in which he has been engaged for the preceding six hundred 
or so pages. This distinction thus allows Conant to claim both that the bulk of the 
Postscript is nonsense, and that its author meaningfully signals this fact. 
Now a clear frame-body distinction may apply to some books. But Kierkegaard's 
works are hardly neat examples. In Postscript, for instance, we have a 'Preface'~ an 
'Introduction'; a 'Part One' that seems to serve as a kind of prologue for the sixteen-times 
as long 'Part Two'; an 'appendix' to Chapter II of Section IT of Part Two in which we 
receive 'a Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature'; a 'Division l' of 
Chapter N (,for orientation in the plan of Fragments '); an 'Appendix to B' at the end of 
Division 2; a 'Conclusion' in Chapter V followed by a further two subsections; an 
'Appendix' entitled' An Understanding with the Reader'; and an 'Appendix' entitled' A 
first and Last Explanation,.44 And the book as a whole is readily seen to provide a frame 
to the work to which it is a postscript. This surely casts immediate doubt on whether the 
be decided in the same breath ... ' (following PF, lUlpaginated). That Fragments is a hypothetical exercise, an 
experiment with concepts, is prominent throughout. 
~2 1 am not denying that there is any plausible distinction to be made bet\\een grm.nmatical truths and . 
doctrines, only that this distinction cannot be ~a?e t? do the work C.onant \\~ts It ~o. As I have mentIOned, 
it is very plausible to attribute to Climacus a dIstInctIOn between an mYestigatlon ot religiOUS concepts and 
a defenre of religious doctrines. 
-13 See for example, Conant (1995), p. 285. 
-14 On the formal structure of the Postscript, sec Burgess (1997). 
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frame-body distinction can provide a clear criterion for distinguishing between serious 
and ironic parts of this text. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the impression that its author went 
to considerable lengths to ensure no such distinction could be imposed.45 
Thirdly, Conant brings external evidence from the corpus to bear. He cites, for 
example, Kierkegaard's remark in his Journals that' [h]ypocrisy is quite as inseparable 
from being human as sliminess is from being a fish' and invites us to compare this with 
Climacus' sense of philosophy as 'somehow reinforcing a particular form of blindness as 
to the character of one's own life,.46 Putting two and two together, it starts to look 
plausible that Kierkegaard intended Climacus himself to exemplify the very forms of self-
blindness he so sharply spies out in others. By appealing to Kierkegaard's stated views in 
his Journals and Papers and such self-commentaries as The Point q(View, Conant thus 
hopes to anchor his claim that the Postscript is intended ironically. 
There are issues here about the 'innocence' of this external evidence, i.e. the 
extent to which it can itselfbe taken seriously. For several critics have argued that 
Kierkegaard is never so unreliable as when he engages in self-commentary, and urge 
instead a wholesale adoption of what Sylvia Walsh has called 'the hermeneutic of 
suspicion' .47 There are also worries about appealing to Kierkegaard's 'authorial 
intentions', given that making such items bear the weight of an interpretation is often said 
to involve a kind offallacy (a view Kierkegaard himself seems to have endorsed).48 But a 
less involved worry is simply that the external evidence cuts both ways. 49 In many places 
in his Journals and Papers, for example, Kierkegaard appears to take quite seriously the 
very claims Conant views as most ironic. 50 (A parallel situation would arise in relation to 
A Modest Proposal if Swift had also written letters in which he advocates cannibalism.) 
15 For a discussion of Postscript as a work in \vhich the 'frame' takes center-stage, see P~ver (1997). 
46 Conant (1993), p. 204. 
47 Walsh (1994a), p. 11. Walsh cites and criticises the work of Herming Fenger and Joakim GartI as 
t t
', ~ fthis approach. (See Fenger (1980); Garff (1998)). For further cntlclSiTI, see Emmanuel 
represen a 1\ eO· f ' . " th . , .. th (1992). From the perspective of one who does not adopt ~e hermeneutIc 0 :SUSPICIOIL e \\Orr) Is at 
Conant depliYcs himself of the resoW"ces to guard agarnst It. . . ' . 
48 Th" f th 0 called 'm' tentional fallacy'. Tohn Lippitt bndh raIses thIS \\"OIT\, and Cites IS IS, 0 course, e s - .... ' . 
. k . d' I' that he has no privileged access to the meamng of the pseudonymous work except as a Kler "egaar s c rum . 
reader' (CUP, p. 626). See Lippitt (2000a), pp. 67-8. 
49 See Evans (1983), pp. 237-240. 
50 For exampics, see Lippitt (2000a), pp. 56-9. 
15 
In sum, there are good prima facie grounds for thinking that Conant has not 
supplied a workable criterion for distinguishing between what we should, and what we 
should not take seriously in the Postscript. The worry therefore is that he cannot make out 
his reading to be constrained by the text it seeks to illuminate; that he cannot account for 
the conditions under which his work can itselfbe shown to be felicitous. 51 
3. Dialectical Knots 
That Kierkegaard's works resist both content- and form-based approaches is 
hardly surprising, in the light of certain passages within the corpus. Consider, for 
instance, how Climacus first explicitly formulates his conception of an indirect mode of 
communication. This, he says, not only conveys some particular content but is also 
designed with a view to how the content will be received. The contrast is with a purely 
'objective' form of communication that is 'aware only of itself and is therefore no 
communication, at least no artistic communication'. 52 Climacus appends the following 
note to this claim that a merely objective communication - a use of words that pays scant 
attention to how they will be read or heard - is really no communication at all: 
This is how it always goes with the negative; wherever it is unconsciously present, it transmutes 
the positive into the negative. In this case, it transmutes communication into an illusion, because 
no thought is given to the negative in the communication, but the communication is thought of 
purely and simply as positive. In the deception of double-reflection, consideration is given also to 
the negativity of the communication, and therefore this communication that seem~ to be nothing 
in comparison with that other mode of communication, is indeed communication.)J 
In other words: a 'positive' communication - e.g. a didactic treatise that posits truths for 
their own sake - is no communication at all. For, and here is Climacus' key assumption, a 
communication is a relation between subjects. 54 On his account, a text (for example) 
communicates only to the extent that a reader is appropriately engaged, and a would-be 
51 That Conant himself feels the force of the kind of worry I am pressing is amply demonstr~ted by his 
intensely self-conscious paper, "JlIst We Show Wha.t We Cannot Say (Conant (1989)). In this paper, Conant 
writes the 'obituary' to the paper he intended to wnte but found he could not. 
52 CUP. p. 75-6. 
53 Ibid., fu. p. 76. 
5~ That Kicrkegaard shares this assumption is suggested by his charactcnst1c dedications to "my reader" 
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author must therefore ensure that his text is designed in such a way as to engage his 
readers. (Whilst insisting that a propositional, doctrinal form is not appropriate to the 
communication of ethical or religious truths, Climacus is fully aware that in cases where 
merely intellectual engagement is appropriate, such a form can fulfil the requirement that 
a text engages its readers.55 ) But Climacus is careful to point out that this has the 
implication that a text that seems to be entirely negative - one that humorously revokes 
itself, for example - may well be of the essence ofa positive communication. 56 
At the very least this should make us wary of readings of Climacus' own texts in 
which the conception of authorship they embody is viewed as entirely negative. A little 
later in the Postscript, we find that the ideal 'thinker' for Climacus is one who is 'just as 
negative as positive, has just as much of the comic as he has essentially of pathos'. 57 And 
he concludes his review of the review of Fragments quoted above as follows: 
But the presence of irony does not necessarily mean that earnestness is excluded. Only assistant 
professors assume that. That is, while they otherwise do away with the disjunctive aut [or] and 
fear neither God nor the devil, since they mediate everything - they make an exception of irony~ 
they are unable to mediate that. 58 
One thing is clear: for Climacus, there is a complex interplay between form and content 
(negativity and positivity, comedy and pathos, jest and earnestness, irony and 
55 In the very next footnote, for instance, Climacus emphasises: .'It.is .alw~ys to ~e borne in m~d ~at I am 
speaking of the religious ... But wherever objective th~g is .Wl~~ I~S nghts, ~lfect commumcatlon IS also 
in order, precisely because it is not supposed to deal WIth Sub]ectHlty (CUP, tn. p. 76). 
56 Climacus is also keen to make related points in connection with certain other 'recent contributions to 
Danish literature'. For example, he says that whilst 'there is no didacticizing' in Either / Or 'this does not 
mean that there is no thought-content' (ibid., p. 254). 
57 Ibid., p. 80. 
58 Ibid .. p. 277. It is perhaps significant that whilst Conant often cites the first part of the footn.ote,. he 
. . b' I nu'ts these concluding lines. Compare Kierkegaard's remarks on the same reVlC\\ m hIS 
mvana y . . II" I" , t' J, l . In . ting that the rcyicw misses the lfony. Klerkegaard IS equa y mSlstcnt on t le serIousness 0 
th
°umaks, dSl:ays that this means 'letting justice be done to Christianity' (JP 45 VI A 84 (Hannay), p. 190). 
e wor an - . . , I h . I· 
Both Climacus and Kierkegaard seem keen to preclude the lmpressIOn ot an c a orate J0"-C 
transparency) in more profound forms of communication. 59 That Kierkegaard' sAnti-
Climacus agrees is amply illustrated by the following: 60 
.. .it is in~ir~ct c~mn1U?ication to place jest and earnestness together in such a way that the 
COmP?SIte IS a dI~lectI~al ~ot - and then to be a nobody oneself. If anyone wants to have 
anything to do wIth thIS kmd of communication, he will have to untie the knot himself. 61 
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This figure of a 'dialectical knot', arising from serious and non-serious threads being 
thoroughly intertwined, amounts to a diagnosis of the weakness of both content- and 
form-based approaches. In short, if the former are liable to render Kierkegaard's work 
implausibly positive, as comprising serious treatises, the latter are liable to render it 
implausibly negative, as comprising self-subverting parodies. One moral is: judge for 
yourselves! Yet in so far as we wish to write in anything like an academic register about 
Kierkegaard's texts, it seems that what we need is a model that can better handle the 
knotty complexities of their form-content relations. 62 
3. Caricatures 
Consider the art of caricature. A good caricature is both significant - it manifests 
and illuminates important features of its subject - and yet it is also humorous - it presents 
these features as exaggerated, distorted, comic, absurd in a way which mayor may not 
have some rhetorical purpose (such as satire). At first blush, the art of caricature is to 
distort the subject enough to achieve a comic effect but not so much as to render the 
59 Cf. CUP, p. 87: 'The pathos that is not safeguarded by the comic is an illusion; the comic that is not 
safeguarded by pathos is immaturity'. And p. 525: 'it is just as questionable, precisely just as questionable, 
to be pathos-filled and earnest in the wrong pla~e a:' it is to l~ugh in,the wrong pla~e.' . The cl.ear impli.cation 
of such passages, in so far as they have an applIcatIon for ClImacus own authorship, IS ~at It \\ould Just as 
mistaken to take his works as elaborate jokes as it would be to take them as earnest treatIses. 
60 Quidam, a character in Stages on Life's Way, seems to be another. ~e say~ that. 'true earnestness is th.e 
unity of jest and earnestness' (SLW, p. 365) and that Socrates exer.nplifies this .umty m, the sense that '.his 
earnestness was concealed in jest' (ibid., p. 366). An~ C?rr:pare Kierkega~d himselr I was ~f the opmlOn 
that the most difficult thing was to deal with the comIC m tear and tremblmg, to mamtam ethIcal and 
religious seriousness and at the same time to delight in jest' (COR, p. 178). 
61 Pc' p. 133. 
62 C rtain remarks in Either .I Or seem gennane here. Haying combated an undue emphasis on the imp~rtance of subject-matter for making ~ good poem~ for inst'illce. Kierkegaard's aesthelL' ~lles on, 'There 
was a school of aesthetics which by one-SIdedly stressmg the lffiportance of fonn can be accused of 
occasioning the opposite misunderstanding' (FO, (Hannay) p. 6.,-4) 
content unrecognisable as a depiction of the subject - indeed, in such a way that salient 
features are revealed. The trick is to clarify by distorting, to jest in earnest. 
A caricature thus sets up a fruitful tension between its fonn (how it depicts) and 
its content (that and what it depicts). As Climacus puts it: 
Caricature is comic. By what means? By means of the contradiction between likeness and 
unlikeness. The caricature must resemble a person, indeed an actual specific person. If it 
resembles no one at all, it is not comic but a direct attempt at a meaningless fantasy. 63 
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Most people who have thought much about caricatures are drawn to similarly paradoxical 
formulations. Stephanie Ross, for instance, writes that a caricature' effects easy 
identification through false description,.64 Or, to annex a fonnula Kierkegaard applied to 
myths, we might say that a caricature is subjunctive in the indicative mood: that is, it 
purports to significantly represent whilst drawing attention to itself as a 
misrepresentation.65 Unlike realistic portraits, which are self-effacing in relation to what 
they depict, caricatures also make play of their status as pictures. 
Now if there is one clear lesson of the problems attendant on reductions either to 
content or form, it is that the search for a single interpretative key such that might unlock 
the treasures ofKierkegaard's works is chimerical. There can be no reductive approach to 
these rich and varied texts. The following is therefore to be taken in the spirit of a 
'research program', motivated primarily by the weaknesses of existing approaches. My 
suggestion is that the art of caricature does provide a helpful model for understanding 
some of the complexities ofKierkegaard's works, and in such a way as to avoid the 
Charybdis of reductions to content and the Scylla of reductions to fonn. 
According to this proposal, one of the things we are offered in Kierkegaard's 
works are a series of 'literary caricatures' - of Christianity, of Hegel, of Christendom, of 
63 CUP, fn, p, 517, 
64 Ross, (1974), p. 286. Compare a,lso Robert Hopkins' di~u:sion ,ofa caricature ~f To~,Y B,lair: '., ,if w~ 
'th 'ture Blarr' With an enormous mouth It seem:-; \\ e must do 1\\ 0 lITl:umcllable thmg:-;, 
are to see m e Caflca , '., ' 
BI ' , 't '0 \,-e must sec it as resembhn!2 hlfIl m outlme shape, But we must also sec ml We must see arr m I , s· ~" , 
th d th 'no m' I't and to "ee it as resemblmg that m outline shape. Uniortunately these 1\\'0 enormous-mou e I ~,', .'
. d'~~ 'd bl" in outline shape' (Hopkms. (1998), p. 96). It should bc Said that. as With thc C3.'iC 
thmgs U1l:f cons} era , . ' ~ th ", . . ,'J' ,.~ ,', 
of the quote from Ross, I Iopkins IS scttmg up a problem here rather an otknng a cUllS! l:rCU \ il:\\ 
65 Cf. jp 36 I A 300 (Hmlllay). p. 58. 
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the Romantics, of Socrates, of Abraham and so on.66 To the extent that these caricatures 
are successful, they bring into prominence important, contentful, significant features of 
their subjects. The repeated depiction of Christianity as 'the Paradox', for example, is not 
to be taken as nonsense, a mere joke. It is to be taken in earnest as integral to an attempt 
to clarify the difference between genuine and counterfeit appropriations of Christian 
concepts (to unmask 'the misunderstanding between speculative philosophy and 
Christianity,).67 Along the way, Kierkegaard's texts enunciate numerous claims - about 
such topics as faith, reason, God, thought, authorship, humour, subjectivity and so on -
claims that whilst not directly attributable to Kierkegaard, can be discussed, criticised, 
developed. To this extent, Evans is right to reject the form-based approach. 
There is a disanalogy with a Swiftian parody here. In such a work - where to take 
any of its 'proposals' seriously would be to miss the whole point - a particular 
perspective is more or less successfully expressed. A good parody of this kind would be 
one in which the author's view of what it parodies is expressed (rather than articulated) in 
a way that illuminates what it is like to be possessed of that view. But a minimal 
condition of finding such a parody illuminating in this way is that one rightly infers that it 
is a parody of such-and-such - where the conceit is that this information is not given in 
the text itself Moreover, this inference is rather complex. It is not, for example, simply a 
matter of ascribing to the author the opposite views as those advanced in the text. As 
Wayne Booth describes the situation in relation to Swift's A Modest Proposal: 
Nothing here can simply be reversed, once the irony is discovered. If the speaker's position is that 
he will save the children and the kingdom by butchering the children, SWift's position cannot be 
simply that 'we should not butcher them': nobody ... had ever proposed that we should, and to 
write an essay attacking such a position would be absurd.
68 
In the case of a good caricature, on the other hand, one does not need to make any kind of 
inforence to see that and what it parodies - the picture just is a parody of its subject. In 
66 In t 1 st ne place Kierkegaard e:'\plicit1~' characterises his writing in tenns of caricatures Of Stages 011 
Life ,; Tr:,:e says th~t '[t]he p~ose o~the ~ve spe~ers 'I~ Vino Veritas', all ofwh~m are Caric~tllren 
d H 
'I' t is to throw essentIal yet talse llght on \\ omen (lP'+'+ V A 110 (Hannay), p, 183 -4). Ine 
es errgs en, " d '/' ['" 'th M 
11 
' 't b k by Heinrich StefTcns entItled Carikatllren es lIel Igstell Cmcatures 01 e ost 
a USIon IS 0 a 00 . , , " ~" , . .., 
Holy] which Kierkegaard sa~'s he read \nth great enthusIasm (CIted m Hannay (2001), p. 16_~) 
67 F' d' f 'C,o"0711ents that emphasises the roles of caricature 1.md 'acoustical illusions' as means of 
or a rea mg 0 1', '40' , ' , 
clarifying important aspects of ChristIanIty see Walsh (1994b). 
68 Booth, (1974), p. 105. Cited in Lippitt (2000a), p, 170. 
this sense, a caricature, unlike a Swiftian parody, stands in an immediate and direct 
relation to what it parodies.69 To view Kierkegaard's works on this model is therefore to 
allow that they provide the conditions for their own interpretation - where this implies 
that it is not necessary either to make artificial distinctions between the serious and the 
non-serious parts or to indulge extra-textual speculations about Kierkegaard's authorial 
intentions. In other words, on this model, there is a good sense in which we are to take 
the texts at face value - for how else should one take caricatures? 
On the other hand, however, Christianity-as-Paradox is no more to be taken as a 
sober theory than a mere joke - for it emphasises incongruency for rhetorical effect, and 
draws attention to itselfas a distortion.70 The 'thought-experiment' undertaken in 
Fragments, for example, is plausibly read as inverting the image of a (Plato-inspired) 
caricature of Socrates in a way that turns out also to be a caricature of Christianity. And 
this project may well involve a parody of any attempt to reduce Christianity to an 
intellectual system.71 (Where the lesson is that Christianity calls for an existential, rather 
than a merely intellectual, reproduction- i. e. a reproduction in one's life.) Kierkegaard's 
presentation is, as he says, a 'corrective' for an age in which Calvary has been relocated 
within the city walls, in which the crucified god has become an intellectual play-thing, in 
which the Passion is the peep-show of bloodless voyeurs. 72 
It remains true therefore that to view a Kierkegaardian caricature of Christianity as 
straightforward depiction - a theory, a doctrine - is 'the most mistaken impression one 
can have of it'. (To take a political cartoon for a realistic portrait would perhaps be more 
69 Someone might object that, in the case of a caricature, one does h.ave to do a kind ?f inferring: n.amel~·, by 
locating and reversing the exaggerated aspects in order to yie~d a faithful rep~esentahon. ~ut, thIS IS a ~'ery 
d b · s account of what is involved in making sense of a CarIcature. Accordmg to Ross, tor example, there u lOU b' ,. al ' 
. mputation by which the exaggeration can be reversed to recover a su Ject s 'actu appearance 
IS no co . 'bl th hi Id b l' (Ross, (1974), p.186) - and, even ifthere were, it is highly lffipiausl e at t s \\OU e necessary or 
perceiving a caricature as of a given subject. 
70 CI' "th humourist is explicit that 'humour, "hen it uses Christian categories, is a false rendition of 
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71 h F ud" remark that '[i]t might be maintained that a case ofhystena IS a caricature 01 a Compare ere re s ..' . d th- 'd d I " .. 
f th t b 'es 'onal neurOSIS IS a carIcature of relIgIOn an <It a paranOi e Usion 1:-0 a work 0 art, a an 0 s ,SI .., '") 
caricature of a philosophical system' (Cited ID A. Cohen (198 .... ), p. 119). 
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mistaken than to take it for a satirical fiction.) Rather, it is an education into thinking 
about Christianity in 'the mood that properly corresponds to its concept'. 73 (Consider here 
how a caricature differs from a mechanical distortion such as a fish-eye photograph _ 
whereas the latter would affect every face in the same way, the former is purposefully 
distorted 'so as to give a new insight into, a new vision of, the face'. 74) To this extent, 
Conant's work offers an invaluable corrective to content-based orthodoxies. 
So whereas Evans' model of the philosophical treatise sits uneasily with the self-
negating structures ofKierkegaard's texts, and Conant's model of the Swiftian parody 
uneasily accounts for their positive insights, the model of the literary caricature pn'ma 
facie avoids these problems. On the one hand, such formal properties of the texts as the 
'indefatigable activity of irony' and the 'parody of speculative thought' are properly 
acknowledged as precluding their interpretation as straightforward treatises. On the other 
hand, these features are not taken to entail their reduction to rhetoric. 
Now it might be objected that since the form of a caricature is only accidentally 
related to its content - for the caricatured subject can always be depicted in other ways -
this model remains vulnerable to criticisms of content-based approaches, At one level, 
this charge is quickly dismissed by observing the distinction between the content and the 
subject ofa caricature. The content ofa caricature of Winston Churchill, for example, is 
not Winston Churchill himself Whilst Winston Churchill can be depicted in many ways, 
the content of a caricature of him is the particular instantiation of a particular form of 
depiction. Similarly, the fact that Hegel can be treated in all manner of ways other than 
that of the Postscript has no bearing whatsoever on the relationship between significant 
and rhetorical aspects of the critique of Hegel in that work. 
Yet there may be a more serious worry here to the effect that the proposed model 
intensifies the puzzle of why Kierkegaard chose to use the literary forms he did 
(especially since, as he was acutely aware, the strategy is so open to misinterpretation 75), 
For why, if Christianity can be treated more accurately, for example, did Kierkegaard 
73 Cf C1, p. 14, 
74 Ross (1974). p. 290. . ' 
7~' ard 1 I" )mplainoo of being misunderstood In tact. '/p!eople understand me S(l little that 
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persist in a perverse form of depiction? After all, 'caricature' often carries negative 
connotations - e.g. 'Kierkegaard attacked a mere caricature of Hegel, a straw man'. \\'hy 
then did he not write straightforward philosophical or theological treatises? More 
particularly: ifKierkegaard's works do purport to say something significant as well as to 
dispel illusions, why do they not say it more prosaically? It still seems we owe a non-
trivial explanation of why these works assume the form they do. 
The model of the literary caricature can go some way to furnishing this account by 
reference to both rhetorical and substantive considerations. For one thing, this model does 
not commit us to hyphening off large portions of the texts as nonsense and therefore 
licences the appeal to passages in which, whether explicitly or implicitly, their rhetorical 
purpose is discursively explained and justified. 76 
So, for instance, if John Lippitt is right that throughout his writings Kierkegaard 
advances a theory of humour that emphasises subjective engagement - e.g. what it is to 
'get' a joke - and if, as is very plausible, Kierkegaard's conception of authorship also 
emphasises subjective engagement, we can see how his own uses of humour are grounded 
in these conceptions. Such theoretical underpinnings, whilst rarely the main focus of the 
works, are perfectly explicit in the works (they are not, for example, neatly confined to 
footnotes or appendices or prefaces) and we need make no apologies for attributing them 
to Kierkegaard. Nonetheless, unlike content-based approaches, the proposed model also 
has a way of accounting by reference to form for why these underpinnings are explicit -
why the works are, in Alastair Hannay's words, 'as much a disquisition on humour as a 
humorous disquisition'. 77 The reason is that it is of the nature of caricatures to draw 
attention to their humourous form. 
Similarly, I shall (in Chapter Four) attribute to Kierkegaard a theory that affords a 
fundamental role to imagination in thinking and understanding - something that may go 
some way to accounting for the deployment ofa form such as caricature. For consider 
how a caricature invites a certain way of imagining a face - and how variously, as Ross 
76 , I' ., t h men.:r unproblematic. For. as should become ck~rr. the prupos~ modd docs Such apped s aIt.: no ( , . . ' . th·· -
. t f'the purely rhetorical aspects of Klerkegaardlan carIcatures twm elr SIgnIfIcant demand a sortmg OU 0 '. .' ",' , . , . . ~ ,'. 
d th ~~ fr' their theoretIcal underpmnmgs Then.: an.: no qUIck solutIons hen..:. and n;admgs contents an cSC om . 
must bc dc\'elopcd on a passagc-by-passagc basIS. 
77 Hannay (2000), p. II. 
puts it, 'a person is perceived by his lover, by a photographer, by an orthodontist'. 78 (I am 
assuming that a literary, no less than a pictorial, caricature works on the imagination.) Or 
again: a central argument of Chapter Three is that Kierkegaard' s sense of the role of 
spontaneity in judgement - his 'theory of the leap' - provides a discursive basis for very 
much the kind of mimetic parody Conant finds so prominent in the Postscnpt (what I 
shall call the rhetorical reductio). The proposed model, however, allows us to view such 
parodies as details within the broader canvasses of these texts - canvasses that comprise 
caricatures with significant content. 
Since this latter notion of a parody that is a detail of a caricature is obscure, let me 
illustrate. Suppose you view a caricature of Tony Blair. The white teeth, broad grin, 
pleading eyes and bristling quiff effectively convey their subject. These correspond to the 
contentful aspects of a Kierkegaardian caricature - they are the features of the depiction 
that signify ('posit'), clarify, illuminate their subject (albeit in a comic form). But suppose 
further that Tony Blair is depicted as suspended in mid-air (as a satire of 'Blue Skies 
Thinking' perhaps) or as attempting to forge a 'Third Way' when it is clear only two 
routes are possible. Plainly, such features are not to be taken as describing some actual 
state of affairs, in which Tony Blair really does fly or forge unforgable paths. Rather, they 
are ironic attempts to expose Blairitejargon as empty, illusory, absurd - mere 'spin'. 
These correspond to the purely rhetorical aspects of a Kierkegaardian caricature. It is in 
this sense that Conant's sense of self-subverting parody can be accommodated by the 
proposed model, without implying a global reduction to form. 79 
Secondly, it is worth at least mooting the possibility of cases in which the subject 
captured by a caricature is best - even only - captured by a caricature. In such cases it 
would not hold true that a more balanced or prosaic representation is desirable or even 
possible. Here, the use of caricature is essentially grounded in the subject-matter at hand. 
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For example: one sometimes meets particularly flamboyant persons. If one wanted 
to depict or describe such a person, it may well be that the least distorting approach 
would be to represent the person as larger-than-life. This seems to be a clear case in 
which a caricature is invited by a certain kind of subject. (Here we have an application for 
the concept of a distorted image that does not distort reality.) 
Or suppose one wanted to write about Fascism qua ideology. Arguably, Fascism 
is such a heterogeneous rag-bag of inchoate ideas, theories, traditions, associations that 
any attempt to reconstruct this movement as a coherent intellectual system would result in 
serious distortions. In other words: Fascism is itself a caricature of an ideology - an 
ideology, to be sure, but a grotesque, over-simplified, distorted, incongruent form of 
ideology. If so, it may well be that a mode of writing that gave prominence to these 
features would be the least distorting approach - where this would involve resisting the 
temptation to depict Fascism as though it were a well-formed ideological position. 
(Hitler's Mein Kampf, for example, surely demands a very different mode of expos ition 
than, say, Marx's Das Capita/.) Arguably, it is the duty of the intellectual historian not to 
make Fascism appear more coherent than it is.80 
Supposing, further, than one wanted to criticise Fascism, it may well be that the 
satirical possibilities of caricature would provide the most effective plan of attack, since 
any critique that assumes Fascism to be a serious intellectual proposal might be seen to 
have already granted too much. 
It is at least coherent, then, that a literary caricature is invited or even required by 
certain topics. Here it is not just that a non-prosaic form stands in a non-arbitrary relation 
to certain theories or doctrines that can be stated prosaically (as in Evans' reading of 
Kierkegaard) but that a perspicuous presentation of certain subjects requires that form. 
Similarly, it may well be that Climacus' humorous depiction of Christianity-as-Paradox is 
essentially grounded in the content of Christianity (in the larger-than-life person of 
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Christ), rather than solely a ploy for dispelling illusions. 81 Paradoxically, it may well be 
that 'the message of the cross' is distorted unless it is presented as 'foolishness to the 
Greeks and an offence to the Jews,.82 After all, and despite the history of Christian art, the 
image of a crucified god is no oil painting. 83 
On the proposed model, a central interpretative task is therefore to explore in what 
sense Christianity-as-Paradox 'rings true' of Christianity, and what rhetorical purpose it 
might serve. In the case of the 'problem of pseudonymity' , the task is to detail how and 
why Kierkegaard used, e.g., a 'humourist' (= caricaturist?) to articulate the out-look of 
one on the very brink of a Christian perspective. Or to take a topic of more direct 
relevance to this thesis: the issue is whether Climacus' satirical treatment of Hegel is 
grounded in the kind of project in which Hegel engaged. The expository task is therefore 
to show what features of that project (if any), and what theoretical commitments, justify 
the claim that 'Hegel and Hegelianism are a venture in the comic'. 84 (This is the topic of 
Chapter Two.) Or again, the task is to show in what sense de Silentio's depiction of 
Abraham in terms of a 'teleological suspension of the ethical' illuminates, and in what 
sense it manipulates, the Genesis narrative. 85 
81 In the course of a Conant-inspired reading of Fragments, Stephen Mulhall appears to concede as much. In 
order to register this concession, Mulhall shifts from his typical characterisation of Climacus' project in 
terms of a 'blasphemous parody' to one in terms of caricature: 
After all, a caricature is not an entirely inaccurate portrait of someone; a good caricature exaggerates the 
true features of its subject, and may even give a clearer picture of it than a more faithful representation can 
convey. 
We must therefore ask how Climacus' intellectualized caricature of the god might nen~rtheless indirectly 
convey the true existential challenge embodied in Christian yision and term.inology - might contairI at least 
an echo of the voice of the god as it is reflected by the offended understandmg. (Mulhall (200 1 ), p. 346.) 
82 Cf. I Corinthians 1: 23-4. Francis Dauer claims that a picture 'cannot be seen as a straight portrait' \\ hen 
'the portrayed actualizes the depictionally impossible' ~a~er (l993?, p. ~85). Dauer illustrates . 
'depictionally impossible' by reference to a sId~-~ortraIt ot a m~ ~ .hIS tace unhardened by the burdens ot 
time, his eyes filled with the innocence and 0PUffilsm of youth ... (IbId., p. 272). Dauer says that ~\htlst \\c 
might readily imagine that, on the unrevealed side of the fa~, some ruffled ~alf to~ches the man s 
forehead, it is depictionally impossible that the unrevealed SIde has a_large dlsfigurmg bOIl. Much m 
Kierkegaard suggests that Clliistianity actualizes \\hat we naturally trnd depIctlOnall~ ImpOSSIble. 
83 George Pattison has explored at I~ngth the Kierkeg~ardian theme of the irIadequacies of art vis-a-ns 
Chtistianity. See, for example, PattIson (1999), esp. l h. 6. 
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It seems to me that, if the current polarisation of content- and form-based 
approaches is not to ossify, these tasks call for heuristic work beyond direct exegesis, 
What is needed is an independent understanding of the (possible and actual) targets of 
Kierkegaard's literary projects such that these can be explained, justified, criticised - that 
is, academics need an external vantage-point from which to 'poke around' in texts whose 
import is non-academic,86 If Kierkegaard ultimately eludes 'the lecturers', his work can 
be (philosophically, theologically, historically) contextualised, If Johannes Climacus, for 
example, embodies an attempt to implode the philosophical tradition from within, the 
rationale, means and scope of this attack can be reconstructed, reapplied and critically 
examined,87 (This might be called a 'target-based approach',) Such, at any rate, is the 
kind of interpretative work to which this thesis might contribute, 
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CHAPTER 
ONE Rule-Following: 
The Argument from Regress 
There i.s nothing so unthinkable as thought, 
unless It be the entire absence of thought. 
(Samuel Butler) 
. . .. reflection has no kind of primacy o\"t~r the 
conSCIOusness reflected-on. It is not reflection whIch 
reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite 
the contrary, it is the non-reflectiye consciousness 
which renders reflection possible. 
(Jean-Paul Sartre) 
The story is told of a Chairman who opened a meeting of the Society of Logicians 
with the question, "Before we put the motion: 'That the motion be now put', should we 
not first put the motion, 'That the motion: 'That the motion be now put' be now put'?" It 
seems that, insofar as the members had reason to assent to the first motion's being put, 
they also had reason to assent to the second. And so on, as they say, ad infinitum. 
Supposing that, as keen logicians, they wanted their meeting to begin, they might have 
called this a vicious infinite regress. 
This chapter tells a similar story. In place of the unspecified original motion, is an 
Objectivist Theory of Judgement (OTJ). In place of the second-order motion, is a thesis 
advanced by the OTJ to the effect that rule-following essentially involve acts of retlection 
(Section 1). In place of the Chairman's proposal, is an argument to show that this thesis is 
similarly regressive, that it implies a Regress of Judgements (Section 2). And in place of 
the frustrated logicians, is an objection to the effect that this renders rule-following 
impossible (Section 3). The aim is to see just what this objection amounts to, whether it 
can be sustained, and where it leaves us in relation to the OTJ (Sections 4 and 5). 
The morals to be drawn are broadly as follows. The problem Impl!cit in the 
objection from regress is genuine and important; it is distinct from, and more fundamental 
than, certain regresses of justification and interpretation: it is a central but cntlcally 
neglected aspect ofWittgenstein's so-called rule-following considerations; and it is best 
characterised as a 'Paradox of Constrained Spontaneity'. 
1. The Objectivist Theory of Judgement 
28 
It is plausible to distinguish between two senses of thought. I think that I have my 
dressing gown on as I write this. What makes this thought true is not my thinking it, but 
the fact that I do indeed have my dressing gown on. On the other hand, this thought is 
also rational, and I hope it will playa causal role in determining what I do before leaving 
the house. What is rational (in this sense) is my thinking it.! We can say that what I think 
is an 'object of thought' and that my thinking it is an 'act ofjudgement'.2 And we can say 
that an act of thinking is intentional in so far as it is directed towards an object of thought 
(where the object mayor may not be actual).3 In these terms, it is the task ofa theory of 
judgement (i) to provide a general account of the objects of thought; and (ii) to describe 
the relation between these and the acts of which they are intentional objects. What I shall 
call the Objectivist Theory of Judgement (OTJ) is a broad reconstruction of what, in the 
analytical tradition, is an orthodox set of responses to this challenge. 4 
The OTJ characterizes thought and judgement in terms of the following four 
features. The first pair are features of content (they apply to the objects of thought); the 
second pair are features of form (they describe the relations between objects of thought 
and between these and acts of judgement). Since I shall be concerned primarily with the 
latter two features, the following brief over-view may suffice here. 
1 The point is not that ascriptions ofrationalit~ o~y apply to acts ofth~g ~d not to objects of thought. 
Nor do I intend to say anything about the distmchon between truth and ratIonalIty. These concepts are only 
mentioned by way of introducing the very basic distinction between acts and objects of thought. 
2 Plainly, some instances of my thinking, such as when I merely entertain a thought, are not accurately 
captured by the term 'act of judgement', but I shall be concerned here only with attitudes that judge the 
truth or rationality of thoughts. 
3 For a defence of the thesis that all (' episodic') thought is intentional in this sense, see Knowles ( 1981 ). 
~ The following is better considered as a general theoretical iI·amework than a particular theory. My 
characterisation of the OTJ, howe\'t~r. owes much to the theory of judgement David Bell has attributed to 
Frege (see D. Bell (1979); (1987a)). 
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(i) Thoughts are representational: 
Thoughts represent possible states of affairs, in virtue of which they can be true or false 
and judged as such. Whilst offering widely divergent accounts of the representation 
relation, OTJ theorists agree that it is this feature that essentially distinguishes thoughts 
from other mental phenomena. Thus, for instance, Frege distinguishes between Ideas and 
Thoughts - where, crudely, the former are the stuff of 'mere' psychology (,creations of 
imagination, of sensations, of feelings and moods ,5) and the latter are propositional 
contents ('something for which the question of truth or falsity can arise at all,6). 
(ii) Thoughts are directly communicable: 
Since the identity-conditions of thoughts are, on the whole, non-indexical, two or more 
subjects can have one and the same thought. The thinker-independence of thoughts 
accounts, in turn, for the fact that they are directly communicable. As Michael Dummett 
puts it, ' .. .I can convey to you exactly what I am thinking .. .I do more than tell you what 
my thought is like - I communicate to you that very thought'. 7 If this were not so, basic 
communication would not be possible, for people would not be able to converse about the 
same things. 8 
(iii) Thought can be reflexive: 
One of the things an act of thinking can be about is another thought. Thoughts are thus 
'objective' in the precise sense that they can become objects of thought (a sense in which 
unicorns are objective); and 'reflexive' in the sense that they can be directed towards 
other thoughts. My thought that the mouse is broken, for example, can figure not only as 
the content of an initial act but also as the object of a subsequent act - that it was 
triggered by the need for an example, say. (Simply by registering it, one objectifies a 
thought in this way - an observation that lends primafacie support to theories that treat 
5 Frege (1984), p. 360. 
6 Ibid., p. 355. 
7 Dummett (1978), pp. 116-7. 
8 Jonathan Cohen \Hites: 'When the doctor converses with another doctor about the pain, each has her own 
idea of the pain, but neither idea \"ill be identical with the thought about the pain. It is in virtue of the latter, 
which they share, that they talk and think about the same thing' (Cohen (1998), p. -+ 7). 
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reflexivity as the mark of consciousness.~ Moreover, in accordance with Kant's dictum 
that every object must be given to us in a particular way, thoughts that are the objects of 
other thoughts can be presented in different ways: instead of directly articulating it, I 
might refer to my thought about the mouse by a description such as, 'the thought I 
expressed two sentences ago'. Or I could give it the name 'T l' . 
Note the difference between trivial and significant reflexivity. An example of trivial 
reflexivity would be 'fighting a fight'. This is normally a mere cognate accusative rather 
than a genuine relatum. 'Fighting a fight' just is the activity of fighting - the object of 
fighting is not itself a fight but rather is the opponent being fought. (Conceivably, a 
pacifist might be said to fight a fight in a nontrivial sense - but this, I think, is not a 
genuine example of reflexivity (see Section 3 below).) According to the OTJ, the 
potential for significant reflexivity is an essential feature of thought. (Note that this is not 
to say that all acts of thinking are directed towards thoughts, but that it is distinctive of 
acts of thinking that they can be so directed.) 
(iii) Thoughts are rule-governed: 
Thoughts have internal structures and bear logical relations to each other. If I think that 
the mouse is broken, for instance, I ought not to think that it is not broken. Some OTJ 
theorists argue that I could not do so if I wanted to: thus, according to Manley Thompson, 
'when we accuse someone of illogical (and not just irrational) thought, what we mean is 
that the person's efforts at thought have completely failed'.lO At any rate, we can do as 
well here with the weaker notion of logical constraints or rules: as David Bell puts it, 
'thoughts are gregarious things, they come in trains, they get together to form arguments, 
they stand together in relations of compatibility, incompatibility, relevance and 
entailment'.l1 Notice that, on this definition, all thoughts are 'rule-governed' - both in the 
sense that the internal structure of any given thought is determined by rules, and in the 
sense that this structure determines its relation to other thoughts. 
9 For such a theory see, e.g., Carruthers (1992). 
10 Thompson (1981), p. 471. 
11 D. Bell (l987b), p. 225. 
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Now it should be fairly clear why this is called an 'objectivist' theory. Thoughts 
represent reality (feature (i)); they are thinker-independent (feature (ii)); they can be 
intentional objects (feature (iii)); and they are governed by objective rules (feature (iv)). 
Whilst there is an obvious sense in which thoughts are also 'subjective' - after all, 
thoughts are had and judged by thinkers - the OTJ theorist will typically view this fact as 
of limited interest to philosophy, a matter for empirical psychology. The OTJ does, 
however, have something to say about the relation between subjective acts and objective 
thoughts. This may be introduced by considering the relationship between the four 
'objective' features. The OTJ, as envisioned here, further advances the following three 
theses which describe the interdependence of (i)-(iv): 
A: Mental acts are directly communicable only if they have representational content. 
B: Mental acts have representational content only if they are rule-governed. 
C: Mental acts are rule-governed only if they are reflected upon. 
For present purposes, the briefest attempt to motivate Theses A and B may suffice: our 
focus shall be on Thesis C. I2 Consider a non-representational content such as my feeling 
of nausea. Now you may well have experienced a qualitatively indistinguishable feeling, 
but however directly I attempt to express my feeling of nausea - by exclaiming 'ugh!' 
perhaps - you will not have the same experience just in virtue of that utterance. The 
contrast is with my thought about the mouse, say, which I can communicate directly such 
that you think one and the same thought. Hence the claim that representationality is a sine 
qua non of that which is directly communicable (Thesis A).13 
As for the claim that being rule-governed is distinctive of that which is 
representational, consider my perceptual awareness of the mouse on my desk. 14 On a 
traditional account, this awareness is immediate and direct. 15 It is not necessary that I 
12 Nothing in the main argument of this chapter turns on the plausibility or otherwise of Theses A and B. 
These are introduced solely for the expository purpose of situating Thesis C. 
13 This might be taken to support the further claim that the identity conditions of feelings are essentially 
indexical - but there may be other ways of accounting for this difference between thoughts and feelings. 
14 Here, and in the following, 'is a necessary condition of, 'is an essential condition of and 'is distinctive 
of are used synonymously to describe the relation..rr only ifY. As I suggest belo\\', ho\\eyer, there is a sense 
of essential conditions or distinctive marks that is not synonymous with necessary conditions. 
15 'On a traditional account' because the yery notion of immediate awareness has come under sustained 
attack in recent "ears. Donald Davidson, Wilfred Sellars, John McDowell and others object to 'scheme-
reflect on my experience in order to have it. And I cannot be wrong about it qua 
awareness. The contrast here is with my judgement that the mouse is on the desk: in order 
to represent ('re-present') my perceptual awareness so as to judge it I must select between 
possible representations (e.g. the mouse is under the desk); and in order to do that, I must 
have reflected on the relative merits of the representation I did in fact select. In short, I 
must think about a representation in order to judge it: an example of significant 
reflexivity. But such choices are surely reason-dependent, and choosing between 
representations would not be possible were they not logically constrained. 16 
Thesis C is thus implicit in the idea that performing judgements involves a prior 
process of rule-governed reflection on possible representations. (Note the primary status 
of C vis-a-vis A and B: together, these say that reflexivity is distinctive of rule-governed 
acts, which are in turn distinctive of representational content, which is in tum distinctive 
of that which is directly communicable.) Moreover, the explicit claim that mental acts are 
rule-governed only if they are reflected upon can itself seem very compelling, even 
truistic. The claim is simply that in order for a mental act to count as an act of rule-
following it must be based on or brought into conformity with rules, and that one must 
reflect on one's acts in order so to regulate them. 
This claim is compelling inasmuch as human thinkers follow rules not just in 
sense that that they conform to them but also in the sense that they are guided by them. 
Being guided by logical norms is surely an essential condition of what it means to think. 
But the notion of one's being guided by a rule certainly seems to involve the subjective 
matter of one's being, as it were, in a position to heed the guidance. Consider an analogy. 
According to a venerable philosophical tradition, moral action requires not only one's 
conforming to the rules of morality, but also one's acting on the basis of those rules. It is 
not good enough to do the right thing for the wrong reason. As David Bloor puts it: 
content dualism' and the so-called 'Mvth of the Given' on the grounds that all content is conceptually 
mediated (see, e.g., Sellars (1956); D~vidson (1984); McDowell (1994)). The point here is mer~ly to se~ up 
a sharp contrast with judgement for the purposes of exposition and no suggestIOn that the aT J IS commItted 
to any particular theory of perception is intended. 
16 Of course the ,vord 'choice' here is not supposed to imply that acts of representing are under the direct 
control of the will. On the contrary, the point is that (according to the OTJ) the mind must select from 
different possible interpretations and that this process of selection is rule-governed. 
Long before rigorists talked of the categorical imperative, irreverent street urchins would have 
been making a version of the same point. 'Get out!', orders the voice of authority: '1 was going 
an~ay', comes the reply. This is not only impertinent, it is philosophically astute. 1fyou are 
gomg anyway (i.e. going of your own volition and in accordance with your own purposes), then 
you are not going because of the order. An order to do X is only obeyed if X is done, and done 
only because of the order and with the intention of obeying it. I? 
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Noting Wittgenstein's appeal to an analogy between following a rule and obeying an 
order (e.g. Philosophical Investigations §206), Bloor goes on to endorse a 
'conscientiousness condition', according to which a rule is followed if and only if 'the 
actors bring about the conformity of their behaviour with the rule by intending to follow 
it. They must, as it were, have the rule before their mind as their guide and goal' .18 That 
is, according to Bloor, rule-following essentially involves acts of reflection. 
Similarly, Phillip Pettit argues that two plausible assumptions - that the rules that 
govern thought are normative or action-guiding and that these are capable of being 
followed by humans - generates the following requirement: 
... not only should a rule be normative over an indefmite variety of applications, it should be 
determinable or identifiable by a finite subject independently of any particular application: the 
rule-follower should be in a position to identify the rule in such a manner that he can sensibly try 
to be faithful to it in application. If the rule were identified by reference in part to how the subject 
responded in a given case, then the subject could not see the rule as something to which he should 
try to be faithful in that case. He could not see it as a nonnative constraint for him to try to respect 
there. 19 
According to the OTJ, then, we cannot so much as make sense of the idea of one's 
following an action-guiding rule unless one has the capacity to determine and identify the 
rule in advance of one's 'trying to remain faithful' to it. 20 
17 Bloor (1997), pp. 43-4. 
18 Ibid., p. 44. 
19 Pettit (1990), p. 3. In this paper, Pettit develops an approach that aims both to satisfy t~s requirement and 
avoid the problem introduced below. Pettit is therefore not in general a good representatIve of the OT.!, 
which I am setting up as innocent of attention to that problem. N~netheless.the q~oted ~assage d?es nIcely 
articulate the motivation for the problematic thesis. Whether PettIt does satlsfy hIS requrrements IS of course 
another matter. 
:0 Compare also Alexander Miller's claim that being guided by rules is 'what distinguishes ~e from some 
machine that, by some cosmic accident, churns out tokens of 'red' in the presence (and only m the 
presence) of red things' (Mil~er (2000), p. 172); and Saul ~pke's cl~~ th~t rules 'should tell.me.w~at ,to. 
do in each new instance' CKripke (1982), p. 24); and TOmO]1 Shogen]1 s clam that rule-folltmmg ill\ oh es 
both conformity and 'subscription' to a rule (Shogenji (2000). p. 503). 
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There is an important caveat here. For it might be thought that the motivation for 
Thesis C depends on a version of internalism (and therefore implies the falsehood of 
externalism). Externalists typically reject the principle that my judgement that pis 
justified or rational if and only if I judge that my judgement that p is justified or rational. 
So perhaps an externalist would deny what Thesis C asserts, namely, that in order for a 
mental act to count as an act of rule-following it must be reflected upon by a thinker? 
The externalist might deny this. But her theory of justification at least does not 
commit her to doing so. For it is entirely consistent with this epistemological doctrine that 
we do reflectively form beliefs in accordance with rules, and that such reflection is of the 
essence of rule-following. The externalist need only deny the relevance of this kind of 
reflection to the ascription of the epistemic status of justification or rationality to objects 
of belief; her claim is that it is possible to be justified by a rule that is not internally 
followed. But she need not - she should not - deny that a plausible theory of judgement 
must account for rule-following and that it must therefore articulate the conditions for acts 
of thinking, as well as objects of thought, being rule-governed. (All the same, it is worth 
noting that externalists do generally have problems in accounting for how agents, as 
opposed to beliefs, are justified or rationa1.21) 
But Thesis C provides an obvious response to precisely that demand - namely, 
that acts are rule-governed just in case they are regulated by other acts. On this well-
motivated view, then, the fact that thoughts can be the objects of other thoughts plays an 
essential role in rule-following. 
2. The Regress of Judgements 
Hopefully, the foregoing is sufficient to indicate the elegance and plausibility of a 
broadly' 0 bjectivist' theory of judgement. Yet there is a problem with Thesis C that 
threatens to undermine the whole edifice. Ostensibly, the worry is straightforward. 
According to Thesis C, if one is to perform a rule-governed judgement one must first take 
21 Linda Zagzebski cites the example of Tolstoy's Oblonsky who 'adhere~ t~nnly to the news of the 
ma'ority, as e\:pressed by his paper, and changed them only when the maJonty changed thelfs~ or rather he, 
d 'd
J t' hanoe them - they changed imperceptibly of their 0\\11 accord', On the assumptlon that Oblonsky s 
1 no c 1:' - ' d th " , 
liberal paper is a reliable source of truth, the e\..1ernalist / reliab,ilist seems comnutte to e counter-mtUltlve 
vicw that Oblonsky is paradigmatically rational, See Zagzebskl (1996), pp, 305-6, 
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that judgement as an object of thought. But then, by parity of reasoning, in order to take 
the rule-governed act as an object of thought one must first take the act-of-which-the-
rule-governed-thought-is-its-object, as an object of thought and so on ad infinitum. IfT(x) 
is the act of thinking about x and t is a rule-governed object, the regress is represented 
thus: 
... T(T(T(t))) ... T (T(t)) ... T(t). 
Notice first that this regress is distinct from two other kinds of regress, more often 
invoked in connection with rule-following. First, there is the Regress of Rules. This arises 
in the context of questions of the form, 'On what basis should such-and-such a rule be 
followed?' If the answer to such questions comes by way of a second-order rule for 
evaluating candidates for the first-order rule, or for stipulating its correct application, it 
looks as though we need a third-order rule, and so on. This regress has long constituted a 
defining problematic within epistemology and is intimately linked with the ubiquitous 
Regress of Justifications. (To see the link, witness Descartes' claim that whatever is 
clearly and distinctly perceived is true: this criterion is supposed to secure a foundation 
for knowledge but it raises the question on what grounds it is justified.) 
Second, there is the Regress of Interpretations. This arises in the context of 
questions of the form, 'In virtue of what should such-and-such a rule be applied thus-and-
so?' If the answer to this comes by way of an interpretation of the rule - as it seems it 
must - it looks as though we need an interpretation of the interpretation, and so on. The 
Regress of Interpretations is most often associated with the work of the later Wittgenstein 
and is perhaps most vividly introduced by his example of the awkward pupil who applies 
the rule '+2' up to 1000 but subsequently proceeds, '1004', '1008', '1012' ... Wittgenstein 
asks: In virtue of what does this pupil go wrong?22 In Section 3 below, I shall make some 
remarks about the relation between these regresses~ and in Section 4, I shall bring certain 
ofWittgenstein's remarks to bear. For now, we can simply note that the present regress-
call it the Regress of Judgements - arises in the context of questions of the form, 'What 
kind of subjectivity is implied by the concept of rule-following?, 
22 C f. PI § 1 85. 
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The pressing question is just in what sense the Regress of Judgements is supposed 
to be vicious. The rich vein of infinite regress arguments in diverse philosophical contexts 
suggest the following three options:23 
(a) Medical Impossibilities: 
The basic idea here is that human subjects are finite - i.e. temporally or causally limited -
and therefore cannot perform infinitely many or complex acts. In a paper on regresses of 
justified belief, for instance, John Williams claims that whilst 'it may be logically 
possible ... to perform an infinite number of tasks in a finite time' this feat is not 'humanly' 
or 'psychologically' possible?4 This is because 'the human mind is finite' and 'it is 
contingently true that there is a minimum time in which a man could consider a 
proposition,.25 Williams is clearly appealing to what, in another context, Russell dubbed 
'medical impossibilities' in showing what is vicious about a justificatory regress. 
(b) Explanatory Impossibilities: 
To explain X in terms ofY where Y demands the same explanation as X is to explain 
nothing. A theory that does this is 'circular' or 'question-begging'. Patterson Brown, for 
instance, has forcibly argued that this is the nub of cosmological arguments for the 
existence of God.26 Brown notes that these arguments depend on two assumptions: the 
transitivity of certain causal relations and a 'quasi-legalistic' reading of 'cause'. This 
latter assumption is the sense of a cause as responsible for, as opposed to its being merely 
concomitant of, its effect. Then the argument is roughly that an adequate explanation of a 
given effect must refer to a cause for which the question of what is responsible for it does 
not arise - and the only cause which fits this bill is supposed to be God. 
Whatever we make of the substance of this argument it is surely formally correct 
that, given that something demands a certain kind of explanation, it is question-begging to 
invoke something else which demands that very same kind of explanation. 27 To object to 
23 The following is not intended as an exhaustive taxonomy of infinite regress arguments. For attempts to 
provide such a taxonomy, see Stanford (1984); Day (1987). 
24 J. Williams (1981), p. 85. 
25 Ibid., p. 86. 
26 See Brown, (1 %6) 
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an 'explanation' of this kind is also sometimes referred to as an objection from 'infmite 
postponement': as Henry Johnstone puts it, 'a series of postponements begins, or shortly 
becomes, a series of repetitions, and repetitions adumbrate nothing - they amount to no 
more than an inane stammering,.28 
( c) Logical Impossibilities: 
A third way to demonstrate that a given regress is vicious is to argue that infinite 
regresses are, ipso jacto, logically absurd. To show that a theory implies an infinite 
regress is, on this account, to produce a reductio ad absurdum. Witness a famous 
argument ofRyle's: 
By the original argument, therefore, our intellectual planning process must inherit its title to 
shrewdness from yet another interior process of planning to plan, and this process could in tum be 
silly or shrewd. The regress is infmite, and this reduces to absurdity the theory that for an 
operation to be intelligent it must be steered by a prior intellectual operation. 29 
Unfortunately Ryle does not intimate just why the regress 'reduces to absurdity' the 
theory he is attacking.30 But the thought is readily supplied in terms of the logical (rather 
than medical) impossibility - of finite beings completing an infinite process. Presumably, 
the absurdity lies in calling one and the same thing both finite and infinite.31 
So which of these options supports an objection to the OTJ from the Regress of 
Judgements? Option (a) is far too weak. The mere observation that humans cannot, as a 
matter of fact, perform infinitely many tasks is of rather limited philosophical interest, 
27 David Annstrong describes what makes a regress vicious in these terms, citing the analogy of a man 
without funds who writes cheques to cover his debts, ad infinitum. See Armstrong (1978) pp. 19-21. 
28 Johnstone (1996), p. 96. A related but different way of showing that a regress is vicious on explanatory 
grounds simply appeals to Occam's Razor. George Schlesinger, for example, claims that a regress of 
physical or metaphysical entities is vicious because we should ' ... avoid the ontological extravagance 
involved in admitting the chain of entities, for whose existence there is no independent evidence' 
(Schlesinger (1983), p. 221, cited in Day (1987), p. 156). 
29 Ryle (1949), p. 31-2. 
30 In fact, this passage is sometimes read in terms of infmite postponement rather than logical absurdity. 
See, for instance, M. Williams (1980), p. 213. 
31 There may, however, be other ways of cashing out the alleged logical impossibility here. 1. P. Moreland, 
for instance: refers to the logical impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, illustrating this claim by 
inviting us to count down from infmity (i.e. ~o) (see Moreland (2001), p. 25). Compare also Roderick 
Chisholm's claim that' [0 ]ne is confronted with a vicious infinite regress ,,·hen one attempts a task of the 
following sort: Every step needed to begin the task requires a preliminary skp' (Chisholm, (19%). p. 5~ ) 
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given that philosophers typically take their theories to stand independently of empirical 
research.32 At any rate, this 'empirical' claim relies, as Williams admits, on 'the intuition 
that the human mind is finite,.33 If this is reducible to the genuinely empirical claim that 
humans die, this leaves wide open whether humans can perform infinitely many acts 
within their lifetimes (not to mention whether there is life before or after death). On the 
other hand, if Williams' intuition is supposed to have a more deeply philosophical 
content, we have stopped dealing with medical impossibilities. In short, this is the 
question whether it is logically possible for finite beings to perform an infinite number of 
acts (i.e. a question that falls under option (c) above) - a possibility Williams admits. 
Option (b) certainly looks more promising. Notice first, however, the putative 
distinction between a demand for understanding or analysis and a demand for explanation 
or genealogy.34 It is plausible that an adequate explanation of any e or the act of B-ing, 
however otherwise construed, is not reducible to the correct analysis of the concept e or 
the act of B-ing. For example: I might be able to correctly supply criteria for headaches 
without being able to give an adequate explanation of how head-aches come about. 
Arguably, then, the OT] theorist need make no pretensions to a full-blooded genealogy of 
rule-governed acts: Thesis C, for example, does not purport to explain rule-governed acts 
in terms of prior acts of reflection, but rather to analyze the concept of rule-following in 
terms of such acts. Yet we might in any case formulate (b) in terms of understanding 
rather than explanation so that the claim would be that the Regress of Judgements renders 
the performance of rule-governed acts unintelligible. In principle, the charge of infinite 
postponement would still hold. 
Now of course the OTJ theorist may well point to objective features other than 
rule-governed acts in his analysis of those acts. He may, for example, require not only 
that such acts are governed by acts of reflection, but also that they satisfy certain truth- or 
assertability-conditions (i.e. features that accrue from the relations between objects of 
thought). But the problem is how the OTJ theorist is to make sense of the particular 
32 Of course, the emergence of 'cognitive science' and 'evolutionary psychol?gy' in recent ye~s.represents 
a brake with this tradition. Suffice it to say here that many philosophers contmue to operate Within the 
tradition that concepts, rather than empirical data, comprise the domain of philosophical research. 
~J J. Williams (198\), p. 85. 
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analysis embodied by Thesis C. One strategy might be to argue that truth- or assertability-
conditions somehow stop the regress, in much the way that 'self-evident' or 'properly 
basic' beliefs are supposed to stop the justificatory regress in foundationalist 
epistemologies. But clearly the notion that there is some point in our thinking at which we 
directly intuit truth- or assertability-conditions would be tantamount to rejecting Thesis C 
- less a counter-objection than a capitulation. 
There is, however, a line of argument that purports to show that the OTJ can 
account for the performance of rule-governed acts in terms of objective features, even 
though the theory does indeed imply infinitely many acts. In other words, this argument 
aims to show that the regress is benign rather than vicious. Consider an argument of 
Peirce's. In a section on 'Whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous 
cognition', Peirce develops the following 'aid to thinking', to show that there is not: 
Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of that line serve to measure 
(so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A point, having no length, will on 
this principle represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line below another 
represent a cognition which determines the cognition represented by that other and which has the 
same object as the latter. Let the fmite distance between two such lines represent that they are two 
different cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether "there must be a firsf'. Suppose 
an inverted triangle to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or instant, the surface of the 
water makes a horizontal line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a 
subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents 
another cognition of the same object determined by the fonner, and having a livelier 
consciousness. The apex of the triangle represents the object external to the mind, which 
determines both these cognitions. 35 
Translating Peirce's terms into those with which we are dealing is fairly natural. 
Substitute talk of objects 'quite out of consciousness' and 'external to the mind' with 
thinker-independent rules, and represent one of these by 'R'~ replace 'cognition' with 'act 
of judgement', represented by the schema 'T(x)'~ and define relative 'liveliness of 
consciousness' in terms of the relative distance between an act of judgement and its 
primary object so that, e.g., a judgement of the form T(t) is more lively than one of the 
form T(T(t». Then we get the following adaptation of Peirce's Triangle: 
34 It is debatable whether this distinction applies to philosophical theories For defence of the claim that it 
does see Blackbwn (1984), esp. p. 210 and passim ~ Price (1988). 
35 Peirce (1958), p. 37. 
T(t) 
T(T(t» 
T(T(T(t») 
T(T(T(T(t»» 
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Peirce goes on to point out that the claim that there must be some cognition of an object 
which is not determined by any previous cognition is like saying that, when the triangle is 
dipped into water, there must be a line made by the surface of the water lower than which 
no other line can be made. But there is reason to think there is no such line: 
... draw the line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you please can be assigned at fmite 
distances below it and below one another. For any such section is at some point above the apex, 
otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be a. Then there have been similar sections at the 
distances liz a, 'l4 a, 1/8 a, Ih6a, and so on as far as you please. So it is not true that there must be a 
fIrst. 36 
Peirce asserts that the 'logical difficulties of this paradox ... are identical with those of the 
Achilles'. (That is, I take it, the paradox associated with Achilles - viz. how is it possible 
to get form A to B, given that distances are infinitely divisible - is analogous to the 
problem Peirce takes himself to be treating - viz. how it is possible to successfully 
perform a judgement, given that this requires an infinite series of mental acts.) But he 
says that for the purposes of denying that 'there must be a first' he does not much care 
how we handle such puzzles: 'Deny motion ifit seems proper to do so: only then deny the 
process of determination of one cognition by another ... The point here insisted on is not 
this or that logical solution to the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a process 
of beginning, as any other change comes to pass'. 37 Adding an arrow to the triangle, to 
indicate the conditions on the possibility ofT(t), yields this: 
36 Ibid., p. 38. 
37 Idem. 
lL(t) 
lL(lL(t)) 
lL(lL(lL(t))) 
lL(lL(lL(lL(t)))) 
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So, on this picture, even though there is indeed an infinite series of conditions on the 
possibility of lL(t) - represented in the diagram by the gap between Rand lL(lL(lL(lL(t))))-
the condition that counts, for the purposes of understanding, is whatever R it is that 
governs t, the apex of the triangle. For just as Achilles can pass through infinitely many 
distances, the argument might go, so a rule can extend across infinitely many acts. 
Exactly how it is possible for finite beings to perform an infinite number of acts will 
depend on how we explain Achilles. One thing is clear: just as our account of how it is 
possible for Achilles to get from points A to B must ultimately assume a determinate 
point B, so our account of how a rule-governed act is possible must ultimately make 
reference to the rule itself ('R' in the diagram), qua thinker-independent relation between 
objects of thought. (Note that this is where the alleged regresses of Rules and 
Interpretations kick in: these can be taken to show that there is, as it were, no apex.) 
lLhe Peircian-style counter-objection to the charge that OlL] renders rule-following 
unintelligible because it implies a regress of judgements, then, is that the regress only 
renders rule-following as problematic as motion - and to the extent that there is a way of 
understanding motion even though distances are infinitely divisible, a similar 
understanding is available to the OlL] theorist. 
Now one may well object here that Zeno's paradoxes do seriously undermine 
those (atomistic) theories that support the claim that space is infinitely divisible and that 
therefore conceive motion as an infinite process. After all, Zeno is usually held to have 
devised the paradoxes precisely in order to show that we ought to reject such theories. 
And Peirce's gesture towards a 'process of beginning' surely requires further explication. 
But this is not the place to discuss possible solutions to the paradoxes of motion. So, for 
the sake of argument, I shall simply grant the counter-objection and assume that the 
Regress of Judgements is, from an explanatory point of view, benign. 
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In this light, we may be tempted by the stronger claim of (c): viz. that any theory 
that implies an infinite regress is eo ipso objectionable because infmite regresses are 
logically absurd. Unfortunately, this claim cannot be taken for granted, even in its most 
general form. Consider the following argument derived from a formulation of Dale 
Jacquette's, which purports to prove that it is too strong:38 
(1) A theory is objectionable on the grounds that an infinite regress is logically absurd iff 
the theory nontrivially implies an infinite regress. 
(2) A conclusion is logically absurd iff it is implied by inconsistent premises. 
(3) Inconsistent premises never nontrivially imply an infinite regress. 
(4) So, no theory is objectionable on the grounds that an infinite regress is absurd. 
The key notion here is the distinction between a trivial and a nontrivial regress. Here, 
according to Jacquette, is a trivial regress: 
p and not-p 
Therefore: q, not-q, r, not-r, s, not-s, ... , 
This argument is classically valid: a contradiction implies any and every proposition. 
Now (1) of Jacquette' s argument says that if a theory is to be objectionable on the 
grounds of infinite regress the 'regress' cannot be of this kind. This is partly because it 
would be pointless to criticize a theory on the grounds of its implying an infinite regress if 
this were the result of a logical contradiction, since showing that it is contradictory is 
enough. But it is also incoherent to fault a theory for implying an infinite regress in terms 
of logical impossibility if the regress is logically necessary. Premise (2) simply embodies 
the classical interpretation of valid inference: consistent assumptions are jointly true in 
some possible world and logically absurd conclusions are false in every possible world. 
Premise (3) may seem ambitious, but is supposed to merely make explicit the fact that a 
logical inconsistency - of the formp and not-p - implies any and every proposition. If a 
theory really is logically inconsistent, any implied regress will be analyzable to the 
'regress' above~ i.e. one that trivially implies any and every proposition. 
38 S~e lacquette (1996). 
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There are several ways in which one might quibble with this argument An 
immediate worry, for example, is that a contradiction does not give rise to a regress, not 
even a 'trivial' one, but rather an infinite list of consequences. For the repetition of some 
common form or pattern between one step and the next seems part and parcel of the very 
notion of a regress.39 Another worry might be that Jacquette simply assumes (in (3» that 
all logically inconsistent premises are of the form p and not-p and thus begs the question 
whether infinite regress constitutes an independent form of inconsistency. Or, contra the 
orthodox view, it might be argued that since a pseudo-statement of the form p and not-p 
is strictly senseless it makes no sense to infer its 'consequences'. Or one might try to find 
counter-examples to (3). 
I propose, however, to grant Jacquette's counter-objection to the global kind of 
objection to theories that imply an infinite regress in category (c) above. (This concession 
seems especially judicious given that, even if Jacquette' s argument fails, the claim that 
there is a logical absurdity in calling one and the same thing both finite and infinite is far 
from unproblematic.) This not only has the dialectical virtue of conceding ground for the 
sake of argument but also, as it turns out, the heuristic advantage of allowing us to 
uncover the root of the problem with Thesis C above. For I shall argue that the problem 
indicated by the Regress of Judgements does not in fact consist in its being a regress. 
3. The First Step 
Even granted that (a)-(c) offer no quick way to show that the Regress of 
Judgements is vicious, I believe that it does raise a genuine conceptual puzzle. To see 
why, we need to formulate the objection a little more carefully: 
(1) An act governed by a given rule, {}, is successfully performed iff it stands in 
an irreflexive relation R to a {}-governed act. 
(2) There are {}-governed acts. 
(3) There is a sequence of infinite range of {}-governed acts, each of which stands in 
relation R to its successor. (From (1) & (2». 
(4) There is no such sequence (on the grounds of options (a), (b) or (c) above). 
39 Jacquette might look to Thomas Aquinas tor support ~or the notion o~ a trivial regr~~s. Aqu~as . 
distinguished per se from per accidens regresses partly III tenns of the former compnsmg no~ J~st a list of 
members, but an ordering of members in the sequence, and argued that per se regresses are nClOUS whereas 
per accidens regresses are not (see Moreland (200 l). p. 25). 
(5) There both is and is not such a sequence. 
(6) Either (1) or (2) is false. 
(7) The OTJ implies both (1) and (2). 
(8) Therefore, the OTJ is false. 
Let's start with (7). According to Thesis C, it is only in virtue of a 8-governed act's being 
an object of other acts that it can be successfully performed. This generates the irreflexive 
relation: A is a prior condition of the possibility ofB. (That this relation is irreflexive is 
important for (3) because reflexive relations imply circularity rather than regression.) It 
follows that a subject's successful performance of a 8-governed act presupposes her 
having performed a second-order act of which the first-order act is its object. But the 
point surely is this. This second-order act is a token of the same type: that is, as (1) makes 
explicit, both acts are 8-governed. For, to perform an act of which a 8-governed act is its 
object (the prior, second-order act which, according to Thesis C is necessary for the first-
order act to count as rule-governed) is surely just to perform a 8-governed act. 
This is the first step of the regress, but we already have a deeply paradoxical 
situation: namely, that one must already have performed a 8-governed act in order to 
perform a 8-governed act. Take, for instance, my judgement that 5+2=7 is a correct 
application of the rule '+2'. If this is a rule-governed act, as it surely is, and if reflective 
appraisal is necessary for it's successful performance, then in order for me to make this 
judgement I must have already judged that the judgement that [5+2=7 is a correct 
application of the rule '+2'] is a correct application of the rule '+2'. (The person who 
claims he can think about the thought that 5+2=7 but cannot actually perform the 
operation '+2' is simply confused.) A regress looms. But that is not really the problem at 
all. The problem is that I must already have correctly applied the rule '+2' in order so 
much as to begin to apply it. 
At this point, it might be suggested that the OTJ need not even imply the first step 
of the regress. For, can we not postulate a single act that judges itself, rather than a 
distinct, prior, second-order act that judges the primary judgement?4o Now it is worth 
noting that this would require a modification of Thesis C. The original claim was that, in 
order for an act to be rule-governed, a subject must have thought about that very act: now 
10 In the ne:\t Chapter, I shall show how certain strands of Hegel's thought can be construed as attempting to 
adopt something like this strategy of responding to a regress of judgements. 
the requirement is that the subject must have thought about that very act without this 
involving the performance of any other act. Is this requirement even coherent? 
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We noted before a sense of 'fighting a fight' that might be significant~ namely, the 
pacifist who fights against fighting. Now this is a rather paradoxical characterisation of 
the pacifist: in fact, it only makes sense if we interpret the first instance of' fight' in, 'to 
fight a fight', in a different way to the second. Were this not so, the pacifist's activity 
would be pragmatically self-stu1tifying~ he would be undermining his own aims. What 
this shows is that 'fighting a fight', even if it can be given a significant interpretation, is 
not a genuine reflexive relation. But the reason why it is not reflexive also points to what 
is wrong about the idea that there might be a single act that judges itself~ namely, that 
such an act would cancel itself out. For, given the basic act-object model, an act that has 
itself as its own object would not be a judgement at all - it would have nothing judgeable 
left to judge. Indeed, this follows directly from the OT], s definition of thoughts as acts 
directed towards representations~ an act that is not so directed is not a judgement. Such an 
act has lost the raison d'etre ofajudgement,just as 'This is a statement' has lost the 
raison d 'e tre of a statement. It is as though one were trying to fish for one's own net.·H 
This way of revealing what is wrong with the Regress of Judgements bears out a 
striking remark of Wittgenstein' s: 
The reasoning that leads to an infInite regress is to be given up not 'because in this way we can never reach 
the goal' but because here there is no goal; so it makes no sense to say "we can never reach it". 
We readily think that we must run through a few steps of the regress and then so to speak give up in 
despair. Whereas its aimlessness ... can be derived from the starting position 42 
In this light, we can see that, strictly speaking, steps (3)-(6) of the objection from regress 
are redundant. According to Jacquette, 'the challenge for opponents of infinite regress is 
to pinpoint the logical absurdity in the assumptions of infinitely regressive theories under 
41 Compare here Wittgenstein on 'the Liar': 
... He might have written "This proposition is false" instead of "I am lying". The answer would be: "Very 
welL but which proposition do you meanT' - "Well this proposition". - "I understand, but which is the 
proposition mentioned in itT' - "This one" - "Good. and which proposition does it refer toT' and so on. 
Thus he would be unable to explain what he means until he passes to a complete proposition. - We may 
also say: The fundamental error lies in one's thinking that a phrase e.g. "This proposition" can as it \\ere 
allude to its object (point to it from far off) \yithout having to go proxy for it (Z §691). 
42 Z §693. Peter Geach paraphrases this remark as follows: ' ... often when philosophers think the trouble is a 
vicious regress. the real trouble arises already at the fIrst step: if it is rightly diagnosed there, we can forget 
about the regress' (Geach (1979), p. 100). 
criticism, and if they cannot do so satisfactorily, for the time being at least, to withhold 
criticism,.43 Well, it appears that the OTJ implies the following: 44 
(1 ') If S began to follow rule R at time tl, then S followed R at some earlier time, tl 
46 
To echo Wittgenstein, the problem is not so much that the OTJ implies that the goal of 
performing an rule-governed act can never be reached, but that the theory cannot so much 
as coherently characterize the goal - its aimlessness can be derived from its starting 
position. This is surely enough to show that there is indeed a logical or conceptual 
problem with Thesis C, not a mere medical impossibility or explanatory deficiency due to 
its regressive quality. 
The general kind of problem here is nicely illustrated by a little cameo in Jostein 
Gaarder's novel, Maya. Frank is accustomed to drinking a little gin to help him get to 
sleep. One night, he is shocked to find Gordon the gecko clinging stubbornly to his only 
bottle. Frank dislikes reptiles and muses as follows: 
I could almost certainly have conquered the smidgen of repugnance I felt at coming into contact 
with that conscious reptile if I'd fIrst been able to take a few stiff pulls at the gin. But the nicety 
here lay in the very sequence of events. I had to imbibe the bottle's contents before I dared to 
raise it to my mouth. The situation was at deadlock, and this little horror drama was to last much 
longer than I had imagined; I was tired and I hadn't the courage to lie down and sleep next to a 
gecko before I'd had some of my sleeping-draught. 45 
Just as Frank needs to have had a dram of his gin in order to get to his gin, so Thesis C 
implies that one needs to already have followed a rule before one can begin to follow it. 
Now, if the OTJ implies (1) of the argument from regress, it should be clear that it 
also implies (2); that there are, in fact, rule-governed acts is admitted by the OTJ. Notice 
that the objection shows that either (1) or (2) is false: either it is not the case that 
~3 Jacquette (1996), p. 117. 
44 Strictly speaking, the OT J only implies (1 a) if it admits the possibility of the antecedent of this claim. 
That is, I'm assuming here that the OT J must account for the possibility that subjects begin to follow rules 
at certain times (where the fact that it implies (1 a) shows that it cannot). Admittedly, the Peircean-style 
counter-objection discussed above might be seen to challenge this assumption, roughly on the grounds that 
cognitive beginnings are infmite processes rather than discrete acts. Whilst granting, for the sake of 
argument, this \\ ay of legitimising explanations that invoke an infmite regress of acts, howen~r, I have not 
granted that the idea that subjects begin to follow a rule at a certain time is incoherent. But if this is so much 
as a coherent possibility then any theory of judgement must account for its being so. In any case. it is surely 
highly plausible that, pace Pierce, we do indeed begin to follow rules at certain times. 
45 Gaarder (2001). p. 89. 
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reflection is necessary for rule-governed acts or there are no rule-governed acts. It is 
interesting to note in this connection that the regresses of Justifications and Interpretations 
(see Section 1 above) are commonly taken to undermine (2). 
Saul Kripke's famous 'sceptical solution' to the puzzle raised by the Regress of 
Interpretations, for example, aims to save (2) by replacing a truth-conditional account of 
rule-following with one based on assertability conditions.46 Happily, the details of this 
solution need not detain us here.47 The present point is a dialectical one: viz. the structure 
of the argument from regress shows that, even if (2) can be rescued in the way Kripke 
proposes, there remains an intractable problem for any theory committed to (1). To be 
sure, if the upshot ofKripke's solution were a theory of judgement that did not imply (1), 
then Kripke would have disarmed the Regress of Judgements. But, to my knowledge, 
Kripke advances no such theory. 
Arguably, then, the Regress of Interpretations, which has been the focus of the 
greater part of work on rule-following to date - where many ofKripke's many critics 
share his basic problematic - is parasitic on the Regress of Judgements. For, even if there 
is a way of interpreting a thought or linguistic sign as rule-governed, it remains obscure 
how we are to account for its successful judgement. To flesh out this claim about the 
dialectical status of the Regress of Judgements a little further: let T(x) be the act of 
thinking about x and let t be a rule-governed thought~ let J mark the irreflexive relation 
'( ... ) justifies ( ... )'~ let I mark the irreflexive relation '( ... ) interprets (. .. )'~ and let C mark 
the irreflexive relation '(. .. ) is a prior condition of the possibility of ( ... )'. Then we get the 
following representations of the three regresses: 
... , (T(tn)) J (T(tn-l)), ... , (T (tl)) J (T(t)). [The Regress of Rules.] 
... , (T(tn)) I (T(tn-l)), ... , (T(tl)) I (T(t))). [The Regress of Interpretations.] 
... , (T(T(T(t))) C (T(T(t))) C (T(t)). [The Regress of Judgements.] 
My point is simple. All three regress, whatever else they are regresses of, are regresses of 
judgements. That is, they are all essentially of the form, 
46 Sec Kripke (1982). 
47 I shall. howeYl.-'f, have something to say about Kripke's position in Chapter Four. 
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... T(t) ... T(t) ... T(t) ... 
So, if our diagnosis of the problem raised by the Regress of Judgements is right, it follows 
that any epistemology that implies a Regress of Justifications cannot account for the 
performance of justified acts; and any theory that implies a Regress of Interpretations 
cannot account for the performance of acts of interpretation. In the former case, this 
chimes with a point sometimes made in connection with justificatory regresses: namely, 
that if any judgement is justified by an infinite regress all judgements are justified and 
since not all judgements are in fact justified none are justified by an infinite regress. 48 In 
the latter case, it certainly echoes Wittgenstein's own formulation of the problem: 'This 
was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course 
of action can be made out to accord with the rule' .49 
The upshot is that a solution to the problem raised by (or implicit in) the Regress 
of Judgements is prerequisite of a solution to the problems raised by those regresses more 
often discussed in the contexts of epistemology and rule-following. 
4. Wittgenstein's Paradox 
There are in fact very good textual grounds for thinking that Wittgenstein's so-
called rule-following considerations at least include an engagement with the Regress of 
Judgements - even that his sustained puzzlement about rules hinges on this basic 
prob lematic. Indeed, this theme is one of the many continuities that gives the lie to any 
crude division between 'early' and 'late' work. Consider, for example, how the notion of 
an 'elucidation' is introduced in Tractatus Logico-Phi!osophicus: 
The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are 
propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of 
those signs are already known. 50 
Wittgenstein does not spell out exactly why the meaning of primitive signs can only be 
interpreted by means of those very signs, but the point is surely that if this were not so, 
48 For this kind of point see, e.g., Post (1980). 
19PI§201 
50 T[,P 3263. 
then understanding any given sign would require the prior understanding of some other 
sign ad infinitum. A passage in Philosophical Remarks displays the same sensitivity: 
49 
... any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain sense, 
the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the 
way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano. 51 
The sense in which language is 'something that cannot be taught' is precisely the sense in 
which understanding a language cannot ultimately be a matter of the reflective regulation 
of acts of judging in accordance with rules. As Baker and Hacker put it, 'explanations 
presuppose a background of prior understanding, a partial linguistic competence'. 52 
Nonetheless, it is not until the later writings that the problematic nature of this 
requirement really comes to the fore. In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein discusses an 
example in a way that sets the scene for much subsequent writing. 'Our problem', he 
writes, 'is analogous to the following:' 
If I give someone the order, "fetch me a red flower from that meadow", how is he to know what 
sort of flower to bring, as I have only given him a wora? Now the answer one might suggest fIrst 
is that he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the 
flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of searching 
and it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one. In fact the process may 
be this: I carry a chart co-ordinating names and coloured square. When I hear the order "fetch me 
etc." I draw my fmger across the chart from the word red to a certain square, and I go and look for 
a flower which has the same colour as the square. But this is not the only way of searching and it 
isn't the usual way. We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to 
anything. To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, consider the order 
"imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must 
have ima&ed a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to 
imagine'. 3 
Wittgenstein allows that there is such a thing as reflecting on a rule and then applying it. 
But, he argues, this cannot always be the case: for then a second-order reflection would 
be needed in order to interpret the first-order reflection. And that way leads to the 
madness that no action can be made out to accord with a rule because every action can be 
so interpreted. No, at some point in our rule-following the relation between application 
and rule must be immediate and direct - more like walking straight up to something (or 
51 PR §6 (p. 54). 
52 Baker and Hacker (1980), p. 31 
'.~ BBB, p. 3 
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someone
54) than following a map. At this basic level, there can be no intermediaries 
between us and the application of a rule, whether platonic logical objects or psychological 
phenomena or whatever. 55 That is to say, rule-govemedjudgement essentially involves 
spontaneous activity. 
This theme takes centre stage in the Investigations. Early on, we are told that in 
case of a child learning to talk, 'the teaching of language is not explanation, but 
training,56, where this is clearly supposed to contrast with the picture of language-
acquisition articulated by Augustine. 57 And when Wittgenstein begins his most sustained 
discussion of rule-following, the explicit aim is to explore what the transition to 
'understanding' a rule consists in. Thus, we are invited to consider what is involved in 
teaching someone the series of natural numbers, where 'the possibility of getting him to 
understand will depend on his writing it down independently' (original emphasis). 58 One 
provides examples, guides the pupil's hand, emphasises patterns and the like, 
And now at some point he continues the series independently - or he does not. - But why do you 
say that? so much is obvious! - Of course; I only wished to say: the effect of any further 
explanation depends on his reaction.59 
For Wittgenstein, the possibility that, after all explanations have been exhausted, a pupil 
might still react abnormally just goes to show that 'understanding' does not ultimately 
consist in a process of reflecting on explanations.60 The rule-following considerations are 
thus, in the first instance, considerations about how subjects learn to follow rules - in 
particular whether this is adequately conceived as involving reflective processes. 
To be sure, Wittgenstein is exercised by the further problem how to characterise 
(the relations between) the objects of thought - for example, whether Frege is right to 
54 Cf. Ibid. §§ 455,457. 
55 Phillip Dwyer writes: 'The fundamental thing in rule-following is ones action. There is no gap between a 
rule and its application. A rule does not transcend its application, or, to adapt Wittgenstein's previous point 
about definition, we may say: a rule does not act at a distance (cf. RFAJ VII--60: 'nothing stands between 
the rule and my action ')' (Dwyer (1989), p. 53-4). 
56 Ibid. §5. 
57 Cf. ibid. § 1. 
58 Ibid. § 143. 
59 Ibid. § 145. 
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compare a concept with a fixed 'area' of space, or whether we ought rather to think of 
concepts as having 'blurred edges,.61 But this is indeed a further problem and arises out of 
issues concerning the subjective conditions ofleaming and following rules. (It is in 
Augustine's conception of how we learn a language, Wittgenstein claims, that 'we find 
the roots of the idea' that each word has a fixed meaning.62) 
To see the connection between these two sets of issues - those concerning the 
relation between acts and objects of thought on the one hand, and the relations between 
objects of thought on the other - consider how Wittgenstein responds to the suggestion 
that we grasp the meaning of a word such as "cube" by reflecting on a mental picture: 
Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the 
drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"? -
Perhaps you say: "It's quite simple; - if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism 
for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn't fit the picture." - But doesn't it 
fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that is quite easy to imagine a method o/projection 
according to which the picture does fit after all. 63 
Now many commentators take the crux of such passages to be that since, as Donna 
Summerfield has emphasised, it is logically possible for a sign (such as a picture of a 
cube) to be interpreted ('projected') in different ways, no such sign can serve as a unique 
means of determining the meaning of a word. 64 This is then taken to open the floodgates 
to a kind of 'meaning -scepticism' , according to which no rules fix the meaning of words 
(where this is usually extended to the case of the content ofthoughts65), since the question 
of interpretation arises for whatever candidate is proposed.66 
But the argument is surely quite the other way around. Wittgenstein' s point is that 
it is incoherent to hold that understanding a rule consists in one's capacity to regulate 
60 This moral is particularly clear in the following: 'To begin by teaching someone "that looks red" makes 
no sense. For he must say that spontaneously once he knows what "red" means, i.e. has learnt the technique 
of using the word' (Z §418). 
61 Cf. PI §71. 
62 Ibid. § 1. 
63 Ibid. § 139. 
64 See Summerfield (1990). 
65 Colin McGinn has questioned this extension, arguing that meaning-scepticism does not straightforwardly 
imply 'concept scepticism' since linguistic signs are syntactically isolatable in a way that concepts are not 
(see, e.g., C. McGinn (1984), pp. 144-147). For a forceful critique see Joseph Sartorelli (1991). 
66 Compare Kripke's reference to 'the incredible and self-defeating conclusion that all language is 
meaningless' (Kripke (1981), p.273). 
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one's behaviour by means of comparing a mental content with the use of a word, since 
this leads to the situation that one has to know how to apply the rule before one can learn 
to do so. But since this is incoherent we must acknowledge that '[o]nly the application of 
language can show how it is to be applied,67 and that 'there is, for any rule, a way of 
taking it which is not an interpretation,.68 For Wittgenstein, it is because the picture 
theory (for instance) is inadequate to account for rule-governed acts that it throws into 
question the very possibility of meaningful thought and language. 
The dialectical point about the primacy of the Regress of Judgements can thus 
also be made as an interpretative point. For, on this reading, Wittgenstein's so-called 
'sceptical paradox' is best read as a reductio of the assumption that meaning involves 
reflecting on a mental content.69 Very plausibly, this is why it is said (at §201) that the 
paradox that accrues from a Regress of Interpretations - which Kripke takes to constitute 
such a serious problem that it requires a 'sceptical solution' - rests on a 
'misunderstanding'. The misunderstanding is to suppose that understanding essentially 
involves reflection on a linguistic sign or mental content. But once this confusion is 
unmasked that paradox simply cuts no ice. The more recalcitrant problems arise, I will 
suggest, just when the role of spontaneity is properly respected. 
The tendency in the secondary literature to major on the objective conditions of 
thought or meaning - i. e. on the problem articulated by the Regress of Interpretations -
and to underplay the subjective conditions of thinking or understanding results not merely 
in imbalance, therefore, but distortion. For, to reiterate, it is only certain conceptions of 
what is involved in how human beings think and speak that give rise to incoherent 
conceptions of what thoughts and meanings are. 70 In particular, it is a mechanistic view of 
the former - i.e. the idea that understanding fundamentally involves ratiocination - that 
gives rise to a 'mythological' picture of the latter - i.e. the notion that thoughts and 
meanings are somehow detached from human forms of life and practice and fixed by 
67 MSS, Vol. VI, p. 70. Cited in Baker & Hacker (1980), p. 40. 
68 PI §201. 
69 John McDowell has gone some \yay towards such a reading. See McDowell (1984), esp. pp. 338-9. See 
also McGinn (1984\ p. 68; Minar (1994). 
70 In chapters Two and Three, I shall show how the distinction between the '\\hat' and the 'hO\\' of 
judgement plays a central role in Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel. In the Epilogue, I shall show ho\\ the 
smne distinction is at work in Kierkegaard' s stance on issues in the philosophy of religion. 
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immutable laws. The Regress of Judgements thus taps a deep current ofWittgenstein's 
thought: viz., a sense of the need to recover our sense of what it means to be a human 
being. As we shall see in Chapter Two, a sense of the urgency of this reminder marks one 
of the most profound affinities between Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. 
Perhaps, however, the relative neglect ofWittgenstein's discussion of the 
psychology of learning and following rules can be explained in terms of a widespread 
sense of dissatisfaction with this aspect of his work. Concerning the pervasive feature of 
the later work that it 'gives prominence to how speakers learn to use expressions', Baker 
and Hacker register a telling observation: 
This fact is widely noted but little understood. Current philosophers are apt to see it as a defect in 
at least one of three ways. First, it infects semantics "ith a primitiye learning-theOl),. 
Wittgenstein's account of language-learning was arm-chair speculation and has long been 
superceded by advances in psychology based on detailed empirical experimentation. Secondly, it 
introduces empirical data which are in principle irreleyant to philosophical theories of meaning. In 
particular, it conflates genetic inyestigations (the natural histOlY of concept acquisition) with 
concept-analysis. Thirdly, it is a sophisticated form ofpsychologism and therefore illegitimate. 71 
Yet we surely have the resources to respond to such objections.72 The problem, I have 
argued, is that the natural account of the concept of rule-following furnished by Thesis C 
- namely that rule-following necessarily involves reflecting on rules - cannot be right. 
But this negative conclusion is not reached on the grounds of any speculation about (or 
indeed observation of) the facts of psychology~ on the contrary, it is reached on the 
grounds that Thesis C is incoherent. If we want to understand what it means for humans 
to follow rules (and this is very different to wanting a story about the casual or 
neurological processes involved) we had better look elsewhere: 
Am I doing I doing child psychology? - I am making a connection between the concept of 
teaching and the concept of meaning73 
The connection, I take it, is that teaching does not, in the first instance, consist in the 
transferal of mental items ('meanings' or 'thoughts ') to be grasped by occult 
71 Bakcr & Hacker (1980), p. 29. 
,: I shall examine a related criticism of Kierkegaard in Chapter Two. Ironically, Baker and Hacker can 
themSL:ln~s be seen to misread the importance of spontaneity for Wittgenstein when articulating their sense 
of an 'internal relation' beh\cen rules and applications. See Chapter Three of this thesis, n. 63. 
73 Z ~412. 
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psychological processes, but rather in eliciting certain fonns of immediate action and 
reaction. The empirical fact, if it is such, that children typically acquire linguistic 
competence by means of training or drilling rather than explanation or interpretation is 
merely invoked to illustrate the conceptual claim that the concept of rule-following has its 
natural home in cases where acts of reflection or interpretation are clearly absent. 
This conceptual claim has very far-reaching implications for Wittgenstein. In On 
Certainty, for instance, it is brought to bear on a whole gamut of epistemological issues. 
Here again we are liable to distort the hackneyed dictum that reasons, justifications, 
explanations 'must come to an end somewhere' - as though this expressed some kind of 
impatience with philosophical inquiry. And we are liable to misunderstand Wittgenstein's 
concomitant attempt to locate those 'hinge propositions' that furnish the non-rational 
framework from which the (important) business of giving reasons, explanations and 
justifications in response to doubts and perplexities derives its sense. For all this appears 
to tum on the far from original claim that knowledge and proof rests on certain 
ungrounded assumptions about the world. 
On the contrary, Wittgenstein is at pains to stress that the idea that our knowledge 
of the world is based on presuppositions or assumptions or unsupported hypotheses or 
primitive conceptual schemes or common sense or whatever, is precisely the conception 
under attack. 74 Consider three typical remarks: 
... As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded 
presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. 75 
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to speak unpredictable. I mean: it is not 
based on grounds. It is not reasonable ( or unreasonable). 
It is there -like our life. 76 
I want to regard man here as an animal: as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not 
ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of 
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of 
... n 
ratIocmatIon. 
74 The notion that knowledge is based on certain kinds of ungrounded assumption appears to be have been 
Moore's position. And Moore is the explicit and sustained target of On Certainty. 
75 ~C, § 110. Cf. §204. 
76 Ibid. §559. 
77 fi)id. §475. 
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On Certainty is plausibly read as working through the claim that thought and language-
use depend on non-rational, non-discursive, non-reflective activity. For to advance that 
claim is precisely to deny that thought and language-use depend on the mediation of 
reflection, whether this is rational or irrational, reasonable or unreasonable, justified or 
unjustified. Rather, it implies that there must be some point in our thinking and judging at 
which the relation between acts and objects of thought is immediate and direct, and 
therefore not regulated by reasons, justifications, explanations. 
5. The Paradox of Constrained Spontaneity 
The dialectical status of the Regress of Judgements - as well as its 
Wittgensteinian credentials - only renders the need for a solution more pressing. For we 
appear to face a dilemma: either deny the possibility of rule-following altogether or deny 
the plausible account embodied by the OTJ. 'Whenever I use a word', Humpty Dumpty is 
reported to have said, 'it means just whatever I choose it to mean'. I take it that few others 
would want to grasp the first horn. And yet, insofar as the OTJ in general - and Thesis C 
in particular - is compelling, the second hom is hardly more comfortable. 
Perhaps, however, there is a middle path to be forged here: what we need is an 
account that does justice to the OTJ but does not imply (1) of the objection from 
regress. 78 By way of a conclusion, I shall outline three general requirements I believe 
such an account must satisfy and which circumscribe the broad strategy of this thesis. 
Firstly, there can be no question of rejecting out of hand the basic conception of 
thought described in Section 1 above. That is, the OTJ is right to characterise the class of 
thoughts as distinctively objective, rule-governed and directly communicable - in 
contrast, say, to feelings or impressions. (But note that the notion of a 'distinctive mark' 
can be taken in a weaker sense than that of a necessary condition, i. e. in the sense that X 
is distinctive ofY is consistent with there being a Y that is not an X.79) And the OTJ is 
therefore right to reject subjectivist or psycho logistic theories that reduce thoughts to 
private psychological occurrences. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding his vigorous 
78 Compare John McDowell's characterisation of Wittgenstein as aiming to steer a middle course between 
the Scylla of viewing rule-following as a matter of acting on interpretations, and the Charybdis of denying 
that \\c follow rules at all. See McDowell (1984), p. 342 and passim. 
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assault on the picture of logic as a 'crystaline purity' 80 comprising a rigid system of 
immutable laws, Wittgenstein conceded that 'following a rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our 
language-game ,81 and insisted just as strongly that meaning is not to be conceived as a 
'gaseous medium,82 or 'atmosphere,83 accompanying acts of thinking or language-use. In 
short, the objectivity of thought must not be thrown out with the objectivist bathwater. 
Secondly, however, the inescapable upshot of the Regress of Judgements is that, 
pace the OTJ, there must be some point in our thinking at which the relation between act 
and object of judgement is immediate and direct. On pain of incoherence, any theory of 
judgement must account for a class of non-reflective acts of rule-following. In other 
words, the theory must respect what, in the context of Kant ian exegesis, Bell calls the 
Principle of Spontaneity: 
If the perfonnance of an act of type @ is learned or rule-governed, then it cannot be a general 
requirement of my perfonning an arbitrary act of type @ that I have already perfonned an act of 
that type or, indeed, of any other type that in its turn requires the prior perfonnance of an act of 
type @. 84 
One very general consequence of this principle is that an objectivist picture is wrong 
insofar as this envisages human subjects standing in an external relation to systems of 
thought fixed by immutable laws. In a slogan: objects of thought cannot be severed from 
acts of thinking. (I shall deal with these issues most fully in Chapter Three.) 
Thirdly, however, the motivation for Thesis C may not simply be jettisoned. To be 
sure, one might well say that at some level we follow rules 'blindly' in the sense that we 
have no reflective justification for proceeding in the way that we do. But we still face a 
problem. For the OTJ theorist is surely right to demand an account of how we gain access 
to rules, and what it means to heed their guidance. Any appeal to 'blind' responses or 
'primitive reactions' must somehow show how these non-reflective acts can be conceived 
(not as arbitrary or merely rule-conforming but) in terms of one's thinking in an objective, 
79 Cf. Canfield (1996), p. 478. 
80 PI §I07. 
81 RF\f. VI-28 (p. 330). 
8~ PI §I09. 
83 Ibid. § 117. 
84 D. Bell (1987b), p. 225 
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systematic, constrained way.85 Thus, ifWittgenstein is right that the concept of rule-
following is at home in cases of spontaneous activity, the OTJ theorist is owed an account 
of how rules can be action-guiding in such cases. 
In other words, to avoid the incoherence of Thesis C by postulating a substrate of 
non-reflective rule-governed acts is to face the further demand for an account of how one 
and the same act can be both spontaneous and constrained by rules. This is indeed a 
conceptual problem, not least because 'constrained spontaneity' just appears to be an 
oxymoron. I shall therefore call it the Paradox of Constrained Spontaneity (PCS). Any 
plausible theory of judgement must not only respect the objectivity of thought and the 
Principle of Spontaneity but must (therefore) also account for the PCS. 
The PCS is comparable with the so-called Antinomy of Taste in the theory of 
aesthetics. Are judgements of beauty constrained by universal rules or are they the 
arbitrary products of subjective responses? The former option invites the counter-intuitive 
conclusion that the one who mechanically chums out correct judgements is paradigmatic 
of aesthetic sensibility. But the latter option appears to have the no less counter-intuitive 
consequence that aesthetic judgements are not judgements at all but mere expressions of 
taste. Kant, of course, aimed to show that this is a false dichotomy by adumbrating a form 
of judgement that is both spontaneous and constrained. 86 The import of the PCS is that, in 
this respect, aesthetic judgements are not a special case.87 
* * * 
I have argued that the Regress of Judgements reveals - even if it does not 
comprise - a genuine and important problem, central to Wittgenstein's so-called rule-
following considerations, and best characterised as a puzzle about how acts of thinking 
can be spontaneous yet constrained by rules. In the next chapter, I show how a closely 
related paradox arises in the context ofKierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel. The hope is 
that the problem articulated in this chapter provides a heuristic prism through which the 
more parochial idiom of these criticisms may be clarified and extended. 
K' Wittgenstein certainly acknowledged that the concept of rule-following involves more than blind 
mechanical conformity: 'One follows the rule mechanical/v. Hence one compares it with a mechanism 
"Mechanical" - that ~eans: without thinking. But entirely'without thinking? Without reflecting' (RR\! VII-
60 (p. 422)). In these terms, the challenge is to account for a class ofnon-reflecti"e acts of thinking. 
86 Sec Kant (1952), esp. Part I. 
CHAPTER 
TWO 
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The Paradox of Beginning: 
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Systematic Inquiry 
.... "for it might end, you know" said Alice to herself, "in my 
going out altogether like a candle. I wonder what I should be 
like then?" And she tried to fancy what the flame of a candle 
is like after it is blown out, for she could not remember ever 
having seen such a thing. 
(Lewis Carroll) 
It is so difficult to fmd the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult 
to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go further back. 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
To say that Kierkegaard did not agree with Hegel's philosophical work would be 
awkwardly prosaic. More resonant is the image of the 'knight of faith' riding out against 
the collective forces of the Hegelian 'World Spirit'; or the stubborn remnant of 'Unhappy 
Consciousness', refusing to be mediated into a more harmonious form of life; or the 
angst-ridden 'Individual', resisJing the tidy categories of a socio-political or intellectual 
system. Yet oppositions of such epic proportions are not readily reducible to matters of 
precise theoretical disagreement. And any such reduction would surely loose something 
of the colour and romance of the clash between Hegel and Kierkegaard. 
To be sure, Kierkegaard's texts hardly lend themselves to close analytical 
commentary, composed as they are of aphorisms, stories, parables, jokes, caricatures, 
polemics, parodies, allusions, satires, revocations. Yet if the virtue of melodramatic 
portrayals of the struggle between 'existentialism' and 'the System' is that they capture 
something of the tone and intensity ofKierkegaard's antipathy to Hegelian philosophy, 
the danger is that they forfeit any precise account of its content. We are left, at best, with 
an irredeemable gulf between two more or less coherent Weltanschauungen, at worst 
with a sense that it all boils down to little more than a clash of personalities. l 
I The following off-hand remark is all too typical of secondary work on the 'debate' between Kierkegaard 
and Hegel, where this rarely goes beyond what might be called the 'Tweedle-Dum I Tweedle-Dee' mode of 
commentary: 'It seems not unjust to say Hegel might consider [Kierkegaard' s] concept of the single 
individual prideful and Kierkegaard considers [Hegel's] concept of the system superficial' (Rertman 
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The argument of Chapter One was that the Paradox of Constrained Spontaneity 
(PCS) is a genuine and important problem in the theory of judgement. In this chapter, I 
show how some of the most pervasive criticisms of Hegel in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript can be faithfully and fruitfully interpreted as articulating that problem. The 
aim is thus to magnify a key moment in the opposition between Hegel and Climacus, and 
thereby to display a central motivation for the latter's broadly anti-systematic stance. 
Hopefully, this strategy will also manifest the non-parochial nature of these criticisms; 
the sense, that is, in which they are not confined to Hegel's peculiar methods and 
ambitions? Nonetheless, the aim is to give a more perspicuous account of, rather than to 
qualify, the profound divergence between Hegel and Climacus.3 
So as to gain a reasonably sympathetic view of Climacus' target, I first introduce 
some of the motivations behind Hegel's conception of systematic inquiry (Section 1). In 
this connection, I draw on recent work in which a 'non-metaphysical' reading of this 
conception is defended. I then locate a central problematic in this connection, viz. 'the 
paradox of beginning' (Section 2) and outline two ways in which Hegel attempts to 
respond to this paradox; first, via the strategy of' immanent critique' as this is worked out 
in the Phenomenology o/Spirit and, second, via the concept of an 'immediate beginning' 
as this is adumbrated in the Science o/Logic (Section 3). 
All this should prepare the ground for an examination of a pivotal passage in 
Postscript, the explicit focus of which is the 'dialectic of beginning' (Section 4). I show 
that Climacus' objection is essentially that Hegel cannot solve the paradox he articulates, 
even if successful in his own terms, since he overlooks an important feature of this 
( 1990), p. 120). Later in the same paper, Bertman goes on to suggest that the debate does indeed boil down 
to a matter of personal preference when he declares that 'though Kierkegaard presents his dogmatic stance 
as the alternative to Hegel and philosophy .. .I don't fmd it convincing as a psychological portrait of my own 
experience. It doesn't ring true as a psychological phenomenology. And since Kierkegaard's approach 
depends on a sympathy of experience there is little more to be said' (ibid, p. 124). 
~ Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel are often viewed as highly parochial. James Collins, for instance, 
declares that many of these are 'of little more than historical interest, as proof of Kierkegaard' s close 
acquaintance with the fme points of post-Hegelian controversy' (Collins (1983), p. 119). Collins concedes 
that the 'major contentions ... can even be applied to more recent versions of absolute idealism' (idem). 
3 In this respect, this chapter aims to take up the gauntlet laid down by Paul Ricoeur when he urged the 
need to get beyond a 'naIve' version of the conflict between Kierkegaard and Hegel- 'the existence of 
which is of course beyond doubt' - to the task of 'leam[ing] how to think it as a significant disagreement, a 
disagreement with a ;"eaning' (Ricoeur (1998) p. 18). I shall not, howe\'er, follow the recent trend of 
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problem. This feature concerns the relation between human subjects and the objects of 
their thoughts and is, I argue, a version of the PCS. Finally, I compare Climacus' worries 
about Hegelian systematicity with the Wittgensteinian worries about rule-following 
discussed in Chapter One (Section 5). 
1. Points of Departure 
Ten years ago, Karl Ameriks reported that 'Hegel's contribution to practical 
philosophy no longer requires rehabilitation'. 4 Ameriks went on to observe that 'Hegel's 
theoretical philosophy, however, continues to be highly suspect'. 5 This latter finding will 
come as little surprise to sympathetic readers of the Postscript. For that work is deeply 
suspicious of what it calls the 'one, two, three, hocus pocus' of Hegelian dialectics.6 
Now Climacus' polemic has often been seen to trade on a 'metaphysical' reading 
of Hegel's systematic approach. On this view of Hegel, a monistic ontology of 'Absolute 
Spirit', for instance, is taken to underpin his peculiar conception of the goal of philosophy 
as the systematic 'mediation' of ontological differences. Or again, it is because Hegel 
believes in a version of metaphysical idealism - 'the recent principle that thought and 
being are one,7 - that he believes his system of thought somehow reveals (perhaps even 
determines) the metaphysical structure of reality. 
Thus, according to a conventional way of setting up the polemical target of the 
Postscript, Climacus is suspicious of 'the system' because he is suspicious of the 
metaphysical claims on which it is founded. Two foci of Climacus' suspicion are 
particularly emphasised. First, there is the worry that Hegel's reductionist ontology flies 
in the face of irreducible differences between thoughts and things, eternity and time, 
words and objects, God and humans, essences and existents.8 Second, there is the related 
attempts to qualify the disagreement between Hegel and Kierkegaard (see, e.g., Ricoeur (1998), Connell 
(1985), M. C. Taylor (1980)). 
4 Ameriks (1992), p. 177 
5 Idem. 
6 Cf CUP, p. 117. 
7 Cf CA, fu. p. 78. 
8 Thus, according to J. Heywood Thomas, 'Hegel's claim is that it is the very nature of our thought to imply 
,m identity of thinking and being, and this is what Kierkegaard rejects on the ground that as long as we 
remain in- the realm of pure thought the difference between them cannot be seen' (J. Thomas (1971), p. 4). 
worry that Hegel's metaphysical speculations transgress the limits of finite human 
thought by attempting to attain a 'God's-eye perspective'. As Merold Westphal 
summarises Climacus' stance, 'God, but not Hegel, can be a Hegelian,.9 
61 
Now metaphysical readings of Hegel's theoretical philosophy are far from the 
preserve ofKierkegaardians. From the early reception of Hegel by Marx through to 
Russell's less ambivalent response, Hegel has been criticised for the alleged implication 
of his idealism that 'everything ends in thought' (Marx) and for its source in a conflation 
of predication with identity (Russell). 10 Many others have owned the suspicion that Hegel 
never offers so much as an intelligible formulation of, let alone a persuasive argument 
for, his peculiar brand of metaphysical idealism. 
Even less hostile commentators continue to foster the idea that Hegel's theoretical 
edifice depends on a highly tendentious metaphysics. Thus a generally sympathetic 
Charles Taylor characterises Hegel's most basic doctrine as the claim that 'nothing exists 
which is not a manifestation of the Idea, that is, of rational necessity' 11 and Michael 
Rosen saddles Hegel with the view that 'mind and nature are not heterogeneous but 
emerge as 'moments' in a unified process' .12 Of course, there are some who want to show 
that Hegel does have good arguments for such doctrines. But it is clear that to the extent 
his systematic approach as a whole depends on these claims, this approach will remain 
'highly suspicious' to anyone who is suspicious either of metaphysical doctrines in 
general, or to those attributed to Hegel in particular. 
To be sure, it is not difficult to find apparent textual support for a broadly 
metaphysical view of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. Having offered as a reason for 
studying the Logic 'the fact that man is capable of metaphysical thought - i.e. is capable 
of thinking that aims at the ultimate foundation of thought and being', one recent 
commentator goes on to cite a characteristic simile.13 'A cultured nation without 
metaphysics', Hegel declared, is 'like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but 
9 Westphal (1998), p. 117. Compare Stanley Rosen's remark that Hegel is '[l]ike other geniuses' in 
'confusing himself with God' (S. Rosen (1974)), p. 130. 
10 On Marx's critique of Hegel see Ameriks (2000): for Russell's see Russell (1993). 
11 C. Taylor (1975), p. 110. 
12 M. Rosen (1982), p. 174. 
13 .' Harnack (1998), p. :\1. 
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without a holy of holies' .14 Such rhetoric gives credence to the idea that Hegel's system is 
supposed to articulate gnomic insights into a metaphysical 'holy of holies' in which the 
hidden nature of reality is revealed. IS The impression is confirmed when Hegel 
characterises his Logic as 'the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the 
creation of nature and the finite mind,.16 And even if, as I shall argue, Climacus' critique 
aims at more interesting targets than such obscurities, there can be little doubt that much 
of his sparkling satire on 'the bewitched speculative thinker' feeds on this kind of quasi-
mystical rhetoric - rhetoric that was certainly taken seriously in his own day. 
Yet many will complain that principles of charity have been violated here, and 
that Hegel's over-blown rhetoric has been over-emphasised. For contemporary scholars 
are at pains to show that, far from depending on gnomic insights, Hegel's systematic 
approach trades on some quite exoteric and plausible motivations. Indeed, David Stem 
has discerned a 'sufficient consensus among a variety of recent interpreters to warrant the 
identification of a decided trend in interpretation', which he locates in terms of 'finding 
in Hegel not the consummate metaphysician, but a subtle and systematic critic of 
metaphysical thought' .17 
Participants in this consensus converge around the need for a so-called 'non-
metaphysical' reading of Hegel. 18 This means many different things at the level of 
exegetical detail, but a common thread is the claim that Hegelian systematicity does not 
depend on any metaphysical claims at all. Rather, it is argued that Hegel's approach is 
motivated by methodological considerations. The upshot of these readings is that one 
14 SL, p. 25. 
15 According to Russell, Hegel's metaphysics 'must have come to him first as mystic 'insight" (Russell 
(1979), p. 702) 
16 SL, p. 50. Compare Hegel's claim that the categories of his Logic 'may be 1oo~e~ UPO? as ~efmition~ of 
the Absolute, as the metaphysical definitions a/God' (HL §85). Compare also hIS IdentlficatlOn OflOglC 
with 'metaphysics, the science a/things set and held in thoughts - thoughts accredited able t? expr~ss the 
essential reality of things' (ibid. §24) and his claim that '[t]o know God by means of reason IS the hIghest 
task of Science' (ibid. §36 trans. modified). 
17 D. S Stern (1990), pp. 19-20. 
18 For diverse 'non-metaphysical' readings of Hegel see Findlay (1958): Hartmann (1972); Lamb (1980); 
Bubner (1981): White (1983); Winfield (1984); Winfield (1987); Winfield (1990); Winfield (1991); 
Winfield (1999); Pinkard (1988): Pippin (1989); D. S Stem (1990); D. S Stern (1993): Hou1gate (1986); 
Houlgate (1991): Houlgate (1998); Hou1gate (1999); Maker (1987): Maker (1990); Maker (1993a); Maker 
(1993b); Maker (1994); Maker (1998). For criticism see, e.g., M. Rosen (1993). 
does not need to be a metaphysical idealist of any kind to appreciate the force of a 
Hegelian conception of systematic inquiry. 
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In what follows, I shall extract some of the considerations stressed by these 
commentators. The aim is less exegetical than to indicate the (methodological) pressures 
towards a broadly Hegelian approach. My reasons for adopting this strategy are as 
follows. First, it should allow the broad rationale behind Hegel's project to come to the 
fore, whilst side-stepping a morass of interpretative detail. Second, it should track the 
intended scope of Climacus' attack - the way, that is, in which he aims to undermine 
Hegel's project as a whole and not merely to fault its local executions. Third, to the 
extent that there are interesting and accessible motivations for Hegel's theoretical project, 
Climacus' criticisms should appear less obscure. In particular, focusing on issues about 
systematicity as such will show up the sense in which Climacus' target is not confined to 
a peculiar brand of idealistic metaphysics. And fourth, this focus should reveal the 
subtlety of Climacus' critique by showing that it does not, as a whole, depend on the kind 
of caricature that most contemporary Hegelians would disown. 
The motivation for Hegel's emphasis on systematicity might be characterised in 
terms of two desiderata ofa philosophical inquiry. It is desirable, namely, that a 
philosophical theory is (i) critical and (ii) reflexive. I shall consider these in tum. 
Firstly, a philosophical inquiry should be critical, where a theory is critical if and 
only if for any claim on which it implicitly or explicitly relies, that claim is offered as a 
candidate for rational appraisal. Examples of uncritical claims are that homosexuality is 
wrong or that angels exist when these are asserted on the basis of Biblical revelation or 
Church dogma. Note that it is not that in order to count as critical a theory must be based 
on good reasons, only that it must be offered as a candidate for rational appraisal. The 
religious believer is uncritical just to the extent that she takes a sacred text or papal edict 
or whatever to be a source of authority that lies beyond the remit of rational appraisal. 
Now few philosophers would deny that critical thinking is desirable in this 
sense. 19 And of course Hegel's contemporaries saw it as the gateway to the brave new 
19 There is a strong case that Kicrkegaard should not be excluded from this generalisation. As I hope to 
show, his critique of Hegel is far subtler than his reputation as a dogmatic irrationalist would suggest. And 
his approach to hiblical and ecclesiastical authority is \"ery far from uncritical (see, f?r e\:am~le, the. 
remarks on biblical interpretation in The Concept o/Anxiety (e.g., CA, p. 40): and hIS polemIcs agamst the 
world of Enlightenment. For Hegel, however, this desideratum is far more demanding 
than it might at first appear. Following Kant, he believed that to take seriously the ideal 
of a critical inquiry requires nothing less a radical rethinking of philosophical 
methodology. For not only does it require the rejection of explicit appeals to religious 
dogma, it also requires the rejection of more modern and more insidious forms of 
uncritical thought. 
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According to many commentators, the chief suspect for Hegel in this respect is 
methodological foundationalism. This programme is characterised by the attempt to show 
that certain commitments are so obvious or inevitable that they can be legitimately taken 
as the foundations on which to base what is in other respects a critical theory. The most 
familiar application of the foundationalist strategy in philosophy is epistemological. For 
there is a long pedigree, within both rationalist and empiricist traditions, of theories that 
treat certain 'self-evident ideas' or 'immediate sense-data' as the proper termini of any 
justificatory chain of beliefs. For Hegel, however, this simply will not do. Insofar as self-
evidence or immediate experience are appealed to as 'given', such appeals are uncritical 
and therefore undesirable. More specifically, they are undesirable in epistemology 
because, in John McDowell's phrase, 'the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we 
wanted justifications ,20 - that is, to simply appeal to brute givens is to evade rather than 
to address the central demand of epistemology that our beliefs are rationally justified. 
So, for example, Hegel distinguishes between Scholastic metaphysics and 
modern, post-Reformation metaphysics but charges both with an illicit reliance on 
uncritical foundations. Stephen Houlgate crisply outlines the position as follows: 
Scholastic metaphysics, Hegel argues, has as its primary task the proof of theological doctrine; it 
is therefore subordinated to the positive authority of the Church. Modem metaphysics, on the 
other hand, is more autonomous. In accordance with what he sees as the Reformation notion that 
truth is available to all and not the 'property' of an authoritarian institution, Hegel says that 
modem metaphysics looks for its content within reason itself, rather than in the doctrines of the 
Church. Yet that content is found in the form of defmitions and principles which still serve as the 
given foundation of thought. Although modem philosophy seeks a content within itself which is 
established Church in the later writings). What Kierkegaard does bhmtly reject is a culture in which the 
tendency 'to bring fundamental assumptions under discussion' has the consequence that 'a marH~ lous 
number'ofmen in the mass get on their feet and open their mouths all at once in the game of discussion' 
thereby revealing themselves to be 'the most insignificant twaddlers' (BiL p. 137). 
20 McDowell (1994), p. 8. 
fully rational and therefore fully its own, that content is not developed out of thought and thus 
remains as external to the free process of reasoning as were the religious presuppositions of 
mediaeval metaphysics.21 
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An equally subtle form of uncritical philosophy for Hegel is the practice of assuming the 
validity of our ordinary forms of understanding. Thus philosophers are liable to launch 
into a discussion of 'subjects' and 'objects', for example, without pausing to consider 
whether this distinction is as unproblematic as it seems. In fact, Hegel believed that our 
'prejudices' about subjects and objects in particular are wholly pernicious: 
... These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations 
which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness; but when these 
prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same relation obtained there, as if this 
relation were something true in its own self, then they are errors the refutation of which 
throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy, or rather, as they bar the 
entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its portals. 22 
Commentators are of course divided about how exactly Hegel does want us to view 'the 
relation of subject and object to each other'. But the important point here is his insistence 
that we must begin without prejudice in such arenas. For Hegel, a genuinely critical 
theory would be one that relied neither on 'self-evident' truths nor on unexamined forms 
of thought. And for Hegel, the desirability of such a theory is readily displayed by the 
notorious failure of philosophy to make progress with respect to its central concerns. 
Secondly, it is desirable that a philosophical theory is reflexive, where an inquiry 
is reflexive if and only if the subject-matter of inquiry just is the very process of reasoned 
inquiry. An example of a non-reflexive inquiry would be any scientific investigation that 
applies a certain method, such as observation, to a circumscribed domain, such as the 
digestive system of rattlesnakes. Clearly, the process of scientific observation is a very 
different topic to the digestive processes of rattlesnakes. And it is quite proper that a 
biologist takes the latter to be the arena of his research. By and large, the scientist applies 
but does not directly investigate scientific methodologies. 23 But, as we shall see, it is 
21 Houlgate (1986), p. 103. 
~~ 5>2, p. 45. 
23 Of cow-se, scientists may delve into the philosophy of science but the point is that they need not do so to 
count as proper scientists. 
arguable that, whilst this is a perfectly appropriate way to proceed within the natural 
sciences, it is a serious mistake to construe philosophical inquiry on this model. 
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Plainly, reflexivity is a less intuitive ideal than critical appraisal. But at least part 
of its appeal derives from that value. For, in order to be comprehensively critical, a theory 
must presumably be critical about its own methods and procedures. So, whilst it is quite 
legitimate for biologists to assume the validity of observation, philosophers cannot 
simply take for granted the tools of their trade. In a word, philosophy ought to be self-
critical. Yet there is an independent point to the ideal of reflexivity. For the idea is not 
only that the process of reasoning should be included within the domain of inquiry but 
that the process of reasoning should uniquely determine this domain. This is desirable 
because, again unlike the natural sciences, the domain of philosophical theory cannot be 
un controversially stipulated. Whilst it is quite in order for the biologist to stipulate that 
his inquiry concerns the digestive system of rattlesnakes, the Platonist, for example, 
cannot simply stipulate that his inquiry concerns super-sensible phenomena without 
begging the question against the naturalist. The promise of a theory whose subject-matter 
is the very process of reasoning, then, is that it would avoid arbitrary and controversial 
assumptions about what philosophical theories are theories about. 
Richard D. Winfield reconstructs this motive of Hegel's project thus: 
A discipline that addresses a subject matter distinct from its own thinking cannot help but 
presuppose its own method. Since such a discipline investigates what its topic is, which is 
something different from the procedure by which it is uncovered, the method is not established by 
the investigation but must be employed by it as something independently furnished. Moreover, in 
order to have a specific topic to address with its given method, such a science must presuppose 
some minimal identity for its subject matter. Otherwise, it has nothing determinate to consider. 
By contrast, logic [i.e. philosophy on a Hegelian model] can presuppose neither method nor 
subject matter. Because what logic thinks is indistinguishable from its thinking of it, if logic were 
to begin with any preconception of its method or topic the identity of valid thinking would be 
taken for granted instead of being established as the outcome of logical investigation. To avoid 
begging the question, logic must therefore begin without any determinate method or content. 24 
Thus, according to Hegel, philosophy should aim not only to be self-critical but also to be 
self-determining. We may assume neither what is to be evaluated in advance of the 
process of evaluation (such as, say, the sensible world) nor what means we have for 
evaluation (such as, say, the verification principle). On the contrary, Hegel insists that 
24 Winfield (1999), p. 37. 
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philosophical science must determine both its subject-matter and its method as it 
proceeds, 'for what this subject-matter is ... will be explicated only in the development of 
science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand'. 25 
A further way in which reflexivity can be seen to be desirable trades on a certain 
conception of the goal of philosophical inquiry. For Hegel, one of the chief goals of 
philosophy is to demonstrate that 'Reason' is a stable and self-sufficient source of 
authority. Robert Stern, for instance, describes Hegel's intellectual milieu in terms of a 
sense of dislocation: 
... Hegel was clearly responding to the sense of dislocation shared by many of his contemporaries, 
both with his immediate circle (such as Schelling and Holderlin) and beyond. This dislocation 
was felt at many levels, as it appeared that the Enlightenment had shaken old certainties but put 
nothing substantial in their place. Thus, reason was seen as leading to scepticism, science to 
mechanistic materialism, social reform to bloody revolution, humanism to empty amoralism and 
crude hedonism, and individualism to social fragmentation. There was therefore a felt need on all 
sides to fmd a way forward, to 'begin again' in a manner that did not lead to these unhappy 
consequences. 26 
If this modern condition of dislocation is to be overcome, and traditional sources of value 
and authority replaced, Reason must somehow be shown to be worthy of confidence. But 
it seems this can only be achieved if Reason subjects herself to rational appraisal, if the 
very process of reasoning becomes the subject-matter of inquiry - in short, if philosophy 
assumes a genuinely reflexive form. 
Plausibly, it is considerations of this kind that undergird Hegel's characterisation 
of his project in terms of 'thought thinking itself or an 'immanent' science of 'self-
determining determinacy'. According to Hegel, we must 
combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The 
forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at 
once the object of research and the action of that object. 27 
Even the remark about the thought of God before the creation of the world can be 
understood in these terms as a metaphor for Hegel's insistence that his system applies to 
nothing but the process of thinking and reasoning. Those who interpret Hegel in this vein 
25 HL § l. 
26 R. Stem (2002), p. 14. 
27 HL §41. 
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are keen to stress the Kantian sources of this self-conception. 'It is an infinite merit of the 
Kantian philosophy', Hegel declared, 'to have given impetus to the restoration of logic 
and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the determinations of thought in and for 
themselves. ,28 Where philosophers had previously conceived of their theories as 
investigating some external domain (such as platonic objects or natural kinds or 
whatever), Hegel learnt from Kant to understand philosophical inquiry as an immanent 
'critique of reason by reason itself. 29 
Reflexivity is a more obviously problematic ideal than rationality. But it should at 
least be clear that neither of these desiderata depend on any obscure metaphysical thesis. 
According to recent commentators, such considerations reveal the extent to which 
Hegel's project is of continuing importance. We are to see that Hegel was no speculative 
metaphysician who 'attempts to foist on us a system that is as unintelligible as it is devoid 
of argument'. 30 On the contrary, William Maker, for one, argues that the distinctive virtue 
of Hegel's theoretical philosophy is that it can accommodate both the modernists' faith in 
reason and the anti-modernists' mistrust of metaphysics and foundationalism. 31 At any 
rate, the ideals of rationality and reflexivity are surely laudable. Even Hegel's most 
unforgiving critic acknowledged as much: 'To tum Hegel into a rattlebrain', Climacus 
writes, 'must be reserved for his admirers. An attacker will always know how to honor 
him for having willed something great and having failed to achieve it. ,32 
2. Preliminary Problems 
Hegel's prescription for addressing the modem condition of dislocation, then, is 
the transformation of philosophy into a true science, a WissenschaJt, a fully critical and 
28 SL, p. 833. 
~9 Hegel's objection to Kant in this respect is that he assumes an unwarrantably subjectivist conception of 
reason - i.e. as a mental capacity - and therefore conceives the critical project as a critique of human 
capacities. Hegel likens this attempt to clear the ground for metaphysi~s by first assessing our mental 
capacities to Scholasticus' resolution not to venture into the water untIl he had learned to SWim. (Cf. HL, 
§41). Yet, on the reading on which I am drawing, what is distinctive about Hegel's position in this respect 
is not a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics but the idea of a self-investigation of rational thought as slich 
(rather than qua mental capacity). 
30 Maker (1994), p. vii . 
. 11 See Maker (1987); Maker (1994). 
J~ CUP tn. p. 109. 
reflexive form of inquiry. Philosophy must abandon its piecemeal approach to local 
problems conducted on the basis of dogmatic or foundational principles and adopt an 
absolutely systematic form. Only then might the human capacity for rational thought 
become fully autonomous, free from unstable sources of value and authority. 
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Now one of the more pressing questions raised by the idea of an absolute or 
systematic inquiry, and one that Hegel was acutely aware of, is where and how to begin. 
For if 'absolute' means anything when predicated of an inquiry, it surely means that the 
inquiry must not assume or presuppose anything that might tum out to be relevant to it. In 
other words, a systematic inquiry must not prejudice the issue at the outset. Indeed, as we 
have seen, avoiding the temptation to begin with a conceptual or empirical 'given', is part 
of Hegel's rationale for systematicity in the first place. But immediate questions arise 
concerning how a groundless inquiry is, as it were, to get off the ground. 
To be sure, there is nothing especially problematic or paradoxical about the 
ambition ofsystematicity per se. Many inquiries within the natural sciences, for instance, 
have some claim to be systematic in the sense of encompassing all the relevant data 
within a unified methodology. But the problem arises for an inquiry with pretensions to 
absolute systematicity. As we have seen, Hegel takes this to mean that he cannot so much 
as prejudge the proper domain of his inquiry. But this is problematic: to say that we must 
begin without an assumed starting point seems rather close to saying that we must begin 
without beginning. And that does sound paradoxical. Hegel formulates this problem with 
uncharacteristic concision: 
We can assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and 
assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and 
underived, makes an assumption or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to 
make a beginning at all. 33 
The worry here is that, even if a presupposition less inquiry were possible in every other 
respect, the mere act of beginning such an inquiry would itself constitute a kind of 
assumption~ namely, I take it, that this is an appropriate way to begin.34 But just that 
33 HL, §l. 
J4 Compare Kuno Fischer's commentary on Hegel on beginning: '~e beginning of lo~c and philosophy 
generally finds itself in a dilemma that e\'en the Skeptics had recogmsed and.declared m~l~ble .. EIther the 
beginning is mediated or it is immediate .. .In the fITSt case \\'e ha\'e a proof WIthout a begmnmg, m the 
presupposition seems enough to scupper any pretensions to absolute systematicity. The 
paradox of beginning, then, is this: 
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Any beginning involves an assumption of some kind, but an absolute inquiry must begin 
without making an assumption of any kind. 
Before considering Hegel's strategy for solving this problem, let me briefly draw out 
some further motivation for the claim in the first clause that any beginning involves an 
assumption of some kind. 
Consider a famous story of Lewis Carroll's.35 Achilles has just finished his race-
course of infinitely diminishing distances. 'Well now', says the Tortoise, 'would you like 
to hear of a race-course, that most people fancy they can get to the end of in two or three 
steps, while it really consists of an infinite number of distances, each one longer than the 
previous one?' The fool-hardy Achilles agrees and is instructed to jot down the premises 
and conclusion of an apparently valid syllogism, calling the two premises 'A' and 'B' 
respectively, and the conclusion, 'Z'. The Tortoise says that he will grant the truth of A 
and B, but demands the right to resist the inference from these to Z until Achilles has 
jotted down, 'C: if A and B then Z'. Achilles soon finds himself writing 'D: if A, Band C 
then Z'. 'Plenty of blank pages?' inquires the Tortoise cheerily. 
Now one thing this story reveals is that question-begging is context relative. 
Arguments normally rely on there being some common ground: minimally, the validity 
of deductive inference. But an absolutely comprehensive argument, such as Hegel would 
have his system embody, must not assume any such common ground. Notice just how 
demanding this constraint is - it is as if Hegel sets himself the task of proceeding as 
though his interlocutor were as stubborn as Carroll's tortoise. 
Quite how Hegel sets about solving his paradox of beginning is one of the most 
vexed issues of Hegelian scholarship. A full account would require a deeply involved 
interpretation of a large body of notoriously impenetrable work. The following 
presentation must therefore be highly schematic. But since I shall interpret Climacus as 
claiming that this strategy is inadequate whether or not it is successful in its own terms, 
second a beginning without a proof, and in neither is the science able to begin ' (cited in Thulstrup (1984), 
p.226). 
35 See Carroll (1895). 
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this should not detract from the force of Climacus' criticisms. The important question, for 
our purposes, is how Hegel conceives a solution to the Paradox of Beginning, how he 
aims to solve it, not whether he can in fact make good these ambitions. 
The essential structure of what, in the next section, I shall characterise as a two-
pronged strategy might best be introduced in terms of the following two constraints on an 
inquiry which seeks an absolute beginning, and which Hegel purports to respect: 
(1 ) The inquiry must begin with that which is immediate. 
(2) The inquiry must spontaneously establish its own beginning. 
Note the different domains of reference. Firstly, whereas (1) applies to the content of the 
inquiry - it constrains what the inquiry must begin with - (2) applies to the form or 
method of inquiry and regulates how the beginning is to be established. And secondly, 
whereas (1) uses a sense of 'beginning' as logically primitive or prior, (2) uses a sense of 
'beginning' as the ultimate justification or ground or rationale of the inquiry. (We should 
take 'established' here to mean 'grounded' or 'legitimated' or 'justified'.) 
Notice also, however, the conceptual similarity at the level of what kind of 
constraint is imposed. For 'immediacy' and 'spontaneity' are closely related concepts-
in fact, for present purposes, we can define these synonymously as freedom from external 
mediation or prior determination. So (1) says that we must begin with conceptual content 
that is free from the mediation of, or prior determination by, another content, and (2) says 
that our inquiry must establish its own methodological foundation without the aid of any 
external or pre-determined method. Hegel combines these two constraints as follows: 
Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning; and 
so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything or have a ground; rather it 
is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must be purely and simply an 
immediacy, or rather immediacy itself. 36 
The motivation for (1) and (2) should already be fairly clear. Philosophical inquiry must 
begin with a conceptual content that is freestanding towards other content because an 
absolute science must not presuppose any content. And the inquiry must establish its own 
standards of justification because it must not presuppose any predetermined logical or 
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methodological constraints on its development. Ostensibly at least, a theory that satisfied 
both constraints would therefore disarm the paradox of beginning. 
3. Getting Off the Ground 
The very formulation of constraints (1) and (2), however, gives rise to a problem 
that seems only to deepen the paradox. For these are, surely, methodological constraints: 
they show us how to proceed if we want to make an absolute beginning. But (2) says 
precisely that an absolute beginning must not presuppose any methodological constraints. 
It appears therefore that (2) is self-stultifying: it is a constraint against all constraints, a 
presupposition of presuppositionlessness. 
Hegel himself apparently acknowledges this problem. At the beginning of his 
Logic, he tells us that this work will begin entirely without presuppositions and that it 
presupposes the results of his earlier work, the Phenomenology.37 Very broadly, his 
response to the obvious charge of self-contradiction here is this: it is only on a certain 
view of the nature of philosophical inquiry that it is so much as a coherent possibility that 
such an inquiry could proceed without conforming to (1) and (2). Thus if Hegel can show 
that this conception is incoherent in some way, then he can show that we need not take 
(1) and (2) on trust, but will nonetheless proceed in accordance with them because there 
simply is no other coherent way to proceed. Then he will have shown that (1) and (2) are 
spontaneously generated by a rational inquiry - rather than being imposed, as it were, 
from outside - and may consistently claim that (2) satisfies its own demands. 
According to Hegel's 'non-metaphysical' readers this project is indeed the raison 
d 'eire of the Phenomen%gy.38 For these commentators - and contra the orthodox 
36 SL, p. 70. 
37 Cf SL, p. 48. 
38 A particularly clear textual justification for attributing this strategy to Hegel is the following from the 
Preface to the Phenomenology: 
Among the various consequences that follow from what has just been said, this one in particular can be 
stressed, that knowledge is only actual, and can only be expounded, as Science or as system; and further, 
that a so-called basic proposition or principle of philosophy, if true, is also false, just because it is on~v a 
principle. It is, therefore, easy to refute it. The refutation consists in pointing out its defect; and it is 
defective because it only the universal or principle, is only the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is 
derived and developed from the principle itself, not accomplished by counter-assertions and random 
thoughts from outside CPS, p.l3). 
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reading of this work as a positive attempt to furnish the metaphysical basis for Hegel's 
system - the Phenomenology performs a via negativa of revealing the inadequacy of 
uncritical and non-reflexive forms of life and thought. And this role is what constitutes 
the sense in which the Phenomenology forms an 'introduction' to systematic philosophy, 
as Hegel insists it does. Before we are ready to begin Science proper (i.e. Hegel's Logic), 
the Phenomenology would have us observe the incoherence of theories that attempt to 
begin without conforming to (1) and (2). In short, this prolegomenon to philosophical 
science would diagnose just what it is that goes wrong with philosophy when it fails to 
make an absolute beginning; the results of which might also explain the tendency of 
philosophy to end in aporiai and impasse. The hope is that this would provide the 
necessary impetus to motivate (1) and (2), without simply assuming these in such as way 
as to contravene their own stipulations. It would do so by showing that there simply is no 
coherent way to proceed without them. 
Consistently enough, Hegel insists that his preliminary inquiry itself proceed 
without presupposition. It must therefore offer no more than an 'immanent critique' of its 
targeted theories, that is, it must show these to be internally incoherent rather than false 
or inadequate according to some presupposed criterion of truth or success. As Terry 
Pinkard reconstructs the beginning of the Phenomenology, 'since we must start 
somewhere, it seems that we must simply take whatever standards of evaluation we 
happen to have and subject them to some kind of internal test' .39 
Unlike its systematic successor, on the other hand, the preliminary inquiry would 
have a fixed and limited subject matter; it would study, namely, any philosophical 
starting-point - any 'formation of consciousness' - that violates the constraints on an 
absolute beginning. Happily, this means that the Phenomenology would itselfbe free 
from the burden of having to make an absolute beginning; for it may simply observe what 
happens when other inquires do not. It would be a kind of phenomenology of philosophy 
itself~ an expose of the ways in which various presuppositions result in incoherence just 
by dint of their status as presuppositions. If successful and sufficiently comprehensive, it 
would show that philosophical inquiry is impossible in lieu of an absolute beginning. 
39 Pinkard (19%), p. 6. 
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According to Houlgate, 'the Science of Logic presupposes the Phenomenology, 
therefore, not by inheriting from it any determinate conclusions or premises, but rather by 
inheriting a task'. 40 The task, I take it, is that of developing a form of inquiry that does 
respect constraints (1) and (2) and thereby fulfills the desiderata of a fully critical and 
reflexive form of inquiry. 
Fortunately, the details how the Phenomenology is supposed to accomplish this 
work need not detain us here. We can simply take it on trust that Hegel has provided an 
incisive and comprehensive critique of philosophical theories that fail to make an 
absolute beginning. But the question remains how philosophical inquiry should begin if it 
cannot so much as determine its proper domain of inquiry in advance of the process of 
inquiring. How does the immanent science of 'self-determining determinacy' get 
underway once it has been shown, via negativa, to be necessary? 
Well, according to the ideal of reflexivity, philosophical inquiry is supposed to 
proceed via an investigation of the very process of reasoning. And it seems fairly clear 
that this process involves the employment of various concepts or thoughts. But what 
conceptual structures should we take to be primitive to the process of reasoning? What 
should we treat as logically prior? It is here that constraint (1) kicks in, that is, the 
requirement that we begin with 'that which is immediate'. 
This requirement clearly rules out taking complex conceptual structures as 
primitive, in so far as these structures are determined by (,mediated' by) simpler 
structures. (Of course one might begin in time with a complex structure and work back to 
simple structures, but this would not be to begin with complex structures in the sense of 
treating them as primitive.) But is there a perfectly simple conceptual structure, a 'logical 
atom' as it were, the investigation of which does not presuppose the mediation of other 
concepts? If Hegel could locate the 'beginning' of all rational inquiry in such a simple, 
unmediated thought, it seems his inquiry could get underway without bringing any more 
complex conceptual tools to bear. 
Ultimately, it may well be an implication of Hegel's holism that there are no such 
logical atoms; that each and every thought can only be fully articulated in terms of its 
relation to other thoughts; that there is no such thing as immediate content simpliciter; 
40 Houlgate (1986), p. 29. 
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and that, strictly speaking, constraint (1) is therefore too strong. 41 But Hegel begins (at 
least in the sense of beginning in time, beginning his book on philosophy) with a putative 
candidate of immediate content. This, it turns out, is the very concept of 'immediacy' 
itself This concept is held up as a putative candidate of immediate content because the 
bare notion of 'is-ness', of unspecified being, is said not to depend on any other 
conceptual determination. For it can seem that one does not have to know what particular 
things there are or even what kinds of beings there are in order to grasp the thought of 
being in abstracto. This utterly primitive thought, stripped of all concrete applications, 
might therefore be seen as free-standing vis-a-vis ontological theory. Indeed, it appears 
we do not need access to any more complex conceptual structures whatsoever to grasp 
the bare notion of 'is-ness'. Houlgate summarises this aspect of Hegel's strategy thus: 
If thought is to determine its own necessary characteristics and presuppose no detenninate 
categories or principles in so doing, it must begin by abstracting from and suspending all given, 
determinate thoughts and must think a thought in which nothing determinate is thought, a thought 
which is thus utterly indeterminate. For Hegel that thought is the indeterminate, empty thought of 
being.42 
By beginning with the concept of immediacy, Hegel thus provisionally respects the 
constraint that we begin with that which is immediate, whilst leaving it an open question 
whether or not this constraint can ultimately be satisfied. 43 Arguably, what ensues in the 
unfolding of the Science of Logic purports to 'sublate' this methodological stricture itself, 
in a way that is supposed to make sense of the notion ofa 'mediated immediacy'. 44 But 
that unfolding, and its strange dialectic of cancellation and preservation, is another story . 
.tl According to Hegel, '[t]he True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, 
that only in the end is it truly what it is' (PS, p. 11). As Michael Rosen has detailed, this view is highly 
problematic from a henneneutic perspective since, for one thing, it seems to imply that only the one who 
has completed the Hegelian system is 'in a position to fully comprehend (and hence to justify or criticize) 
the method by which it was reached' (M. Rosen (1982), p. 23). 
42 Houlgate (1991), p. 50. 
~3 The ob\ious objection here is that the attempt to think about 'unconceptualised being' fails since an 
utterly indeterminate thought is no thought at all. Arguably, Hegel's claim that pure being collapses into 
nothi~g is an acknowledgement of just this point, which is why his attempt to begin with immediate content 
is only provisional. The Logic, on this interpretation, proceeds by making a series of 'false starts' but in a 
way that gradually approximates to an adequate conception of what is essential to the process of thinking 
and reasoning. What is not provisional is the insistence that we begin without dogmatic assertion. 
44 According to Justus Hartnack, 'the beginning of logic is both mediated and immediate' (Hartnack (1998), 
p.8). 
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In summary, then, Hegel conceives ofa solution to the paradox of beginning in 
terms of (a) an immanent critique of theories that fail to satisfy the constraints on an 
absolute beginning; and (b) an investigation of the basic units of thought, which proceeds 
from the simple concept of immediacy to more complex conceptual structures. The first 
part of the strategy aims to ensure that no methods are dogmatically presupposed, the 
second that no concepts are left unexamined. If the strategy works, Hegel might just have 
found a way of getting off the ground without making an assumption of any kind. 
4. 'From the Papers of One Still Living,45 
S0ren Kierkegaard - alias Johannes Climacus - deals with what he calls the 
'dialectic of the beginning' at some length in Book Two, Part One, Chapter Three, 
Section Four of Concluding Unscientific Postscript.46 Due to the self-consciously 
unsystematic nature of this eccentric work, Climacus' remarks are typically fragmentary, 
often funny and satirical, rarely closely argued. For instance, Climacus raises an 
objection about how the comparative reflection in talk amongst Hegelians of 'the most 
immediate of all' might be dangerous for an absolute beginning and adds in a footnote: 
To show how would become too prolix here. Frequently it is not worth the trouble either, 
because, after a person has laboriously advanced an objection sharply, from a philosopher's 
rejoinder he discovers that his misunderstanding was not that he could not understand the idolized 
philosophy but rather that he had allowed himself to be persuaded to believe that the whole thing 
was supposed to be something - and not flabby thinking concealed by the most overbearing 
expressions. 47 
The pattern of alluded objections collapsing into satire and abuse is, from an analytical 
point of view, all too common. And this mischievous, irresponsible, style has the 
(thoroughly intended) effect of making the real substance behind the jibes frustratingly 
elusive.48 But real substance, I believe, there is. The objection I want to pinpoint - for 
~5 This is of course the title of Kierkegaard's early review (1838) of Hans Christian Andersen's semi-
autobiographical novel Kun en Spillemand [Only a Fiddler]. The review is collected in Early Polemical 
Writings. 
46 The over-the-top sectioning of Postscript is itself part of the parody of 'scientific' philosophy. 
~7 CUP, fn. p. Ill. 
48 'Thoroughly intended' because Climacus, qua self-styled 'humourist', wants to show that if the proper 
response to errors in thought is careful critique, the proper response to illusions of thought is laughter. Thus 
Climacus writes that the problem \\"ith 'modern speculative thought' after Hegel is 'not afalse proposition 
there are several distinct objections in this section - is to the effect that Hegel's 
constraints on an absolute beginning are rather too lenient. Climacus says that Hegel is 
'quite correct' about the need to begin with that which is immediate, but that he 
completely overlooks a rather important corollary of this very constraint: 
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The system begins with the immediate and therefore without presuppositions and therefore 
absolutely. This is entirely correct and has indeed also been adequately admired. But why, then, 
before the system is begun, has that other equally important, defmitely equally important, 
question not been clarified and its clear implications honored: How does the system begin with the 
immediate, that is, does it begin with it immediately? The answer to this must certainly be an 
unconditional no .... The beginning of the system that begins with the immediate is then itself 
achieved through reflection. 
Here is the difficulty, for if one does not let go of this one thought, deceptively or 
thoughtlessly or in breathless haste to have the system fmished, this thought in all its simplicity is 
capable of deciding that. .. a logical system must not boast of an absolute beginning, because such 
a beginning is ... a pure chimera. ,49 
Climacus wants to know just how we are to begin with that which is immediate. 
Presumably, if Hegel's second constraint is to be satisfied, we must begin immediatery. 
F or part of what it means for an inquiry to be self-determining or presuppositionless is 
that it is not determined, or in any way mediated, by the outcome of any prior process of 
reflection. Climacus complains that Hegel does not so much as properly consider the 
implications of this constraint, let alone meet them. Now, in the light of Hegel's 
concerted efforts to accommodate the second constraint, this criticism may seem at the 
very least exaggerated. Perhaps Hegel cannot ultimately meet this requirement, but it 
seems clear he wants to. As we have seen, he is acutely aware not only of the need to 
begin with immediate content but also in such a way that the form of the inquiry is 
immediately constituted, that is, without presupposing any prior conceptual or 
methodological machinery. 
In this light, one contemporary Hegelian scholar has suggested that Climacus' 
'equally important question' here can readily be accommodated within Hegel's own 
account of the beginning: 
but a comic presupposition, occasioned by its having forgotten .. what it mean~ to. be a human being' (CUP, 
p. 120). On the role of humour and satire in C1imacus' critque of Hegel see LIPPItt (2000), esp. Ch. 1; 
C10eren (1985), pp. 4-5. 
49 CUP, p. 112. 
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If philosophy begins with indeterminacy to be free of foundations and provide the only admissible 
commencement for a development determined by nothing but itself, then indeed, the indeterminate content 
with which philosophy begins is equally indeterminate in form, in so far as no determinate method can 
already be operative. Hence, contra Kierkegaard, the beginning not only begins with immediacy but begins 
immediately. 50 
Perhaps, then, Climacus has simply not read enough Hegel to know that the latter 
certainly does at least attempt to 'honour the implications' of the requirement that we not 
only begin with that which is immediate, but that our inquiries also assume an immediate 
form?51 Well, Climacus says that this constraint needs to be clarified before its clear 
implications can be honoured. In fact, I think, he adds this third constraint, which is 
supposed to follow from the two Hegel plainly does recognise: 
(3) The inquirer must begin immediately with that with which she begins. 
Climacus' point is that constraint (2) - that the inquiry must begin immediately with that 
with which it begins - has an important implication for the inquirer as well as the 
inquiry; namely (3). And this is surely correct: if an inquiry is to spontaneously establish 
itself it must not in any way be mediated by the prejudices of any particular inquirer. That 
is, it must not depend upon the results of any prior reflection that an inquirer has made. 
But it is precisely this constraint that Climacus charges Hegel with not so much as 
recognising, let alone satisfying. More: he proceeds to argue that since this constraint 
cannot be satisfied, the very idea of an absolute beginning is a 'pure chimera'. 
Between the dots in the passage quoted above, this argument impinges on a 
contrast between 'existence' and 'system', and on some claim about the priority of the 
former, an adequate interpretation of which would involve a careful reading of Climacus' 
technical use of the word 'existence' already in play here. 52 But, for present purposes, I 
50 Winfield, (1990), p. 55. 
51 Niels Thulstrup reports that Kierkegaard's knowledge of Hegel's texts 'can scarcely be correctly 
described as particularly extensive or exhaustive' (Thulstrup (1980a), p. 13). James Collins, however, 
asserts that 'Kierkegaard gave special attention to the Science of Logic and especially to the Encyclopaedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences. The first or logical section of the latter work was studied more closely than 
an" other Hegelian text' (Collins (1983), p. 105). 
~~ For a classic statement of Kierkegaard's various notions of 'existence' see Elrod (1975), esp. pp. 20-22. 
think we can do without this involved excursion. 53 The basic structure of the objection 
becomes clearer as Climacus expands: 
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In other words, if a beginning cannot be made immediately with the immediate (which would 
then be conceived as a fortuitous event or a miracle, that is, which would mean not to think), but 
this beginning must be achieved through reflection, then the question arises very simply (alas, if 
only I am not put in the doghouse on account of my simplicity, because everyone can understand 
my question - and consequently must feel ashamed of the questioner's popular knowledge): how 
do I bring to a halt the reflection set in motion in order to reach that beginning? Reflection has the 
notable quality of being infmite. But being infmite must in any case mean that it cannot stop of its 
own accord, because in stopping itself it indeed uses itself and can be stopped only in the same 
way as a sickness is cured if it is itself allowed to prescribe the remedy, that is, the sickness is 
promoted. 54 
Essentially, Climacus wants to push Hegel into a dilemma here: either the beginning is 
made in a truly spontaneous manner, in which case it can only be conceived as utterly 
thoughtless ('a miracle,55), or it is made reflectively, in which case a regress looms. If 
Hegel grasps the first hom, he forfeits the resources to argue for a particular starting-
point, however 'immanent' the critique in which his reasons are embedded. For, by 
definition, an immediate (= non-mediating) act cannot mediate between contents on the 
basis of reasons. If, on the other hand, Hegel goes for the second hom, he owes an 
account of how a process of reflection can culminate in a spontaneous act. Let me try to 
make a meal of what Climacus finds embarrassingly simple here. 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that one of the things a thought can be about 
is another thought. The possibility of significant reflexivity is a general feature of 
thought. Now ifClimacus' 'reflection' is read as a generic term for a series of reflexive 
acts of thinking it may be clearer why he should claim that reflection 'has the notable 
"3 It would also take us into metaphysical territory. It is undeniable that aspects of Climacus' critique trade 
on a metaphysical reading of Hegel. What I want to show, however, is that a very important part does not. 
54 CUP, p. 112. 
55 Cf. CUP, p. 188: ' ... when a systematic ian entertains us with a report that he became an adherent of the 
system through a miracle, something that seems to suggest that his systematic life and career do not have 
this in common with the system: to begin with nothing'. 
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quality of being infinite'. 56 Consider this proof of Dedekind' s that at least one infinite set 
exists: 57 
Given some arbitral)' thought S1, there is a separate thought S2, namely that S1 can be an object of 
thought. And so on ad infinitum. Thus the set of thoughts is infInite. 
Whether or not we take this to prove the existence of an infinite set of thoughts, we can 
surely give some sense to the 'and so on ad infinitum' here. And it is, at least, a natural 
way to read Climacus' claim that reflection is infinite; i.e. injust the sense that it is 
possible that an initial thought could 'set in motion' a self-perpetuating series of 
subsequent reflections. 58 Given that the search for an absolute beginning is also the 
search for an immediate, and therefore non-reflective, philosophical cognition, the wony 
is just how such a self-perpetuating series of reflexive acts is to be halted. 
Roughly speaking, the regress arises as follows. Reflection on the desiderata of 
philosophical inquiry gives us reason to make an absolute beginning. So we reflect on 
how we might do that. We discover that we must begin immediately. So we reflect on 
how we might do that. But we discover precisely that we cannot do that whilst we are 
reflecting. So we reflect on that. And so on interminably. Each act judges of its object 
that it fails the requirements of an absolute beginning, just because it is a reflection. One 
thing, says Climacus, is clear: this sort of tail-chasing is not going to resolve itself into an 
absolute beginning. To attempt to reflect oneself out of reflection, he observes, is like 
attempting to cure oneself of a disease by promoting it. (Or compare the insomniac's 
attempt to escape wakefulness by reflecting on the need for sleep.) 
Yet Hegel might be interpreted as arguing that the process of reflection is halted 
by an act that takes nothing but itselfas its own object. For perhaps 'thinking pure 
immediacy', construed as an act of thinking that has no determinate object, is supposed to 
involve a kind of pure reflexivity. In this way, Hegel might want to claim that the process 
56 Justus Hartnack, for one, seems to think this claim is deeply problematic: 'in the sense in which it is self-
evident it is irrelevant and in the sense in which it is relevant it is not correct that [reflection] is infmite' 
(Hartnack (1991), p. 125). 
57 Cited in A. Moore (1990), p. 113. 
58 Pat Bigelow offers the fo Howing description of Kierkegaard' s use of 'reflection': 'Sometimes reflection 
means the reflected image and effect of the age in private, domestic and public life (the Danish Rejlex), 
sometimes deliberation (the Danish Rejlexion, meaning Besindelse, akin to Heidegger's Besinung)' 
(Bigelow (1987), p. 56 fu. 59). 
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of abstracting from all determinate thoughts results in a genuinely spontaneous act, that 
is, one that is unmediated by any prior acts. Recall that in Chapter One, we dismissed just 
this notion of an act that has nothing but itself as its own object on the grounds that such 
an act has lost the raison d 'etre of a judgment in the same way as 'This is a statement' 
has lost the raison d 'etre of a statement. Climacus appears to have a similar worry in 
mind when he reconstructs and probes the Hegelian position as follows: 
When a beginning with the immediate is achieved by reflection, the immediate must mean 
something different from what it usually does. Hegelian logicians have correctly discerned this, 
and therefore they defme the immediate, with which logic begins, as follows: the most abstract 
remainder after an exhaustive abstraction. There is no objection to this defmition, but it is 
certainly objectionable that they do not respect what they themselves are saying, inasmuch as this 
definition indirectly states that there is no absolute beginning. "How is that?" I hear someone say. 
"When one has abstracted from everything is there not then, etc.?" Indeed, when one has 
abstracted from everything. Let us be human beings. Like the act of reflection, this act of 
abstraction is infmite; so how do I bring it to a halt [?]. .. Let us even venture an imaginary 
construction in thought. Let that act ofinfmite abstraction be in aetu; the beginning is not an act 
of abstraction but comes afterward. But then with what do I begin, now that there has been an 
abstraction from everything? Alas, at this point a Hegelian, deeply moved, perhaps would 
collapse on my chest and blissfully stammer: With nothing. And this is precisely what the system 
declares: that it begins with nothing. But I must pose my second question: How do I begin with 
this nothing?59 
Climacus imagines his Hegelian interlocutor as responding to his initial goad about how 
reflection is to be halted by appealing to the concept of abstraction. Beginning to judge in 
accordance with a fully reflexive and rational system, a Hegelian might say, can only be 
achieved once we have abstracted from (i.e. put aside, bracketed) all determinate objects 
of thought in such a way that we are left with no other object of thought than the pure act 
of thinking itself Given that this process of abstraction would itselfbe infinite, Climacus 
is worried whether this kind of bracketing is really possible for us (,Let us be human 
beings '). For the sake of argument, however, he is willing to imagine that someone has 
actually performed an 'act of infinite abstraction'. But what, he wonders, is left for this 
person to think after he has abstracted from all determinate objects of thought? 
Climacus clearly has little time for the notion of an act of thinking that has 
nothing but itself as its own object. He continues, 
59 CUP, p. 114. 
I \ 
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The expression "to begin with nothing," even apart from its relation to the infinite act of 
abstraction, is itself deceptive ... "The beginning is not" and "the beginning begins with nothing" 
are altogether identical theses, and I do not move from the spot.60 
In other words, the only sense Climacus can make of the notion of beginning with 
nothing is the sense in which any beginning involves a new point of departure - the sense 
that to begin anew is to make a break with whatever went before. But this is very far from 
admitting any mysterious idea of an act of thinking that has nothing but its own 
nothingness as its object. Pure reflexivity, we might say, is a pure chimera. 
Now Climacus' remarks on philosophical beginnings have often been seen to 
betray a rather naIve confusion. In a recent article, for instance, Rem B. Edwards makes 
the following, somewhat ofthand, remark: 
Kierkegaard failed to keep track of the distinction between temporal and epistemological termini, 
especially in his complaint that Hegel had no way of beginning immediately with immediacy. 61 
That Edwards declines to expand this objection any further is perhaps testimony to its 
received status amongst Kierkegaard's critics. To flesh it out a little more fully: 
According to Kierkegaard, a fully rational system of beliefs is impossible for human 
beings. This is supposed to be because, whereas such a system would be infinite, humans 
are finite, temporal beings who must therefore form their beliefs non-rationally. From 
this, Kierkegaard concludes that, since all belief-systems are founded on non-rational 
commitments, we are free to choose our basic beliefs. What Kierkegaard fails to see, 
however, is that how people happen to form their beliefs is quite irrelevant to the question 
whether their beliefs are justified. The former is a matter of contingent fact, the latter of 
epistemological principle. Kierkegaard thus commits the embarrassing mistake of 
identifying the genesis of a belief with the terminus of a justificatory chain. 
Now Edwards is surely right to distinguish between sources and justifications. For 
example: I form my belief that it will rain tomorrow simply because I am inclined 
towards pessimism, but then consult a reliable forecast to see whether or not I am 
justified in so believing. But it is not at all clear that Kierkegaard is guilty of conflating 
the temporal moment of belief-formation and the logical moment of justification. On the 
60 Ibid., pp. ll4-5. 
61 Edwards (1985), p. 201. 
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contrary, Climacus is careful to distinguish between an epistemological 'beginning with 
immediacy' in the sense of beginning with a certain kind of content and a temporal 
'beginning immediately' in the sense of a subject beginning in time to act in a certain 
way. Far from smudging this distinction, Climacus wants to show that problems 
surrounding the latter kind of beginning are philosophically important in their own right. 
To reiterate: the basic structure of his objection takes the form ofa dilemma. In so 
far as we begin immediately, we forfeit any reflective justification for beginning where 
we do. But as soon as we start a process of reflection in order to do that, we forfeit the 
possibility of beginning immediately. Either the inquiry cannot legitimate itself because it 
is founded on an arbitrary act or it cannot get started because it presupposes a self-
perpetuating process of reflection. Climacus then sharpens the second hom by foreclosing 
the proposal that reflection is halted by a pure act that has no content other than its own 
activity. There is no such thing as a purely reflexive mental act, for Climacus - to think is 
to have a determinate thought. I take it that this dilemma, this 'simple thought', is from a 
dialectical point of view very powerful against Hegel. For it can 'grant' all of Hegel's 
solution - his provisions to ensure that his inquiry spontaneously grounds and generates 
itself - and still claim that he fails to satisfy his own desiderata. Certainly, this is what 
Climacus thinks he has shown: 
This means that pure thinking is a phantom. And if Hegelian philosophy is free from all 
postulates, it has attained this with one insane postulate: the beginning of pure thinking. 62 
Baldly put, the objection is that the Hegelian vision of a fully reflexive and critical 
system comes to grief on the fact that thinking presupposes a thinker. 63 (Climacus is well 
aware that calling attention to this fact has the ring of the platitudinous. His objection is 
'very plain and simple' and he is 'almost embarrassed to say it or to have to say it' .64) 
This is also the significance of the charge that Hegel illicitly attempts to 'smuggle 
movement into logic' - according to Climacus, there is only progress in thought to the 
62 CUP, p. 314. 
63 Geoffrey Hale puts the point succinctly when he characterizes Climacus' objection to the 'i~eal 
objectivity' of Hegelianism thus: 'The moment one recognizes that there must be som~me domg the " 
thinking, this ideal objectivity falls apart' (Ha.le (2002): p. 180, n. 32) .. Compare also NIels ~hulstrup: If 
the beginning of the allegedly logical system IS determmed by somethmg other than the logIcal, then there 
is, in fact, a necessary presupposition for the beginning' (Thulstrup (1980b), p. 74). 
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extent that a thinking agent is active.65 The dream of an absolute beginning is chimerical 
because such a beginning would require the possibility of a kind of 'thought thinking 
itself, a kind of pure reflexivity, in which no actual thinkers are involved. 
Very plausibly, this is the significant content ofClimacus' vicious caricatures of 
Hegel and the Hegelians. Thus, for example, he concludes his remarks on the dialectic of 
beginning in typically satirical vein: 
.... a philosopher has gradually come to be such a marvelous creature that not even the most 
prodigal imagination has invented anything quite so fabulous ... Whoever wants to be a 
philosopher will ... above all not want to become a ludicrous creature by being transmogrified -
eins, zwei, drei, kokolurum - into speculative thought. If the person occupied with logical thought 
is also human enough not to forget that he is an existing individual, even if he has finished the 
system, the fantasticality and the charlantry will gradually vanish. 66 
The 'fantasticality and the charlantry', I take it, derives from the Hegelian philosopher's 
pretensions to a kind of 'pure thought' which, because it necessarily requires both the 
absence of any determinate object of thought and the absence of any particular thinker, is 
a 'pure fantasy' .67 Witness, for instance, one scholar's recent attempts to commend 
Hegel's conception of the role of the philosopher in systematic inquiry: 
What happens in life is muddier, more confused, and less conscious than what happens in 
thought. The "science of experience" is much clearer than experience itself is (though it has not 
seemed so to most students of Hegel's text) precisely because it is scientific. This is "our 
contribution." Our task is to be scientific observers, and the philosophical science that we are 
concerned with is logic. Eventually our motion becomes the progression of human culture in 
historical time. 
64 CUP, p. 116. 
65 The 'movements' in Hegel's Logic are notoriously difficult to account for. One scholar has recently 
suggested that the only way to account for 'Hegel's mysterious transitions' between Begriffe is in 
functional rather than deductive terms. On this view, each new Begriffin the system fulfills 'the functional 
purpose of providing depth and clarity to the preceding Begriffe and their subdivisions - a purpose which, 
from a narrative standpoint, is external to the conceptual content present at both key transitions' (Gaskins 
(1990), p., 405). Similarly, Michael Forster appeals to 'the drive to escape ... self-contradictoriness' (Forster 
(1993), p. 146) and cites Hegel's reference to a 'drive to find a stable maning' (HL §87). Are these 
admissions of an extra-systematic teleology? From whence comes the 'drive'? Note, however, that 
Climacus' strategy (unlike Schelling's) is not to argue that this or that move within the system is illicit 
given their supposed necessity. Rather, he wants to undermine the very notion that concepts 'move', 
independently of the activities of any particular thinker. 
66 CUP, p. 117. 
67 Climacus writes: 'it seems a bit peculiar to me that there is this continual talk about speculation and 
speculation as if this were a man or as if a man were speculation. Speculation does everything - it douhts 
everything etc. The speculative thinker, on the other hand, has become too objective to talk about himself 
(CUPp.51). 
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The philosopher [who has read and understood the Phenomenology] is a singular shape of 
consciousness, and in her perfect appreciation of the great cycle of experience, she is logicallY the 
richest of shapes; but when she moves on to develop the Science of Logic from the threshold' 
provided by the standpoint of speculative observation we have now achieved, she is "pure 
thinking" - and that is a shape no longer because "experience" is left behind.68 69 
It is this conception of 'our task' in philosophical inquiry as that of the 'scientific 
observer' who somehow gets free of the muddiness of life by being caught up first in 'the 
progression of human culture in historical time' and then in 'pure thinking itself that 
Climacus finds wholly pernicious (not to mention ludicrous).7o Hegel maintained that 'it 
is a matter of perfect indifference where a thing originated; the only question is: "is it true 
in and for itself?",71 'Therefore one must be very cautious about becoming involved with 
a Hegelian', Climacus warns, 'and above all must ascertain who it is with whom one has 
the honour of speaking. Is he a human being, an existing human being?,72 
5. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein 
Kierkegaard held a wildly subjectivist theory of truth. Wittgenstein conducted an 
all-out assault on the notion ofprivacy.73 In the light of these caricatures it is somewhat 
curious to find the latter eulogizing the former as the 'most profound thinker of the 
nineteenth century' .74 There is, in fact, a growing interest in the relationship between 
68 Harris (1995), pp. 20, 93. 
69 Compare William Maker: ' ... there is no claim that as pure logical categories they [i.e. the components of 
Hegel's Logic] are the thought categories of the actual thinking subject (whose thought categories are what 
they are because of the relation of the subject to a world of objects)' (Maker, (1993b), p. 276). Compare 
also Willem de Vries' way of setting up the fundamental problematic of Hegel' s Logic: 'How does one 
start doing logic? Since logic is the self-movement of the concept, it seems there is nothing that one does at 
all. How does one get concepts to move themselves?' (de Vries (1993), p. 236). 
70 Cf CUP, p. 133: 'The objective orientation (which wants to tum everyone into an observer and at its 
maximum into such an observer that, almost like a ghost, he is easily confused with the prodigious spirit of 
ages past) naturally wants to hear nothing except that which stands in relation to itself. 
71 PH, p. 331. 
72 CUP, p. 306. Compare Nietzsche's claim that 'the only thing of interest in a refuted system is the 
personal element' (cited in Houlgate (1986), n. 26, p. 261). 
73 On the apparent tension between Kierkegaard's association of 'spiritual integrity with a sense of the 
essentially private' and Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument, see Gurrey (1990). 
74 According to Maurice O'c. Drury, Wittgenstein made this declar~tion during a ~iscussio~ ~ter a .. 
meeting of the Moral Sciences Club (Drill!. (1981), p. 102). For an mventory ofWIttgenstem s explICIt 
references to Kierkegaard, see Creegan (1989), Ch. 1. 
,( 
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these two thinkers, largely from within the philosophy of religion. 75 Arguably, however, 
Climacus' remarks on the 'dialectic of beginning', mark a broader field of philosophical 
common ground. 
F or it should already be clear that there are close parallels between the issues 
discussed in Chapter One concerning rule-following and Climacus' worries about 
Hegelian systematicity. In both cases, the issue is how human subjects begin to think in 
accordance with systems or rules of thought. And in both cases, the problem is that this 
appears to require a role for spontaneous activity that is in tension with an obvious 
reading of what it means to/allow a rule or to think systematically, namely, by means of 
acts of reflection, interpretation, reasoning, mediation. In other words, both cases involve 
versions of the Paradox of Constrained Spontaneity (PCS). Wittgenstein draws the lesson 
that it cannot be the case that following a rule requires a prior mental act of the kind 
postulated by some philosophers of mind. Climacus draws the lesson that it cannot be the 
case that human subjects perform an absolute beginning of the kind envisioned by Hegel. 
Yet there is an important asymmetry between Wittgenstein and Climacus' 
concerns. For whereas we obviously do follow rules, it is far from clear that anyone has 
actually performed an absolute beginning. This raises the following problem. Climacus 
argues that Hegel's attempt to solve his paradox of beginning is inadequate on the 
grounds that it fails to address the PCS. But, according to the Wittgensteinian 
considerations explored in Chapter One, it appears this latter paradox is not unique to the 
Hegelian project. For any account of mundane acts of rule-following must somehow 
explain how one and the same act can be both spontaneous and constrained. So is 
Climacus in danger of unintentionally ruling out the possibility of rule-following per se 
by arguing that Hegel's conception ofsystematicity is incoherent on these grounds? 
One possible solution to this problem is that Climacus simply fails to foresee the 
extent of the problem he articulates. In the following chapters, I shall show that, on the 
contrary, the central Kierkegaardian themes of 'the leap' and 'indirect communication' 
(Chapter Three), as well as the role of the imagination (Chapter Four), are all informed 
75 See, e.g., Cavell (1969); Hustwit (1978); Cloeren (1985); R. H. Bell, (1988): Creegan (19~9); Conant 
(1989a); Conant (1993); Conant (1995); Hannay (1990); Phillips (1992); Hall (1993); Ferrerra (1994); 
Barrett (1994); Mulhall (1994); Roberts (1995). In very large part, the burden of these writers is to expand 
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by a wide-ranging engagement with the PCS. Indeed, we shall see how Climacus even 
insists on the intractability of the paradox, on a sense in which it cannot be solved. 
Climacus is therefore not committed to the crude position that any theory that implies a 
tension between spontaneity and systematicity is ipso facto nonsensical. And he certainly 
does not want to commit himself to the impossibility of logical, systematic thought per se 
- after all, the section in which he focuses his worries about absolute beginnings purports 
precisely to 'posit and expound' the possibility of a logical system.76 
The truth is that the PCS plays a subtler role in Climacus' criticism of Hegel. 
Climacus' point is that if logical beginnings do indeed involve a kind of constrained 
spontaneity - what he calls a 'leap' (see Chapter Three of this thesis) - then they cannot 
be achieved by means of a wholly reflexive form of critical reflection. Thought - even 
abstract philosophical thought - cannot be detached from the spontaneous activity of 
existing human beings; systems of rules cannot be meaningfully abstracted from the 
extra-systematic activities of those who follow them. And here is the deep kinship with 
Wittgenstein. For both Climacus and (the later) Wittgenstein diagnose the kind of 
mistake characteristic of philosophers in the attempt to sever logic, thought and language 
from the interests, decisions and practices of actual human beings. Wittgenstein, too, 
once pleaded, 'Let us be human,.77 
This kinship is evident, to briefly take one example, when Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein tum their attention to philosophers' doubts. Johannes Climacus, the 
unfinished novella also entitled, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, is a sustained satire on the 
modern dictum that philosophy only truly begins once each and every assumption has 
been subjected to the test of doubt - an idea that clearly informs Hegel's method. 78 The 
piece revolves around a distinction between genuine doubt - the kind that humans 
on Cavell's proposal: 'The religious is a Kierkegaardian stage of life; and I suggest it should be thought of 
as a Wittgensteinian form oflife' (Cavell (1969), p. 172). 
76 Julia Watkin is therefore right to distinguish between a Hegelian conception of absolute systematicity 
(which Climacus rejects) and a more modest conception of rule-governed thought (which Climacus 
upholds). Watkin, however, construes this distinction metaphysically in terms of an attempt to 'put all 
existence into a total logical existential system' on the one hand, and 'propositional logical systems' on the 
other, and therefore overlooks the non-metaphysical aspect ofClimacus' critique (See Watkin (1997a), fn. 
pp.96-7). 
77 CV, p. 36 (MS 11983: 7.10.1937). 
78 Cf Houlgate (1991), p. 48: . [Hegel] is insisting that . science be preceded hy universal doubt. or a total 
absence of presupposition". 
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actually experience and struggle to overcome - and a sort of pseudo-doubt - the kind 
arguably displayed by the philosophers' claim to have doubted everything in the first few 
pages of their systems.79 Thus the eponymous hero is humorously portrayed as an earnest 
youth whose attempts to take seriously the philosophers' injunction to 'begin with doubt' 
only end in despair of ever beginning to philosophize. Kierkegaard apparently intended to 
append the following epilogue: 
Then the philosophers are worse than the Pharisees, who, as we read, impose heavy burdens but 
themselves do not lift them, for in this they are the same, but the philosophers demand the 
impossible. And if there is a young man who thinks that to philosophize is not to talk or write but 
in all quietness to do honestly and scrupulously what the philosophers say one should, they let 
him waste his time, many years of his life, and then it becomes clear that it is impossible, and yet 
it has gripped him so profoundly that rescue is perhaps impossible. 80 
So in what sense is the injunction to 'begin with doubt' worse than pharisaical? Again, 
the crux of the matter is the 'simple thought' that acts of doubting require, so to speak, a 
bona fide doubter. Thinking and doubting are simply not the kind of phenomena that 
occur in the absence of the interests and concerns of any particular thinker or doubter. 
The accent is thus firmly on the question: 'How does the single individual who enunciates 
[the] thesis [that philosophy begins with doubt] relate to it?,81 But just as the notion of an 
absolute beginning is seen to be incoherent when the role of spontaneity is respected, so 
we are to see that the notion of an all-encompassing kind of doubt such as might preface 
a philosophical 'science' appears quite absurd once this question is properly addressed. 
79 Kierkegaard's choice of epigraph from Spinoza clearly signals the importance of such a distinction: 'I 
speak of real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubts as we see exemplified when his mind does not 
really hesitate. The cure of the latter does not fall within the province of Method, it belongs rather to 
inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure' (JC, unpaginated). Kierkegaard had made a similar distinction 
in his Masters' dissertation between 'speculative doubt and common doubt about this or that' (Cl, p. 247). 
Compare also Judge William: 'one must distinguish between a personal and a scientific doubt. Personal 
doubt is always about something special, and a passion for annihilation of the kind one so often hears talk 
of leads at most to crowds of people venturing out without having the strength to doubt, or else ending in 
some half-measures which is certain failure just the same' (EO (Hannay), p. 433). For his part, Climacus 
ironically refers to the modern tendency '''to doubt everything" - at the lectern' (CUP, p. 365). 
It is interesting to note that Johannes de Silentio spares Descartes himself from censure on the 
grounds that this 'venerable, honest, humble thinker' was not a 'bellowing street-watch' and was 'modest 
enough to allow that his method was important only for himself and sprang partly from his own earlier 
bungling with knowledge' (FJ' (Hannay), p. 41). In support, de Silentio quotes Descartes as avowing his 
aim 'not to teach the Method which everyone should follow in order to promote the good conduct of 
Reason, but only to show in what manner I have endeavored to conduct my O\\n' (ibid., p. 42). 
80 JP III 3291 (Pap. IV B 6) n.d., 1842-3. 
81 JC, p. 151. 
89 
This, Climacus discovers, is not least because to take seriously the injunction to 
'doubt everything' appears to have the unfortunate consequence that one has to withdraw 
one's assent from nothing whatsoever. To be sure, we can perfectly well make sense of 
one's withdrawing assent from this or that commitment in order to subject these to 
critical scrutiny. But this only makes sense in the case that one has commitments from 
which to withdraw. To suppose that, if we go on 'withdrawing' long enough, we can 
somehow get ourselves into a position in which we can 'start again' with a clean slate, on 
the other hand, is absurd. This is not because such a process would take too long or 
require too much eifort, but because 'to withdraw assent' presupposes prior assent. Just 
as the parent who never gives their children sweets would be confused if they tried 
'withdrawing' sweets as a punishment, so to attempt to simultaneously withdraw one's 
assent from every proposition is to withdraw from no proposition. The lesson is that, as 
with the case of breaking promises, doubts only make sense against a background of prior 
commitment. 82 As a matter of logic, doubting must come to an end somewhere. 
Wittgenstein, for his part, also made much of the distinction between merely 
being able to imagine a doubt in a certain case, and one's actually doubting: 
." that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine 
someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and 
making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right)-
but that does not make me doubt in the same case. 83 
Armed with this distinction between genuine doubt and the thought of the possibility of 
doubt, Wittgenstein goes on to attack the pervasive idea that 'secure understanding is 
only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these 
doubts,.84 This notion, he argues, rests on the mistaken idea that the mere possibility of 
doubt in a given case reveals some kind of deficiency in our epistemic structures. That is, 
philosophers are liable to confuse the fact that something can be doubted with a genuine 
8: Climacus' route to this conclusion, as reported in Johannes Climacus, is circuitous. But he puts the point 
succinctly enough in Postscript: 'It is quite certain that at the bottom of all skepticism there is an abstract 
certainty that is the foothold of doubt and is like the line one draws as the base upon which the figure is 
sketched' (CUP, fn., p. 335). 
83 PI §84. 
84 Ibid. §87. 
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epistemological problem.85 If this is something of a passing remark in the Investigations, 
the distinction between genuine doubts and the kind of doubts philosophers' typically 
take themselves to engage becomes the overture of On Certainty. To cite just two 
remarks, both of which might have made fit epigraphs for Kierkegaard's novella: 
If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty. 86 
I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say 
"can trust something"). 87 
Note the agreement with Climacus that the notion of doubting everything is absurd since 
doubts are only possible against a background of prior certainty, commitment, trust. 88 
It is important to stress that, for both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, the point here 
is not is that 'doubting everything' or 'thinking according to a fully critical and reflexive 
system' are ideals that humans, due to their metaphysical condition of finitude, are 
unfortunately unable to attain. 89 Neither is their intention to recommend a 'retreat to 
commitment' or unreflective praxis in the face of the endless possibilities of doubt or 
critical reflection. No: doubt is a genuine issue and critical reflection an important task 
for thoughtful human beings.90 Rather, the point is simply that 'thoughts' and 'doubts' 
are only possible at all to the extent that they are inhabited - i.e. immediately related to -
by actual subjects. Since this is something that, according to Kierkegaard and 
85 This is surely also the point of the more provocative remark: 'Is no demon deceiving us at present? Well, 
ifhe is, it doesn't matter. What the eye doesn't see the heart doesn't grieve over' (RFM 1II-78, p. 205). 
86 DC §1 IS. 
8? Ibid. §509. 
88 This is what Climacus calls 'faith in the ordinary sense' as opposed to the 'eminent sense' of religious 
faith (cf PF, p. 84). For helpful further discussion see Evans (1983), p. 132. Compare also Santayana's 
conception of 'animal faith' (see Sartwell (1991 )). 
89 Julia Watkins, for instance, stresses 'Climacus's realization that reflection concerning everything must so 
exceed the capability of the human mind to fInish with it, the thinker is forced to set limits to the scope of 
inquiry' (Watkins (1997), p. 110). To be sure, Climacus does sometimes make this kind of point, for 
example, when he says that an 'existential system' - i.e. a total comprehension of the whole of reality of 
the kind 'metaphysical' readers attribute to Hegel- is possible for God but not for humans. But, as I have 
tried to show, Climacus' critique has an important non-metaphysical aspect. For thoughtful criticisms of 
attributions to Climacus of a 'reassuringly standardized formula' (Cf CUP p. 123) pertaining to the 
ditTerence between existential and logical systems, see Turner & Beidler (1991). 
90 StanJe~' Cavell emphasises this kind of point in connection with Wittgenstein on scepticism. Far from 
summaril~' dismissing sceptical questions as 'mere nonsense', for Cavell 'this struggle with scepticism is 
cndless~ I mean to say that it is human' (Ca\'l~ll (1989), p. 56). 
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Wittgenstein, philosophers are liable to forget, their self-appointed task in relation to the 
academy is to 'assemble reminders' of what it means to be a human being. 
In sum, Climacus appeals to the PCS by way of emphasising the close conceptual 
tie between thought and thinker, a tie he believes Hegel's vision of a fully critical and 
reflexive system necessarily sunders. In his role as 'humourist', Climacus brings out the 
comedy involved in a human being confusing himself with 'thought itself. For Climacus, 
however, this is not only confused but also unethical, in the sense in which having an 
interest in the purpose and significance of one's own life is the point of departure of 
ethical reflection. 91 For consider again the idea of a presuppositionless inquiry. Is this an 
inquiry in which the inquirer can have no interest? But is not the mere resolution to 
undertake the inquiry the expression of interest, an assumption that the exercise will 
enrich our lives or deepen our understanding? If so, is it a necessary condition of 
conducting an absolute inquiry that one resolves to forget one's resolve to conduct it? 
Witness an unlikely case: 
A thinker erects a huge building, a system, a system embracing the whole of existence, world 
history, etc., and if his personal life is considered, to our amazement the appalling and ludicrous 
discovery is made that he himself does not personally live in this huge, domed palace, but in a 
shed alongside of it, or in a doghouse, or at best in the janitor's quarters. Were he to be reminded 
of this contradiction by a single word, he would be insulted. For he does not fear to be in error if 
he can only complete his system - with the help of being in error. 92 
Kierkegaard sometimes expressed a desire to find an idea that he could live by. For him, 
the most ambitious of philosophers was not ambitious enough. 
* * * 
I have argued that a major trajectory of Climacus' critique survives 'non-
metaphysical' readings of Hegel's project, and involves an extension of Hegel's own 
requirement of immediacy to the thinking subject. Certain general parallels with 
Wittgenstein (which I have but sketched) reinforce this reading of Climacus in terms of 
the PCS. The task of the next chapter is to show how, far from being confined to a one-
off section of the Postscript, the PCS plays a philosophically fertile role in the pervasive 
Kierkegaardian themes of 'the leap' and 'indirect communication'. 
91 Cf Lc\'inas' claim that 'ethics' is prior to 'philosophy . (e. g Levinas (1979), p. 201). 
9c SUD, p. 43-4. 
92 
CHAPTER 
THREE Thinking without a Rule: 
The Theory of the Leap 
We are probably best in accord with ordinary usage if 
we take a judgement to be an act of judging, as a leap 
is an act ofleaping ... With an act there also belongs an 
agent, and we do not know the act completely if we 
do not know the agent. 
(Gottlob Frege) 
Tell me how you seek and I will tell you 
what you are seeking 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
Consider the following passage from a paper by Norton Batkin on Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy of language: 
It is in the context of a particular training or of particular practices already mastered that a 
moment of pointing teaches us or defmes for us a use of a word. Learning the use of a word is not 
a matter of leaping from the word to the world, along the pointing arm of the teacher, but rather a 
matter of leaping from practice to practice. From this training I leap to that practice, from that 
practice I leap to another. From repeating the words "block", "slab", "beam" after the teacher, I 
leap to repeating the words as he points to differently shaped stones and says "block", "slab", 
-'beam". And then I leap to saying the words out loud as he points, silently, to the stones. ,1 
Batkin's argument, of which this is a fragment, is just one take on the so-called 'rule-
following considerations'. Rather than getting immediately embroiled, I want merely to 
register the repeated and striking mention of' leaping' here. Batkin seems to be claiming 
that there is some curious kind of activity, at the very heart of our linguistic competence, 
which is best captured by the verb, to leap_ Witness now a passage in the introduction to 
the collection to which Batkin's paper contributes, compiled in honour of Stanley Cavell: 
On standard accounts [of the so-called Private Language Argument] ... [t]he public nature of 
language ... is supposed to provide an automatic resolution to scepticism about other minds. Again, 
however. Cavell turns the table: for him, the fact that we can only learn our language in a public 
situation means that we can never be quite sure of what we mean in making a claim about another 
or. in fact, in making claims about ourselves. The conditions under which we learn to use a 
1 Batkin (1993), p. 255 
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language preclude certainty that we mean the same as others, thus that in telling them how it is 
with ourselves as well as venturing how it is with them we can be guaranteed error-free 
communication. Instead, the use of language for the description of our own state as well as those 
of others requires a leap of faith in what Cavell calls "our mutual attunement." This leap seems 
less dramatic than Kierkegaard' s leap of faith in religious life but far more pervasive; it 
characterises the whole of life with others and ourselves'. 2 
The burden of this chapter is to show how 'Kierkegaard's leap' is not confined to 
applications in the religious life, that it does indeed characterise the 'whole of life with 
others and ourselves', and that it offers a surprisingly cogent way of cashing out Batkin' 
sense of leaping as a condition of learning and following the rules of thought and 
language.3 Although I shall not pursue the possibility here, it may just tum out that this 
reveals rule-following to involve quite as 'dramatic' a leap as that involved in the kind of 
religious faith more often associated with Kierkegaard. 4 
Specifically, the aim is to justify treating Kierkegaard's 'theory of the leap' as a 
response to the PCS (see Chapters One and Two) on both interpretative and substantive 
grounds.s To this end, I first offer a reading ofClimacus' use of the metaphor of leaping 
in the context of his critique of Hegelian systematicity (Section 1). I argue that this 
metaphor serves the dual purpose of affording an ineluctable role for spontaneity in 
judgement whilst maintaining a sharp distinction between acts and objects of thought. It 
thereby also serves to intensify the paradox, implying certain limits to explanation. 
Given that, however well-motivated, this metaphor hardly offers a satisfying 
solution to the PCS, I proceed to explore a strategy for 'dissolving' the paradox suggested 
by Kierkegaard's texts (Section 2). In this connection, I advance an 'Inseparability 
Thesis' about the relation between acts of thinking and their logically constrained objects. 
2 Cohen, Guyer & Putnam (1993), p. 6 . 
. 1 The popular notion that Kierkegaardian leaps are exclusively religious phenomena is far from foreign to 
serious scholarship: 1'. H. Croxall, for example, baldly asserts, 'l a Jnd in every case this leap is a leap of 
Faith. it is a religious movement' (Croxall (1956), p. 20). In fact, as M. Jamie Ferreira has emphasized, 
Kierkegaard never actually uses the phrase 'leap offaith' (see Ferreira (1998), p. 207) . 
..f It may thus have the added value of providing prima facie grounds for taking the latter rather more 
seriously than analytical philosophers are wont to do. On religious 'leaps' in Kierkegaard see the Epilogue 
to this thesis. 
5 There is no intention in what follows to argue that the theory of the leap is exclusively concerned with the 
theory of judgement. Of course, Kierkegaard paints on a much broader canvass, and religious concepts 
undoubtedly provide his main subject. It is my contention, however, that a proper understanding of the 
more formal aspects of Kicrkegaard' s thought sheds light on the nature of his project as a whole (see the 
Prologue and Epilogue to this thesis). 
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This thesis not only helps to make sense of the notion of constrained spontaneity, I argue, 
but also offers an account of why the paradox arises for philosophical reflection. 
The focus then turns to Kierkegaard' s theory and practice of communication. 
Beginning with ajoumal entry that refers to the 'indirect' demonstration of basic 
principles, I display the limitations of this strategy via an argument ofFrege's (Section 3). 
Kierkegaard's connection between indirect demonstration and 'the leap', however, 
suggests a way of overcoming these limitations, which I illustrate by reading Frege's 
argument as a Kierkegaardian indirect communication (Section 4). The upshot is a form 
of argument I call the rhetorical reductio, the aim of which is to elicit spontaneous 
agreement. I conclude by showing how Kierkegaard deploys such arguments against 
Hegel (Section 5). 
1. Describing the Paradox 
In the course of objecting to Hegel's conception of systematic inquiry - on the 
grounds that beginning to think according to a logical system essentially involves the 
spontaneity of the thinking subject (see Chapter Two) - Climacus writes, 
What if, rather than speaking or dreaming of an absolute beginning, we speak of a leap? To want 
to be satisfied with a "mostly," an "as good as," a "one can almost say that," an "if you sleep on it 
until tomorrow, you may as well say that" merely shows that one is related to Trop, who little by 
little went so far as to assume that having almost taken the bar examination was the same as 
having taken it. Everyone laughs at this, but when one chatters speculatively in the same manner 
in the realm of truth, in the shrine of science and scholarship, then it is good philosophy - genuine 
speculative philosophy. Lessing was no speculative philosopher, therefore he assumed the 
opposite, that an infinitely little distance makes the ditch infmitely broad, because the leap itself 
makes that ditch broad. 6 
Two things are immediately note-worthy. First, the metaphor of leaping is applied in the 
context of thinking according to a logical system. So much for the idea that 
Kierkegaardian leaps are all of religious faith. Second, part of the purpose of this 
metaphor is to emphasise the kind of transitions involved in thinking logically. According 
to Climacus, such transitions are qualitative transitions - where a transition from X to Y 
is qualitative if and only if X and Yare different in kind - or, in Aristotle's terms, a shift 
6CUp,p 115. 
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from one genus to another. 7 The rhetorical context of this insistence on the qualitative 
nature of logical transitions is Climacus' attempt to undermine the Hegelian notion that 
new points of departure in thought are achieved 'immanently' and 'necessarily' within the 
self-generating activity of 'thought itself. 8 Any prior process of reflection such as might 
precede a new point of departure, Climacus goes on to declare, 'must be halted by a leap'. 
Or, as he puts it later in the Postscript, 
.. .if ['the infinity of reflection '] is to be overcome there must be a break, a qualitative leap, and 
that is the end of the [Hegelian] method, of the dexterity of immanence and the necessity of 
transition. 9 
Hence the satirical analogy between the Hegelian method and Trop' s delusion of 
achievement. lO As we saw in Chapter Two, Climacus wants to show that, pace Hegel, 
movement in thought requires the decisive, spontaneous activity of a thinking subject. 
And the metaphor of leaping serves, in the first instance, to underscore that point. 11 
Now it is not hard to see why Climacus chooses this metaphor for modelling a 
spontaneous act that effects a qualitative change. For leaping usually involves getting 
from A to B without touching whatever lies between; and spontaneity usually has to do 
with the achievement of some result in the absence of intermediate or external 
determination. Less obvious is what 'A' and 'B' are place-holders for in the case of the 
7 Climacus frequently uses the tenn metabasis eis alia genos (i.e. transition from one genus to another) to 
characterize the leap to religious faith (see, e.g., CUP, p. 98). Compare the following from Kierkegaard's 
Journals: 'Can the transition from a quantitative to a qualitative determination occur without a leap? And 
doesn't all oflife lie in this?' (JP 42-3 IV C 84 (Hannay), p. 177). 
8 For a detailed account of 'the leap' as a protest against Hegelian mediation see Johnson (1997). 
9 CUP, p. 338. 
10 The same satirical note is struck in the following: 
If a dancer could leap very high, we would admire him, but ifhe wanted to give the impression that he 
could fly - even though he could leap higher than any dancer had leapt before - let laughter overtake him. 
r ,~aping means to belong essentially to the earth and to respect the law of gravity so that the leap is merely 
the momentary, but Hying means to be set free from telluric conditions, something that is reserved 
~:\clusively for winged creatures, perhaps also for inhabitants of the moon, perhaps - and perhaps that is 
also where the system will at long last fmd its true readers (CUP, p. 124). 
11 Arguably, Climacus' talk of the need for 'decision' and 'resolution' in this context serves the same 
purpose (s~c c.g. ibid., p. 113). Although such terms suggest prior deliberation, this surely cannot be right 
given Climacus' insistence on spontaneity. Compare Wittgenstein's remark that 'it would almost be more 
correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage [of applying a rule], but that a new decision 
was needed at every stage' (PI § 186, my emphasis. Cf. RF'J.\f VI-24 (p. 326». See also M. 1. Ferreira's 
distinction between a decision to do such-and-such and a decision that such-and-such is the case (Ferreira 
(1991), pr. 44-5); and C. Stephen Evans' criticisms of 'volitionist' interpretations (Evans (1989». 
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leaps allegedly involved in judgement. Why exactly does beginning to think according to 
a logical system - or learning to follow a rule - involve a qualitative transition? 
The primary qualitative difference of relevance here is that between one's lacking 
and possessing a capacity. 12 Climacus' argument hinges on the assumption that for any 
given subject there is a determinate answer to the question whether or not they have 
learned how to think according to a given rule or system. Either a child can extend '+2' 
beyond the examples they have learnt by rote, or the child has not yet acquired that 
competence. The two cases are qualitatively distinct. To say, on the contrary, that one has 
'almost' acquired the capacity to follow a given rule makes no sense. In other words, to 
think systematically and to follow a rule are success verbs. But if, as Climacus has argued, 
acquiring a logical capacity cannot be a matter of gradual approximation by means of 
prior acts of reflection, it must involve a peculiar kind of spontaneity by means of which 
one somehow 'leaps' into possession of the capacity. That is, it must involve a logically 
constrained form of spontaneity. In this way, 'the leap', as a metaphor for qualitative 
transitions, serves also to underline the paradoxical nature of our acquiring new capacities 
for judgement. 
When Russell once asked Wittgenstein whether he was thinking about logic or his 
sins, the latter famously replied, 'both'. 13 The combination seems unlikely. Yet, in The 
Concept of Anxiety, the metaphor of leaping is applied in the context of a discussion of 
sin in a way that might help to shed light on the sense in which logical thought involves a 
12 It should be noted, however, that Climacus also marks a 'leap' from possessing a capacity for performing 
judgements of a certain kind to the 'subjective acceptance' that is constitutive of one's actually performing 
acts of that kind. For he denies that the latter 'follows directly of its own accord' from the former (CUP, p. 
129-30). The basic point here is that, in all cases of non-tautologous judgement, there is a logical gap 
between being able to apply concepts and entertain judgements on the one hand, and exercising those 
capacities in judgement on the other. Whether one judges that all swans are white, for example, is a separate 
question from whether one has learnt how to apply the concepts all, swans and white. (By contrast, to judge 
that all bachelors are unmarried men just is to grasp the concept bachelor.) This, therefore, is a species of 
what Climacus will call 'the leap from possibility to actuality' - in this case the transition from entertaining 
certain propositions, to actually judging them to be true. 
But is not the gap between entertaining and judging bridged by such items as evidence and reasons? 
Suftice it to sa" here that Kierkegaard insists that how we interpret evidence has a large bearing on what we 
takc it to prov~ and suggests that, in cases of non-deductive reasoning such as induction and argument from 
analogy, forming a judgement on the basis of such arguments is not compelled but requires a 'leap' beyond 
that which logic can guarantee. See Climacus' discussion of arguments for the existence in God (e.g. PF, 
pp. 39-44) and Kicrkcgaard's remarks on non-tautologous reasoning (e.g. JP III V C 7, n.d. (1844), p. 19; V 
A 74, n.d (I X44), 16). I shall not be concerned here to defend these particular claims about the roles of 
e"idence and induction since the motivation for the metaphor does not depend upon them. 
13 Sec Monk (1991 ), p. 64 
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leap. Vigilius Haufniensis has already declared that 'sin came into the world by a leap'. In 
characteristically complex prose, he enlarges as follows: 
The difficulty for the understanding is that sin presupposes itself, that sin comes into the world in 
such a way that by the fact that it is, it is presupposed. Thus sin comes into the world as the 
sudden, i.e. by a leap; but this leap also posits the quality, and since the quality is posited, the leap 
in that very moment is turned into the quality and is presupposed by the quality and the quality by 
the leap. To the understanding this is an offense; ergo it is a myth. As compensation, the 
understanding invents its own myth, which denies the leap and explains the circle as a straight 
line, and now everything proceeds quite naturally. The understanding talks fantastically about 
man's state prior to the fall, and, in the course of the small talk, the projected innocence is 
changed little by little into sinfulness, and so there it is. The lecture of the understanding may on 
this occasion be compared with the counting rhyme in which children delight; one-nis-ball, two-
nis-ball, three-nis-ball, etc., up to nine-nis-ball and tennis balls. Insofar as the myth of the 
understanding is supposed to contain anything, it would be that sinfulness precedes sin. But if this 
were true in the sense that sinfulness has come in by something other than sin, the concept would 
be canceled. But if it comes in by sin, then sin is prior to sinfulness. This contradiction is the only 
dialectical consequence that accommodates both the leap and the immanence (i.e. the subsequent 
. ) 14 Immanence. 
This passage reworks a puzzle that has long exercised theologians. In Augustine's terms, 
it is the puzzle of how a perfect creation could spontaneously go wrong. Now it would not 
be wildly off-beam to paraphrase the PCS as a puzzle about how logically imperfect 
human subjects can spontaneously go right in judgement. And the structure of 
Haufniensis' difficult train of thought suggests the possibility of transposing his remarks 
to the context of judgement in the following, I hope fairly natural, way: 
What is difficult to understand is that acquiring the capacity to perform judgements of 
type X seems to presuppose that one already possesses that very capacity. If learning 
how to perform judgements of a certain kind is a matter of spontaneity, it seems this 
spontaneity must already be mediated by that capacity. This might be thought of as a 
leap, where leaping is a kind of activity that, as Climacus puts it, is 'closest to being in 
two places at the same time,.15 Since this is deeply paradoxical, we may be tempted to 
reject the notion of a leap and resort instead to that of a gradual transition. On this 
account, one acquires the capacity to perform judgements of type X on the basis of 
judgements of other types. But this cannot be right. For a series of judgements of, say, 
11 CA. p. 12. 
15 Cf. CUP, pro 199. 
98 
type Y can never produce a judgement of type X, no more than a series of numbers 
produces tennis balls. So we are forced back on the view that acquiring the capacity to 
perform judgements of type X requires exercising that capacity. Whilst this is 
undeniably paradoxical, it is the only way of accounting for the possibility of one's 
acquiring a capacity which, once acquired, presupposes itself. 
Again, the accent is on the qualitative nature of the transition involved in acquiring a 
capacity to perform judgements. (Compare the tennis-ball joke with the Peanuts cartoon 
in which ten milligrams equal one centigram, ten decigrams one gram, and ten grams one 
grampa!) But here we have a stronger sense of paradox. For the main lesson of 
Haufniensis' metaphor of leaping seems to be that 'the understanding' cannot supply the 
intermediary steps that would appear necessary for one to get from a state of lacking a 
certain capacity to possessing it. The figure of a leap thus registers the sense that 
inasmuch as rule-following does not involve prior reflections on or interpretations of a 
rule, it must involve a sudden and mysterious act of 'boot-strapping', in which a capacity 
is acquired just by dint of its being exercised. 16 
If the above transposition from the context of sin to that of thought is along the 
right lines - and I hope it is clear that the results of this maneuver are supported by 
Climacus' text - it follows that a 'Kierkegaardian' theory of judgement is committed to 
the view that the paradoxical notion of a leap is in some sense inescapable. Now, as 
Haufniensis admits in the context of sin, this conclusion is difficult to stomach - it is an 
'offence to the understanding'. I shall shortly try to render it less offensive. But it is worth 
noting in passing that Wittgenstein sometimes articulated his understanding of rule-
following in similarly paradoxical terms. For example, 
... However many intennediate steps I insert between the thought and its application, each 
intermediate step always follows the previous one without any intennediate link, and so too the 
application follows the last intermediate step. It is the same as when we want to insert 
intennediate links between decision and action. 
We can't cross the bridge to the execution until we are there. 17 
16 Compare CaveIrs reference to 'a leap [not of faith but, let us say, of reason] from a ground that is itself 
implied or defmed by the leap' (Cavell (1985), p. 531). 
17 PC; § 110 (p. 160). Cf BBB, p. 145. 
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If there are no intermediary mental acts that reveal how one is to apply a rule in a given 
case, and if there is thus a qualitative distinction between interpretations and applications, 
then the latter must be unmediated by the former. But how then can we learn to apply 
rules? It seems that acquiring the capacity to apply a rule presupposes the exercise of that 
very capacity. And the metaphor of a bridge that has to have already been crossed before 
it can be crossed surely recalls Haufniensis' sense of a leap to possession of a capacity 
that presupposes itself A passage from Wittgenstein's Nachlass is even more redolent: 
I see that it is red - but how does that help me if I do not know what I have to say or how, in some 
other way, to give expression to my knowledge? For sooner or later I must make the transition to 
expression. And at this transition all rules leave me in the lurch. For now they all really hang in 
the air. All good advice is of no help to me, for in the end I must make a leap. I must say "That is 
red" or act in some way, which amounts to the same thing. 18 
Such passages surely bear out my claim (in Chapter One) that, for Wittgenstein, and pace 
Kripke, the real problem is not how to account for knowledge of rules qua interpretations 
but how to account for rule-following once the gap between interpretations and 
applications - once the need for a 'leap' - has been properly acknowledged. 19 
Now an obvious concomitant of stressing the role of spontaneity in performing 
judgements is acknowledging certain limits of explanation. In particular, the metaphor of 
leaping implies that there are limits to our internal access to justifications for judging in 
the way that we do. Like Wittgenstein, Climacus is thus committed to the claim that our 
capacity for judgement is closely tied up with our non-discursive responses, with 
'ungrounded ways of acting'. For to claim that rule-following essentially involves 
spontaneous activity is just to claim that explanations in terms of rules must come to an 
end with such activity, that at this point we can go no further than appeal to our actual 
. 20 practice. 
18 MS 129, cited in Baker & Hacker (1985), p. 148. 
19 It might be objected that there is a disanalogy between the figure ofleaping as this occurs in Kierkegaard 
and Wittgenstein. Whereas in Kierkegaard, as I have argued, the transition is from lacking to possessing a 
capacity to follow a rule, in Wittgenstein, the transition is 'from the acknowledgement of a grammar to the 
use of some one of its possibilities' (Guetti & Read (1996), p. 46). In other words, for Wittgenstein, the 
rele\"ant transition is from the interpretation of a rule to the application of that rule in a particular case. 
Plainly, howc\'er, this is a special case of the transition from lacking to possessing the capacity to follow a 
rule, inasmuch as this capacity involvcs being able to apply the rule. 
~o This is perhaps why Paul Holmer can attribute the tollowing thesis to Kierkegaard: 
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The notion of an irreducible immediacy that conditions our use of language, but 
which can never itself be fully expressed in language, is nicely articulated by the 
discussion of language and music in the essay on Mozart in Either / Or. Having observed 
that both very primitive forms of language, such as the noises a baby makes, and highly 
developed forms, such as poetry, share a kind of immediate, musical quality, 
Kierkegaard's 'aesthete' continues, 
.. .In language there is reflection and therefore language cannot express the immediate. Reflection 
kills the immediate and that is why it is impossible to express the musical in language: but this 
apparent poverty of language is precisely its wealth. For the immediate is the indeterminable and 
so language cannot express it, but the fact that it is indeterminable is not its perfection but a 
defect. This is indirectly acknowledged in many ways. Thus to cite but one example, we say: 'I 
can't really explain why I do this or that, in this way or that; I do it by ear. ,21 
Compare with this the following remark from Philosophical Investigations: 
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may 
think ... Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say 
"Because 1 know what it's all about." But what is it all about? I should not be able to say. In order 
to 'explain' I could only compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the 
same pattern). (One says "Don't you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn" or "This is 
as it were a parenthesis", etc. How does one justify such comparisons? There are very different 
kinds of justification here.)22 
Since, for both Wittgenstein and the aesthete, the responses involved in learning a 
language are immediate in a way that bears comparison with coming to understand a 
musical theme, this understanding cannot itself be directly communicated.23 (Both 
passages, I think, supply a nice rejoinder to Frank Ramsay's famous quip that what we 
can't say we can't whistle either.) The point that, as the aesthete has it, 'reflection kills 
immediacy' is also made rather more formally in a chapter of Johannes Climacus which 
presents a view to the effect that the possibility of doubt emerges just at the point when 
we try to express our immediate consciousness of reality in language. Since language is a 
system of conceptual relations, the immediate, indeterminate quality of our pre-reflective 
engagement with the world is lost, and we gain the possibility that language and reality 
There is no proof for logical laws or principles .... They describe only the conditions for valid inference; they 
do not provide logical grounds for being logical. Logic is not its own proof (Holmer (1957), p. 39). 
~I EO (Hannay), pp. 80-81. 
22 PI §527. 
23 Compare Climacus' reference to 'the lyrical culmination of thought in the leap' (CUP, p. (5). 
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come apart.24 The relevant point here is that a response to the PCS in terms of a 
Kierkegaardian leap will acknowledge an important role for remarks like, 'I can't really 
explain why 1 do this or that, in this way or that, 1 do it by ear' .25 
It ought to be registered that there is available within Kierkegaard' s texts a 
weightier terminology than that of the distinction between lacking and possessing a 
capacity, which vivifies the sense of a leap to thought. This is the dichotomy between 
'finite' or 'existing' subjects and 'eternal' thoughts. Thus, for example, Climacus 
contrasts 'existing persons' with 'the eternity that is essentially the medium of thought' 
and remarks that' existence is not thoughtless, but in existence thought is in an alien 
medium'.26 According to this contraposition, the transition involved in acquiring new 
capacities for judgement is not merely that from lacking to possessing a capacity, but also 
that whereby finite subjects lay hold of the eternal forms of thought. 27 The qualitative 
distinction between lacking and possessing a capacity is thus also, in the case of acquired 
capacities for judgement, the difference between the limited capacities of a time-bound 
subject and an 'alien medium' of timeless objectivity.28 
24 Or, as The Concept of Anxiety has it, 'the immediate is annulled at the very moment it is mentioned, just 
as a somnambulist wakes up at the very moment his name is mentioned' (CA, p. 10). 
25 Compare Cavell's notion of 'mutual attunement' mentioned in the quote above (from Cohen, Guyer & 
Putnam (1993), p. 6). Cavell refers, for example, to 'the fact of our attunement in words (hence in form of 
life)' (Cavell (1979), p. 34). For more on why attunement is an appropriate metaphor here, see Chapter Four 
of this thesis. 
26 CUP, pp. 302; 332. 
27 Geoffrey Hale gestures towards this dichotomy when he ascribes to Adorno a reading of Kierkegaard 
according to which, ' ... the aesthetic emerges in Kierkegaard' s discussions of language not as the realm of 
free play and dissociation now prized by those commentators who would now claim Kierkegaard as a kind 
ofprotopostmodernist but precisely as the condition of finitude upon which meaning is infmitely founded' 
(Hale (2002), p. 35). 
28 Compare the problem of accounting for the origin of language within an evolutionary framework. 
Stephen Clarke describes one aspect of this problem thus: 
Where Chomsky's theories do not fit so easily into an evolutionary framework. .. is just that there is no 
precedent for Universal Grammar, that it is a single, shattering mutation ... The power of language is 
infinitely in e:\cess of anything that a practical animal would need even if our present linguistic capacity 
arrived (as seems quite likely) by degrees, that transformation from the [mite to the infmite is not a matter 
of degree. But such rapid shifts are not ones that evolutionary theorists can accommodate (Clarke (2000), 
p.409). 
For his part, Haufniensis responds to the problem of the origin of language with humilit y: 'If one were to 
sa\' further that it then becomes a question of how the first man learned to speak, I would answer that this is 
\'~r\' true, but also that the question lies beyond the scope of the present investigation. Howe\,er, this must 
not be understood in the manner of modem philosophy as though my reply were evasive, suggesting that I 
could answer the question in another place. But this much is certain, that it will not do to represent man 
himself as the inventor of language' (CA. fn. p. 47). 
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Now the platonic overtones of this idiom may well seem wholly out of place in 
the context of an attempt to secure a close connection between thinker and thought, act 
and object of judgement. Indeed, I shall shortly defend on Kierkegaard' s behalf the claim 
that these relata are inseparable. But I also hope to show that this thesis is consistent with 
acknowledging the objectivity of thought, albeit in terms very different to Plato's. And 
the language of temporal subjects and eternal forms might be taken as simply a way of 
dramatising the conceptual gap between subjective acts and logical constraints. After all, 
if there were no such gap between psychology and logic, there would be nothing 
paradoxical in the idea ofa logically constrained spontaneity, no need for a 'leap'. What 
makes Kierkegaard's position so interesting in this respect is that he seems to hold both 
that thoughts are objective in a way that subjective acts are not and that thoughts 
spontaneously arise from such acts?9 
Ultimately, it is this tension between the objectivity of thought and the 
requirement of spontaneity that accounts for Climacus' choice of metaphor. For we have 
seen how leaping is apt to model a kind of transition which is both qualitative and 
spontaneous. To be sure, Kierkegaard never set out to develop a theory of judgement. But 
the upshot of the metaphor of leaping in this context is that his approach is circumscribed 
by the attempt to respect the ineluctable role of subjectivity whilst insisting on a 
qualitative distinction between subjective acts and objective thoughts. In other words: talk 
of 'leaps' of judgement is motivated by a sense of the need to do justice both to the 
objectivity and to the spontaneity of thought - or again, by the need to reject an 
objectivist theory without implying subjectivism.30 (Recall that the conclusion of Chapter 
One was that these are precisely the conditions a theory of judgement ought to satisfy.) 
2 Dissolving the Paradox 
What Kierkegaard somewhat playfully calls his 'theory of the leap' is thus, in 
part, an attempt to characterise the PCS. But is a metaphor for a puzzling phenomenon 
29 Kierkegaard's insistence on the 'infmite' objectivity of thought and language - as \\ell as on its 'fmitude' 
- is one of the features of his work that makes it recalcitrant to fashionable 'postmodem' readings. For 
exampks of this school see note 18 of the Prologue to this thesis 
10 h)r further explication of what' subjectivism' means in this context see Section 2 below. 
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really the best we can do? Would not endorsing the notion ofa paradoxical leap represent 
more an admission of failure than a theoretical advance? In Chapter Four, I shall argue 
that an appeal to the role of the imagination can go some way towards a solution to the 
substantive issue of how subjects learn to follow rules. In effect, this is an attempt to give 
some content to the idea of following a rule, as it were, 'by ear'. For now, however, I 
want to develop a strategy for 'dissolving' the paradox by clarifying the concepts 
involved and considering just why it arises for philosophical reflection.31 
Kierkegaard's metaphor can itselfbe seen to point to such a strategy. For one 
virtue of the figure of 'the leap' is that it corrects the temptation to think of rule-governed 
judgement as proceeding 'step by step like a calculus' by means of intermediate 
reflections (i.e. the temptation succumbed to by the OTJ - see Chapter One). But once we 
reject that prejudice, the puzzle of how we manage to traverse an infinite series of steps 
between a rule and its application simply does not arise. That is, by invoking the role of 
spontaneity, the metaphor of leaping disarms the Regress of Interpretations discussed in 
Chapter One. Another way of putting the same point is that, by respecting the requirement 
of spontaneity, Kierkegaard's approach shows just why the paradox usually associated 
with Wittgenstein cuts no ice - where this is roughly the paradox that since rules can be 
interpreted in different ways, every action can be construed as in accordance with a given 
rule. For, as Wittgenstein himself indicates, that paradox presupposes the 
misunderstanding that following a rule essentially involves acts of interpretation. 
Yet it should be clear by now that the theory of the leap articulates a different 
paradox, namely, that one and the same act is both spontaneous and logically constrained, 
where these are qualitatively distinct. I believe that Kierkegaard's texts offer not only a 
nice metaphor for characterising it, but also an insight that helps unravel this puzzle. To 
anticipate: the insight is that to insist that spontaneous acts and logical constraints are 
qualitatively distinct is not to deny that they are interdependent, even to the point of 
31 Wittgenstein writes: 'Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a partiCUlar, as it were 
defecti\'e. sillTounding. One needs to complete this sillTounding in such a way that what looked like a 
paradox no longer seems one' (RF\/, VII-43 (p. 410». 
In case someone thinks such a strategy \\ould be inimical to Kierkegaard, given his penchant for the 
paradoxical, consider the following from his Jou171als: 'Paradox is the intellectual life . s authentic pathos, 
and just as only great souls are prone to passions, so only great thinkers are prone to what I call paradoxes, 
which are nothing but grand thoughts still wanting completion' (my emphasis) (JP 38 II A 755 (Hannay), 
p. 115). 
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inseparability. The particular text I have in mind is the chapter of Johannes Climacus 
which reports Climacus' youthful attempts to explain the conditions of the possibility of 
doubt (an account, as he puts it, of' doubt's ideal possibility in consciousness ,32). This 
unfinished chapter is very sketchy and it is charitable to assume that Kierkegaard would 
have filled it out considerably had he chosen to publish the book. Yet it arguably contains 
the germs of a unique and fascinating theory of mind.33 
Climacus begins with 'the child,.34 He assumes that children have consciousness 
but that they do not doubt. The first question is therefore what kind of consciousness a 
child has if it is constituted in such a way that the possibility of doubt has not yet arisen: 
'How, then, is the child's consciousness qualified?'. Here is Climacus' answer: 
It actually is not qualified at all, which can also be expressed by saying that it is immediate. 
Immediacy is precisely indetenninateness. In immediacy there is no relation, for as soon as there 
is a relation, immediacy is cancelled. Immediately, therefore, everything is true, but this truth is 
untruth the very next moment, for in immediacy everything is untrue. If consciousness can remain 
in immediacy, then the question of truth is cancelled. 35 
To say that the child's consciousness is immediate is just to say that it is not yet 
constrained by a system of conceptual relations. The concepts of truth and falsity, for 
example, have not yet been acquired. (The formula that in immediacy 'the question of 
truth is cancelled' - where 'cancelled' is read as 'non-operative' - is much happier than 
talk of everything being both true and untrue.) The child cannot doubt, Climacus reasons, 
because it is immediately bound up in a world it has not yet conceptualised. But the issue 
is how 'the question of truth' , and then the possibility of doubt, arises from this immature 
consciousness. Climacus' initial answer appears bizarre: 
How does the question of truth arise? By way of untruth, because the moment I inquire about 
truth, I have already inquired about untruth. In inquiring about truth, consciousness is brought into 
relation with something else, and what makes this relation possible is untruth. 36 
Jc JC, p. 166. 
33 Nonetheless, I have yet to find anything approaching a sustained treatment of this tex1. For historical 
contexts of Johannes C [imacus see Strawser (1994). 
34 Climacus does not specify any age, but the subsequent argument makes it clear that he imagines 'the 
child' as one who has not yet acquired linguistic competence. 
35 Jc, p. 167. 
36 Idem. 
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Appearances to the contrary, I think Climacus' point here is not implausible. His claim is 
that the issue whether what seems to be the case truly is the case could only arise for a 
form of consciousness that had already become aware that appearances are not always 
what they seem. In other words: the question of truth is intelligible only to whoever is 
aware of the possibility that their immediate awareness is untrue. 37 Indeed, it is perhaps 
only the one whose naIve confidence in their immediate awareness has been disrupted in 
this way who could stand back, as it were, from that awareness in order to categorise it 
al1.38 But what is the 'something else' into which such a disrupted consciousness is 
brought into relation? Climacus' answer is 'mediacy' or 'ideality' - i.e. the logically 
constrained system of conceptual relations embodied by a natural language. But before he 
unpacks this answer he is himself disrupted by another question: 
Which is first, immediacy or mediacy? That is a captious question. It reminded him of the 
response Thales is supposed to have given someone who asked whether night or day came into 
existence first: Night is one day earlier. 39 
The question here is a quite general one about the relation between our pre-reflective 
engagement with the world and the conceptual and linguistic tools at our disposal for 
mediating that engagement. From the fact that Climacus quite plainly holds that, in a 
developmental sense, immediacy precedes mediacy (it is the child's consciousness that is 
immediate), it is clear that what is at stake here is not temporal but logical or 
metaphysical priority. Climacus is considering whether logical constraints determine our 
spontaneous actions and reactions or vice versa. 
Climacus' answer is very revealing. The question is 'captious' since it overlooks 
the interdependence of the two relata. 4O Just as the concepts night and day are mutually 
37 Compare Stephen Clarke: 'As long as we were only aware of our own world, wordlessly present to us, we 
had no way of making any distinction between our world and the Truth' (Clarke (2000), p. 421). 
38 There is a curious argument lurking here to the effect that the capacity for judgement presupposes a kind 
of dislocation from the world. 1. e. if one did not experience dislocation, one would not achieve the 
necessary 'distance' from one's immediacy that makes judgement possible. Even if I could do so, this is not 
the place to pursue such an argument. It ought to be pointed out, however, that whatever the disruption of 
immediacy is supposed to involve it is clear that Climacus does not take it to amount to doubt, if only for 
the fact that doubt emerges much later in his explanatory scheme. (perhaps he envisages it as a kind of 
uncertainty or anxiety? Kierkegaard distinguishes between uncertainty and doubt (cf Pap. IV B 10: 18 n.d., 
IX42-3 (JC, Supp., p. 262)) Of course he devotes a whole book to the concept of an\:iety.) 
39 JC. p. 167. 
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dependent, he seems to be claiming, so logical mediation is inextricable from human 
spontaneity. To be sure, the relata are qualitatively distinct. Spontaneous subjectivity and 
logical rules are as different as are night and day. But one cannot ultimately separate the 
one from the other - just as our concept of day would be very different if we had no 
concept of night and vice versa, so our spontaneous actions and reactions would be very 
different if they were not determined by logical constraints and vice versa.4-1 And, given 
this relation of mutual interpenetration, it therefore makes no sense to ascribe logical or 
metaphysical priority to night or day, unmediated subjectivity or mediated objectivity. To 
deploy an idiom that Kierkegaard develops in the context of religious belief, the 
spontaneous how of judgement is essentially (rather than externally) related to the 
logically constrained what.42 
It hardly needs saying that this is highly suggestive vis-a-vis the PCS. The 
prospect is of a way of dissolving the paradox by making sense of a relation of, roughly 
speaking, being distinct-but-inseparable.43 Before this prospect can be explored, 
however, Climacus needs to be rescued from an obvious charge of self-contradiction. For 
if, as I have suggested, his response to the question of priority implies that human 
spontaneity and logical mediation interlock to the point of inseparability how then can he 
have just characterised a child's consciousness as wholly immediate? 
40 Compare Samuel Butler: 'The chicken was the egg's idea for getting more eggs'! (Cited in Hughs & 
Brecht (1979), p. 19). 
41 Compare Vigilius Haufuiensis: 'Immediacy is not annulled by mediacy, but when mediacy appears, in the 
same moment it has annulled immediacy. The annulment of immediacy is therefore an immanent 
movement within immediacy, or it is an immanent movement in the opposite direction within mediacy, by 
which mediacy presupposes immediacy' (CA, p. 37). There is more than a hint of parody in this Hegelesque 
formula, but the point is that SUbjective 'immediacy' and logical 'mediation' stand in a relation of mutual 
determination, such that the former precipitates the latter, and the latter precipitates the former. 
42 For more on the religious context of this idiom, see the Epilogue to this thesis. 
D Note, however, that, for Kierkegaard, a conceptual dissolution is not equivalent to an existential 
resolution. If, as I shall argue, we can make good sense of Climacus' sense of immediacy and reflection as 
distinct-but-inseparable, we still have to live in the tension between the two. In this sense, Pat Bigelow may 
be right to talk of 'the tightrope tension ... of living in the zone of the breach [between immediacy and 
reflection l' (Bigelow (1987), p. 56). Roughly, I take this to mean that, since we have our being neither in a 
stable world of logical objects nor in a fllLX of unthinking immediacy, we are denied the kinds of existential 
stability such worlds might ofTer. Nonetheless, BigelO\y unduly mystifies matters when he declares that this 
rdation ~is the nothing that thinking cannot think' (idem). Here, as so often with Kierkegaard, the strategy 
is to dissolve our sense of an intellectual problem in order to intensitY our sense of an existential problem. 
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As if to encourage the objection (and support my interpretation) Climacus directly 
goes on to declare that if consciousness remained in immediacy 'there would be no 
consciousness at all'.44 The word to notice, however, is 'remained'. Climacus' argument 
hinges on the claim that the possibility of conceptual mediation (and therefore, as he will 
go on to argue, the possibility of doubt) is latent in the child's immediate consciousness. 
If this were not so - if, counterfactually, the child were the kind of being that remained in 
immediacy - then the child would not qualify as conscious at all. In other words: it is only 
in virtue of a child's having the potential for conceptual and linguistic competence that 
Climacus wants to count as it as a conscious being.45 
The suggestion that logically constrained objects of thought are distinct-but-
inseparable from the spontaneous activities of subjects passes by all too quickly as 
Climacus hurries on towards the possibility of doubt. But we might well pause by taking 
leave ofKierkegaard's text and homing in on a debate between two analytical 
philosophers. In a paper entitled 'More About Thoughts', Michael Dummett responds to 
an 'exceedingly illuminating article' in which David Bell had offered a generally 
sympathetic interpretation ofFrege's theory of judgement but with two exceptions.46 The 
first of Bell 's charges against Frege need not detain us. But the second is this: 
In its fully Fregean form the incoherence arises as follows. Thinking is grasping or apprehending 
a thought, and a thought is an object. Although Frege himself nowhere explicitly asserts that 
thoughts are objects, this follows immediately from his identification of a thought as the reference 
of a singular term of the form: "The sense of the sentence'S '''. And yet, of course, a thought is 
also the sense of a name of an object, i.e., the sense of a sentence whose reference (if it has one) is 
a truth-value. According to Frege, to have an object in mind is to have grasped the sense of some 
expression which has that object as its reference. But a vicious infmity of such acts of grasping is 
generated immediately if we maintain, with Frege, that this sense is, in turn, merely an object we 
have in mind; for in this case the sense would likewise have to be grasped via the sense of some 
expression, which in its turn, as an object, would have to be grasped via the sense of some 
. d 47 expresslOn ... an so on. 
44.1c, p. 167. 
45 This helps explain why, as Kierkegaard's papers testify, Climacus rejected the option of taking animals as 
his prototype of immediate consciousness (see Pap. IV B 143 n.d., 1842-3 (JC, Supp., p. 252)). Compare 
the structure ofClimacus' argument in this respect with that of mora! philosophers who seek to circumvent 
the implication of their theories that non-rational beings are excluded from the moral community by 
appealing to the potential for rationality latent in children. 
·16 Sec D.Bell (1987a): Dummett (1991). 
171kll (1987a), pp. 46-7. 
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If the technical machinery is unfamiliar, Bell's worry is surely not. Simply put, the charge 
is that Frege's theory implies the absurdity that in order to grasp a given thought, T, one 
must have grasped a thought that refers to T, which in tum requires that one has grasped a 
thought that refers to a thought that refers to T, and so on ad infinitum. In fact, as Bell 
goes on to spell out, he is no more than applying the principle that one's performing acts 
of a certain kind cannot require the prior performance of acts of that very kind - i.e. the 
very principle that I have argued underpins the Kierkegaardian figure of leaping in this 
context (see also Chapters One and Two.) 
Bell proceeds to argue that this principle is sufficient to discredit what he calls the 
agent-act-object model of thought. Pace Frege, thoughts are not to be conceived as 
timeless objects existing in some Third Realm, wholly independent of subjective acts. 
Instead, Bell proposes an agent-act model. What this means is that we should construe 
thinking and judging as intransitive verbs - i.e. on the model of to leap, say, rather than to 
carry. Or, as Dummett glosses the proposal, thinking and judging are mere cognate 
accusatives (where e.g. to feel afeeling of anger is just to feel angry). The agent-act 
model thus implies a kind of subjectivism (or 'anti-realism') about thoughts. 
Now, according to Dummett, this proposal comes with a high price-tag. The cost 
is in fact just what, by Bell's own lights, makes Frege's theory so attractive - namely, its 
capacity to account for the objectivity of thought. In particular, Dummett argues that to 
endorse the agent-act model is to forfeit any plausible account of the indisputable 
explanandum that two or more thinkers can have one and the same thought. 48 For in order 
to capture this, the agent-act model must surely make sense of two subjects acting in the 
same kind of way. But it is possible to determine what counts as 'acting in the same way' 
in a given case, Dummett asserts, only to the extent that it is possible to identify what 
subjects are thinking independently from any particular mental act. 49 
It is tempting to cast Dummett's objection in Kierkegaardian terms as charging 
that, whilst paying full due to the role of spontaneity in leaps of judgement, the agent-act 
481n an unpublished paper, 'Thoughts, Spontaneity and Rationality', Stefano Manfredi argues further that 
only ,ill act-agent-object model is sufficient to account for such features of thoughts as that they are 
structured, that they contain repeatable elements, and that we can isolate these repeatable elements by 
means of a procedure of analysis. 
·19 Cf. Dummett (1991). p. 308. 
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model fails to respect the qualitative achievement such leaps accomplish, namely 
'eternal', transitive, logically mediated thoughts. The agent-act model can accommodate 
the subjectivity of thought - the how - only at the expense of its objectivity - the what. 50 
In fact, however, Dummett does not want to saddle himself with Frege's 'mythology' of 
eternal logical objects. It appears that what he needs, therefore, is a way to retain the 
agent-act-object model without implying Fregean realism. In this spirit, Dummett 
proposes that we distinguish between two kinds of objects in the following terms: 
A dance step, for example, is an immanent object. There appears to be no clear answer to the 
question whether or not we should construe the statement that a dancer danced a certain step on 
the model of agent-act-object. It would be unreasonable to deny that the dance step is an object: 
two dancers can execute the same step, and the step may have been danced many times, and 
hence have existed a long time, before a particular dancer danced it: a dance step has objective 
properties, and can be spoken of and thought about. On the other hand, the step did not exist, and 
could not have existed, antecedently to or independently of anyone's dancing it: it is this which 
distinguishes it as an immanent object from a transcendent one like a shoe. Thoughts and other 
senses should not be banished, as Bell wishes to banish them, from the category of objects; but 
they are immanent, not transcendent, objects and hence not inhabitants of a realm altogether 
independent of us and our activities. Since we can conceptually separate the thought from the 
particular act of thinking, it does not hann to construe that act as having an object. 51 
So Dummett, like Climacus, seems to want to have it both ways.52 Contra Frege, thoughts 
are not transcendent objects standing in an external relationship to unmediated acts. But, 
contra Bell, neither are they mere cognate accusatives. Rather, thoughts are the 
'immanent' objects of acts, where these relata are both distinct and mutually dependent. 
Dances and thoughts can be identified independently of, but they nonetheless both 
determine and depend on, and to that extent are inseparable from, the activities of 
50 Similar charges are, of course, routinely leveled at 'Kierkegaard's doctrine that truth is subjecti\'ity' -
where the worry is that to over-emphasize the how of religious faith is to forfeit any account of its objective 
content. See, for example, Anderson (2000), p. 81. Suffice it to say here that if - as I argue in the Epilogue 
- there are structural analogies between leaps of judgement and faith, we might expect Kierkegaard to 
display a similar respect for both the how and the what in the case of the latter. 
51 Dummett (1991), p 313. 
52 Therc is some evidence that Climacus wants to 'have it both ways' in an even stronger sense than 
Dummett. This is suggested by the following passage in which he aligns himself with Plato: 'Human 
c:-.:istencc has Idea in it, but it is not a purely ideal existence. Plato placed the Idea in the second rank of 
c:-.:istence, as intennediary between God and matter; an e:-.:isting human being does indeed participate in the 
Idea, but he is not himseif an Idea' (CUP, Lowrie trans., p. 295 (cf. CUP, p. 331)). The picture of the 
human subject as suspended between t\\'o metaphysical poles - in this case, unthinking matter and platonic 
fOlms - runs throughout Kicrkegaard's authorship (see, e.g., CUP,p. 314; SUD, pp. 29-42). Nonetheless. 
Climacus is consistent in breaking down the traditional implication of the platonic scheme that Ideas stand 
in an c:-.:kmal relation to human subjectivity - on the contrary, humans 'participate' in the Idea. 
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particular dancers and thinkers. To ask whether acts of dancing or thinking or speaking a 
language are logically prior to the steps danced or the objects thought or the meanings 
expressed would therefore be, as Climacus might say, to ask a captious question. 53 
The conception of language, in particular, as both prior to the activity of any 
particular subject and yet spontaneously determined by the activities of subjects comes 
out very clearly in the following passage from Kierkegaard's Journals: 
If it were true that philosophers are without presuppositions, an account would still be due of 
language and its whole importance for speculation. For here speculation has indeed a medium 
which it has not provided for itself, and as the eternal secret of consciousness for speculation is its 
being the unity of specifications of nature and of freedom, so also is language partly an original 
given and partly something that freely develops. And just as little as the individual, no matter how 
freely he develops, can ever reach the point of absolute independence, since true freedom consists 
on the contrary in appropriating the given, and consequently in becoming absolutely dependent 
through freedom, so too with language: though we do at times fmd the ill-conceived tendency not 
to want to accept language as a freely appropriated given but rather to give it to oneself whether 
that manifests itself in the highest regions where it usually ends in silence or in the personal 
isolation of a jabbering argot. Perhaps the story of the Babylonian confusion of tongues may be 
explained as an attempt to construct an arbitrarily formed common language, which attempt, just 
because it lacked fully integrative commonality, had to break up into the most scattered 
differences, for here it is a question of totum est parte prius [the whole is prior to its parts], which 
was not understood. 54 
This passage not only contains the germs of a theory of freedom - freedom consists in 
'freely appropriating' that which is not self-given - but also anticipates the twentieth-
century refrain that, with language, the whole is prior to its parts. 55 But the most 
prominent emphasis is that language is both 'freely developed' by individual subjects and 
independently given to them in the form of the 'fully integrative commonality' of their 
language as a whole. 56 To deploy a formula Kierkegaard liked to apply to the whole of 
53 In the light of Dummetl's example, it is intriguing to note that Kierkegaard quite often connects thinking 
and dancing. Climacus, for example, introduces himself as someone who is 'training myself always to be 
able to dance lightly in the service of thought' (PF, p. 7). This remark comes in the context of an ironic 
disavowal of the 'concordance of joys' that come with one's 'having an opinion' - that is, for Climacus, 
learning to think is more akin to practicing a dance than amassing 'real estate' (cf. PF, p. 98). 
54.1p 40 III A II (Hannay), p. 130. 
'i'i Compare Wittgenstein 's extension ofFrege's 'Contex1 Principle' - viz. that a word has meaning only in 
the context of a sentence - to such contexts as 'language-games', 'practices', 'forms of life'. Kierkegaard's 
emphasis on the 'integrative commonality' that is an essential condition of language is just one 
cvidence that his oft -noted' individualism' has nothing to do with atomism. For others. see Westphal 
( 1996) pp. 140-41: Connell & Evans (1992): and Chapter Four of this thesis. 
56 b'cI1 Fregc himself, for all his anti-psychologism, saw that the relationship between logic and psychology 
is complex: 'Language is a human creation; and so man had, it would appear, the capacity to shape it in 
conformit~· \\ith the logical disposition alive in him. Certainly the logical disposition of man was at work in 
III 
life: for any given subject, language is 'both gift (Gave) and task (Opgave)'.57 (Note that 
all this is framed as an objection to philosophy sans presuppositions - the irony is that the 
very ambition for a language of pure objectivity reduces one to the isolated subjectivity of 
a 'gibbering argot'.) If this is existentialism, it is existentialism in a realist spirit. 58 
To draw all these threads together: the proposal, suggested by Kierkegaard's texts 
and developed via the debate between Bell and Dummett, is that the PCS can be clarified 
by making sense of a relation of, roughly speaking, being distinct-but-inseparable. I take 
it that Climacus' analogy with the concepts day and night and Dummett's example of the 
relation between an act of dancing and the dance step performed go some way to 
illustrating this relation. Admittedly, however, the language of , distinct-but-inseparable' 
(or 'both gift and task') remains somewhat paradoxical. I therefore suggest the following 
general definition of 'inseparability' relations: 
X and Y are inseparable iff (i) the relation R between X and Y is such that X could not be the 
same item, or an item of the same kind, ifit did not stand in relation R to Y; (ii) Y could not be 
the same item, or an item of the same kind, if it did not stand in relation R to X; (iii) X and Yare 
non-identical; (iv) X is not a part ofY and vice versa; (v) X and Y are not causally related.59 
For example: (some mathematical structuralists would argue that) since no number can be 
identical to 2 unless it is greater than 1, and since no number can be identical to 1 unless it 
is less than 2, the numbers 1 and 2 are inseparable in the required sense (and since also 1 
is not part of 2 or vice versa; 1 and 2 are not identical; and 1 and 2 are not causally 
related).60 Or consider the relation between a sound-wave and the wooden block through 
which it passes: if the sound-wave were not the shape it is then the wooden block would 
not have the molecular structure it has and vice versa. Or, again, consider the relation 
between an artwork and its medium. Although there is no causal relation between a novel 
the fonnation of language but equally alongside this many other dispositions - such as the poetic 
disposition. And so language is not constructed from a logical blueprint' (cited in Cohen (1998) p. 65). 
57 Cf. CI, p. 276 . 
. '18 I am commenting here on the Sartrean connotation of 'existentialism' as a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
Despite his reputation as advocating a 'criterionless choice', Kierkegaard explicitly rejects the notion of 
libemm arbitrium: 'that abstract freedom of choice, is a fantasy, as if a human being at every moment of his 
life stood continually in the abstract possibility, so that consequently he never moves from the spot, as if 
freedom were not also a historical condition .... ' (cited in Perkins (1990), p. 11). 
59 The word 'item' in this defmition is supposed to leave it open whether X and Y are concepts, objects, 
properties. universals. particulars, events or whatever. I do not wish to proscribe here what kinds of relata 
inseparability relations mayor may not hold between. 
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and the order of words in which it is written, and these are not one and the same entity 
(one does not weep over what happens in the order of words), both are essential for the 
other.61 Plainly, the relata in such cases are not identical. But there is surely a reasonably 
clear sense in which they inseparable. 
The sharpest contrast is with what are usually called external relations. To say that 
Milly is externally related to the mongoose to her left, for instance, is to say that both the 
mongoose and Milly would remain essentially the same (instances or kinds) were they to 
stand in a different spatial relationship. Inseparability relations are, by contrast, a species 
of the genus, internal relations.62 But it is important to note that inseparability is a 
specific kind of internal relation. It is to be distinguished, for instance, from the following 
four species. First, there is the internal relation that is sometimes held to obtain between 
the proper parts of an organic whole. An inseparability relation may be of this kind, but 
nothing in the above definition requires that this is SO.63 Second, on a standard 
understanding of internal relations, these relations can be asymmetric (i.e. it is possible 
that X is internally related to Y in the case that Y is not internally related to X). For 
60 lowe this example to James Bogen (see Bogen (1995), p. 756). 
61 This example is not arbitrarily chosen. It is well documented that Kierkegaard was strongly influenced by 
the Danish Hegelian, J. L. Heiberg, for whom the harmony of form and content was the comer-stone of his 
critical theory. On Heiberg's influence on Kierkegaard see Pattison (1983); Pattison (1999), pp. 16-26,36-
9. For Kierkegaard' s use of Heibergian aesthetics see, for example, the essay on Mozart in Either / Or. 
62 The very notion of an internal relation is of course far from uncontroversial. It was famously 
problematized by the early twentieth-century debate between those, such as Bradley and Blanshard, who 
argued that all relations are internal, and those, such as Russell and Moore, who argued that no relations are 
internal. For a helpful overview see Rorty (1967). Suffice it to say here that I take it that it is possible to 
hold the more moderate and common-sensical view that some relations are external and some internal. A 
proper defence of the notion of identity presupposed by the claim that a given item would not 'be the same' 
were it not to have certain relational properties, however, is beyond both my scope and my competence. 
63 This is important because appeals have been made to internal relations in connection with rule-following 
in an altogether different way to that developed here. Most notably, Baker and Hacker argue, on 
Wittgenstein's behalf, that the relations that exist between a rule and its application are internal to the 
'grammar' oflanguage. Very briefly, this means that both a rule and the act of applying it fall under the 
same description (e. g. 'the rule that the king may not move through check in castling is complied with by 
not castling through check' (Baker & Hacker (1984) p. 114)). Thus, '[t]o understand a rule is to grasp an 
internal rclation between rules and their application' (ibid., p. 93). 
By contrast, whilst I also claim that there is a non-external relation between acts of applying a rule and 
the rule itself, I do not make any appeal to a ,vhole (e.g. 'grammar') of which these are internally related 
parts. Nor do I make any appeal to the notion of 'grasping' an internal relation. This has the important 
implication that, whereas Baker and Hacker are committed to the vic\\ that how one is to apply a rule is 
delennined in advance of any particular act of application, I am not committed to any such view. On the 
contrary, the vicw I am developing is that rules and acts of application are mutually determining (a view 
Baker ~d Hacker might dismiss as 'a bizarre form oflogical existentialism' ((1985). p. 116)). For a 
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example, a (certain kind of) object is sometimes said to be internally related to the 
properties that are essential to it, where those properties are not internally related to that 
(kind of) object (e. g. frogs would not be frogs were they not amphibious but one does not 
need to be a frog to be amphibious). By contrast, inseparability requires that the two 
terms of a two-place relation are mutually dependent. 
Third, there is a weaker notion of internal relations such that if X and Yare linked 
by the internal relation R then, given their nature, X and Yare necessarily R-related. That 
is, in every world in which X and Y both exist, the two are R-related. It does not follow 
from this, however, that in every world in which one exists the other also exists. By 
contrast, if X and Yare inseparable in the required sense then in every world in which 
either X or Y exist, both exist.64 Fourth, there is the kind of relation that obtains between 
an organic whole and its proper parts. A putative example would be the relation between 
the brush marks on a canvass and the painting as a whole. Such cases also invite the 
notion of mutual dependence: if the brush marks were not what they are then the painting 
would not be what it is and vice versa. But the difference between this kind of whole-part 
relation and inseparability relations is that, in the case of the latter, a certain symmetry 
obtains between the relata. In mereological terms, the notion of inseparability is that of 
mutually dependent wholes. This distinction can be roughly pictured as follows: 
Whole-Part Relations Inseparability Relations 
whole whole 
forceful critique of Baker and Hacker's account - on both interpretative and substanti\'c grounds - and a 
partial defence of 'logical existentialism' see Guetti & Read (1996). See also Dwyer (1989). 
M Arda Denkel discusses the distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' internal relations (see Denkel (1997». 
Following Peter Simons, Denkcl defmes the latter in terms of Husserl's "founding-relation", where A is 
'strongly founded' on B iff A is necessarily such that it cannot exist unless B exists, and B is not part of A 
(ibid., p. 603. Cf. Husserl (1970) p. 478-9). Compare also Hegel's pervasive notion of 'identity-in-
difference'. Whilst it is plausible that Kierkegaard inherited eertain features of Hegel's understanding of 
relations, this neither compromises his criticism that Hegel fails to respect the inseparability of acts and 
objccts of thought nor commits him to the idealist doctrine that all relations are internal. 
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Loosely, then, inseparability is a relation that holds between two wholes just in case any 
attempt to prize the two apart would destroy the integrity of both. 
To advance an 'Inseparability Thesis' about two or more relata is thus to assert 
that these are inseparable in the above sense. I hope to have shown that endorsing an 
Inseparability Thesis about the relation between acts of thinking and logical constraints is 
both profoundly Kierkegaardian and an attractive general response to the PCS.65 The 
upshot is that thoughts are distinct from but cannot be fully identified or conceived 
independently of the spontaneous actions and reactions of particular subjects. 66 
Now apart from showing why 'constrained spontaneity' might not be nonsense, 
the Inseparability Thesis may be seen to have an additional explanatory value. For if it is 
true that acts of thinking are inseparable from their objects, this has certain meta-
philosophical implications. To see this, consider the distinction between thinking a 
thought and thinking about a thought. Thinking that the cat is on the mat, for instance, is 
very different from thinking about the thought that the cat is on the mat. (Climacus draws 
a closely related distinction between 'concrete thinking' and 'abstract thinking,.67) We 
might say that the latter involves adopting an external perspective on acts of thinking and 
their objects. Such, typically, is the position of the theorist of judgement: she is someone 
who isolates, abstracts, inspects, analyses, interprets, contextualises and in general 
reflects on thoughts.68 But there is a clear tension between the claim that thoughts are 
65 That this thesis is 'profoundly Kierkegaardian' could, I believe, be demonstrated under many different 
rubrics. One of these is Kierkegaard's conceptions of 'authority' and 'authorship', and his engagement with 
what one commentator has called 'the problem of writing' (see Bigelow (1987)). The inseparable relation 
between author and authored is poetically described in the following passage from Either / Or, in which the 
aesthete reflects on his status as an author of a version of the Antigone myth: 
[Antigone] is my creation, her thoughts are my thoughts, and yet it is as if in a night of love I had rested 
with her, as if she in my embrace had confided a deep secret to me ... She belongs to me, she law-fully 
belongs to me, and yet at times it is as if I had cunningly crept into her confidence, as if I always had to 
look behind me for her; and yet it is the reverse, she is always in front of me - only as I lean forward does 
she come into existence (EO I: 153) 
On the theme of the relation between author and authored in Kierkegaard see Hale (2002), Ch. 1. 
66 Or, as Kicrkegaard more elegantly puts it, 'ideas are like Thors' hammer, which returns to the place from 
which it was thrown even if in a changed guise' (JP 31 I A 76 (Hannay), p. 38). 
67 See CUP, p. 332. Compare also Kierkegaard's distinction between 'the indicative' and 'the subjunctive', 
according to which -l t]he indicative thinks something as actual ... the subjunctive thinks something as 
thinkahle' (JP 37 II A 156 (Hannay), p 91). 
68 Climaeus sees Hegelian specUlation precisely as an attempt to absolutize this posture, where the 
philosopher takes himselftl) be a mere receptacle through which pure thought thinks itself. 
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inseparable from acts of thinking and this theoretical posture. For, where the philosopher 
treats thoughts as stable objects of reflection, the claim is that it is ultimately impossible 
to separate out thoughts from particular acts of thinking. 69 
The 'ultimately' is important here. For just as one can partially identify a dance 
step independently of particular acts of dancing, so the Inseparability Thesis allows that 
one can partially identify thoughts independently from particular acts of thinking. (This 
would be like drawing only that part of the circle that does not overlap with the other 
circle in the above diagram.) The point is that it is impossible to preserve in abstracto the 
integrity of thoughts as unified wholes. According to the Inseparability Thesis, therefore, 
a version of what Russell once called 'the very important logical doctrine ... that analysis is 
falsification' applies in the theory of judgement to the extent that philosophers treat 
thoughts as thinker-independent wholes.70 
It is irrelevant in this connection that philosophers do sometimes reflect on the 
relation between acts of thinking and objects of thought. For such reflections are about 
the relation between acts and objects. This relation is thus itself treated as a transcendent 
object, as though it had no essential connection to any particular act of thinking. But to 
take seriously the Inseparability Thesis is just to deny that any objects of thought are 
wholly separable from particular acts of thinking, including that very thesis. That 
Haufuiensis, for one, takes this claim seriously is intimated by the following: 
The point about the particular is precisely its negative relation to the universal and its repellent 
relation to it. But as soon as a person thinks the particular away it is cancelled, and as soon as it is 
thought, it is altered. Therefore, either he does not think the particular but only imagines that he 
thinks it, or he thinks it and merely imagines that it is included in thought. 71 
A cursory reading might take this to express the existentialist doctrine that 'particularity' 
cannot be thought, that concrete stuff is beyond conceptualisation, that bare existence 
eludes essence (i.e. the position that Hegel criticises as 'Sense-Certainty'). But the 
second clause of the disjunction of the last sentence clearly implies that, on the contrary, 
particularity can be thought. What Haufniensis is committed to is that particularity cannot 
69 Cf. I -Jegel' s recommendation that we make 'thoughts pure and simple our object' (H L §3). 
70 Russell was referring to the distortions allegedly involved in treating a whole as merely a collection of its 
parts. See the early draft of Russell's The Principles oj;\fathematics, in Russell (1994). p. 39. 
71 CL tn. p. 78-9. 
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be thought as such by means of acts of abstract thinking. In other words: the object of the 
second-order thought about the thought that the cat is on the mat is not identical with the 
first-order thought that the cat is on the mat. To think about thoughts is already to have 
'altered' them by failing to think through their particularity. 72 
A distinction of C. S. Lewis' may help to bring out how this implication of the 
Inseparability Thesis contributes to a response to the PCS. Lewis contrasts looking at with 
looking along, where looking at a beam of light is a very different experience from 
looking along it. 73 Now the philosopher may be envisaged as someone who looks at our 
practice of performing judgements. In so doing, she is confronted by a puzzle concerning 
how we spontaneously conform to rules. But if to look along a form of judging is to 
instantiate an inseparable relation, it is hardly surprising that paradox ensues when we 
attempt to separate ourselves from that form of judging in order to 'look at it' from the 
outside. 74 It is as though one were staring at a sign or pointer itself rather than along it to 
what it signifies or points to - quite as though one were attempting to circumvent what 
Merleau-Ponty has called the self-effacement of language: 
Now, one of the effects of language is to efface itself to the extent that its expression comes 
across. 
In the way it works, language hides itself from us. Its triumph is to efface itself There is 
language after the fact, or language as an institution, which effaces itself in order to yield the 
meaning which it conveys. 75 
72 Indeed, Haufniensis argues on these grounds that in theoretical reflection on psychology we must strive 
to avoid the distortion that arises from attempting to isolate and abstract 'psychological states', as though 
these were discrete units. The psychologist must be a phenomeologist, who somehow captures in his 
theorizing the 'mood that properly corresponds to the correct concept' of whatever he is researching (ibid., 
p. 14). Thus insofar as we want to understand the concept of freedom, for example, we must not transform 
it into an object of thought: ' ... misunderstanding arises because freedom is changed into something else, 
into an object of thought. But freedom is never in abstracto' (ibid., fn. p.lll). Haufniensis own attempts to 
inflect the 'mood' of anxiety in his theoretical reflections on the subject goes some way to accounting for 
what one commentator has ~alled his 'maddeningly difficult' prose (Marino, (1998) p. 308). 
73 See Lewis (1985). 
71 Compare Nietzsche's diagnosis of philosophical illusion as the attempt to situate oneself 'outside life' 
(Nietzsche (1978), p. 45). Compare also the claim that underpins Wittgenstein's early saying / showing 
distinction, namely that the 'logical form' that propositions 'must have in common with reality in order to 
be able to represent it' cannot itself be represented since '[i]n order to be able to represent logical form, we 
should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside 
the world' (TLP 4.123). 
75 Merkau-Ponty (1973), p. 108 (cited in Guetti & Read (1996), p. 51). 
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In this light, the PCS might be seen as a Marcelian mystery; that is, a problem whose 
solution encroaches on its own data. 76 Such a conclusion certainly chimes with Climacus' 
sense of the limits of abstract, reflexive thought. It also resonates with Kierkegaard's 
image of the philosopher as 'like a man who is wearing his glasses and nevertheless 
looking for his glasses - that is, he is looking for something right in front of his nose, but 
he does not look right in front of his nose and therefore never finds it'. 77 
3 Indirect Demonstration 
In 1844, Kierkegaard marked the following entry in his journals: 
Basic principles can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively). This idea is frequently found 
and developed in Trendlenburg's [sic] Logische Untersuchungen [Logical Investigations]. It is 
significant to me for the leap. 78 
What follows is an attempt to read this remark, as it were, the other way around. That is, 
we have already seen something of what Kierkegaard means by 'the leap' in the context 
of performing logically constrained judgements. The task is now to show how this is 
'significant' for another central Kierkegaardian theme: indirect communication. Given 
that this latter topic is hardly homogenous and is subject to widely divergent 
interpretations, it will be as well to approach the matter obliquely, taking our cue from 
Kierkegaard's reference to the 'indirect demonstration' of basic principles.79 
76 Cf. Marcel (1948), pp. 8-11. Compare Seng-Ts'an: 'If you work on your mind with your mind, how can 
you avoid an immense confusion?' (cited in Hughs & Brecht (1979), p. 13). 
77 C/, p. 272. 
78 JP III, V A 74 n.d., 1844, p. 16. Cf. CUP, p. 220: 'The highest principles for all thought can be 
demonstrated only indirectly (negatively)'. Compare also Kierkegaard's remark that since 'the highest 
principles for all thought, or the proof of them, are negative', human reason has a boundary. He goes on: 
Boundary engagements are negative, one is forced backwards. But there is a chattering and conceited 
conception of human reason, especially in our age when it is never some thinker one has in mind, a 
reasoning human, but pure reason and the like, which simply does not exist, since nobody. whether a 
proiessor or what have you, can be pure reason. Pure reason is a fantasy, and with it belongs that fantastic 
boundlessness wherein there are no negative concepts but which grasps everything, as did the witch who 
ended C\'CI~1hing by eating her own stomach (JP 50 X 2 A 354 (Hannay), p. 463). 
79 For synoptic treatments of Kierkegaardian indirect communication see Ramsland (1987); Liibcke (1990); 
Wood (1990); J. Thomas (1992). 
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Now, it is hardly philosophical news that some principles are so basic that they 
cannot be directly, proved, justified, demonstrated, grounded and so on. Witness Aristotle 
in a passage that Kierkegaard may well have had in mind when penning the above: 80 
Some, owing to lack of training, actually demand that. .. [the Law of Non-Contradiction] be 
proved; for it is lack of training not to recognise of which things proof ought to be sought and of 
which not. For in general it is impossible that there should be proof of everything, since it would 
go on to infinity so that not even thus would it be a proof But if there are some things of which 
proof ought not to be sought, they could not say what they regard as a principle more fully of that 
kind. 81 -
So according to Aristotle, some principles, such as the Law of Non-Contradiction 
(hereafter 'LNC'), cannot be directly proved since these constitute the very conditions of 
proof And generally speaking, one such condition is that the proof does not depend on an 
infinite number of steps: demonstrations must, as they say, come to an end somewhere. 82 
Not to properly acknowledge this, Aristotle chides, is simply incompetent. 
Yet Aristotle himself felt the pressure of the demand for a demonstration of the 
LNC, not least because Heraclitus had apparently denied it. 83 And if a direct rebuttal was 
out of order here, that was by no means the end of it for Aristotle. He continues: 
But even this [i.e. denying the LNC] can be proved to be impossible in the manner of a refutation 
if only the disputant says something. If he says nothing, it is ridiculous to look for a statement in 
response to one who has a statement of nothing, in so far as he has not; such a person, in so far as 
he is such, is similar to a vegetable. By 'proving in the manner of a refutation' [sometimes 
translated, 'negative demonstration '] I mean something different from proving, because in 
proving one might be thought to beg the original [ question], but if someone else is cause of such a 
thing it must be refutation and not proof In response to every case of that kind the original [step] 
is not to ask him to state something either to be or not to be (for that might well be believed to beg 
what was originally at issue), but at least to signify something both to himself and to someone 
else; for that is necessary if he is to say anything. 84 
80 In the work to which Kierkegaard refers, Trendelenburg sought to uphold Aristotelian logic against 
Hegelian innovations. On Trendelenburg's influence on Kierkegaard see Come (1991). In the light of what 
follows, it is a curious fact that Trendelenburg also influenced Frege. Hans Sluga explains 'It is possible 
that Frege read the Logische Untersuchungen ... Frege certainly took one thing from Trendelenburg and that 
was the name for his notational system. Following Trendelenburg he called his logical symbolism a 
'Begriffsschrift,' a conceptual script.' (Sluga (1980), p. 49). 
81 Met. r4 1006a5-11 (Aristotle (1993), p. 8). For discussion see Lear (1980). 
82 Cf. An. Post. 71 b 26-9 (Aristotle (1994), p. 3) '[proofs must] proceed from items which are primitive and 
indemonstrable because otherwise you will not possess a demonstration of these (to understand something 
of which there is a demonstration non-incidentally is to possess a demonstration of it)'. 
83 Cf Met r3 1005b22 (Aristotle (1993), pp. 7-8): 'For it is impossible for anyone to bdic\'e that the samc 
thing is and is not, as some consider Heraclitus said ... ' 
84 Met. r4 1 006al1 (Aristotle (1993), pp. 8-9). 
In this way, Aristotle aims to deny the likes of Heraclitus the luxury of so much as 
formulating a denial of the LNC. And since there is little to be gained from talking to 
vegetables, a silent opponent is, he claims, as good as refuted. 
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Now, in the Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Frege, too, develops something like an 
indirect demonstration. The example is, I think, especially instructive. I will suggest 
below that it sounds a surprisingly Kierkegaardian note, but for now it will serve to 
illustrate the limitations of the indirect strategy.85 As is well known, a major battleground 
for Frege was the 'psychologism' he found to be rife amongst his contemporaries. This, 
for present purposes, is the doctrine that the so-called 'laws of logic' simply describe 
psychological processes. Frege wants to show that this doctrine conflates the subjective 
act of taking-to-be-true with the objective truth. (In other words: he wants to show that 
there is a qualitative distinction between human spontaneity and logically constrained 
thought.) Like Aristotle, however, Frege recognises that a direct proof is out of order here 
- for to prove the psychology-independence of logic by means of logic, conceived as 
independent of psychology, would plainly be to beg the question. Instead, Frege advances 
a thought-experiment. The strategy, it seems, is by indirections to find directions out. 
Frege invites us to imagine what it would be like to encounter beings that do not 
accept a basic law of logic, the LNC, say. This scenario is consistent with psychologism 
in that this theory treats logical laws as rules for beings like us: as merely the way we (for 
some 'we') are compelled to think. Indeed, it seems essential to the very formulation of 
this view of logic that there could be beings that do not think like us. Now a perfectly 
natural question is: whose inferences are correct, ours or the logical aliens (or neither)? 
But, Frege argues, as soon as his opponent grants this as an intelligible question - as it 
seems he must, inasmuch as he thinks we are psychologically compelled to think of our 
patterns of inference as the right ones - he has also granted the distinction between logic 
and psychology: 
S5 The following discussion is deeply indebted to an article by James Conant (Conant (1991), esp. pp. 142-
155). Conant makes no reference ho\\cyer either to Kierkegaard or to 'indirect communication' in this 
paper - rather, he is concerned to elucidate the Fregean-Wittgensteinian notion of elucidation - and I cannot 
sa\' whether he would approye of my deYelopment of his ideas. 
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Anyone who understands laws of logic to be laws that prescribe the way in which one ought to 
think - to be laws of truth, and not natural laws of human beings' taking a thing to be true - ,,\ill 
ask, who is right? Whose laws of taking-to-be-true are in accord with the laws of truth. The 
psychological logician cannot ask this question: if he did he would be recognising laws of truth 
that are not laws of psychology. 86 
But suppose the 'psychological logician' simply refuses to grant the intelligibility of the 
normative question. Then, says Frege, he must also deny the intelligibility of the question 
whether the doctrine of psychologism is itself true. And ifhe does that, he forfeits the 
resources so much as to advance his own theory - his theory is self-refuting in the sense 
that it cannot allow for there being any conditions in which it can itself be said to be true. 
Like Aristotle, Frege wants to reduce his opponent to silence. But surely the 
advocate of psychologism might reason somewhat as follows: 
"You have shown that I cannot state that my theory is true in any other sense than that I 
am compelled to think that it is true. And you claim to have shown that, even though I am 
compelled to thinking that the logical aliens are wrong (because I am compelled to think 
that my inferences are right), I cannot give any sense to the difference between 'right' and 
'wrong' here. But all you really show is that if my thesis is true, it cannot be meaningfully 
stated. So much the worse for the meaningful statement of true theses! Moreover, it is not, 
in fact, the case that I am compelled to think that the logical aliens are wrong: I can quite 
readily purge my talk of normative commitments - without being 'reduced to silence' -
by distinguishing merely in terms of the rules that are followed by them, and those that 
are followed by us." 
Frege's next gambit is stunning. Insofar as the 'psychological logician' blithely abandons 
the resources to distinguish between himself and a logical alien in normative terms, Frege 
suggests, he abandons the resources to make any kind of distinction between himself and 
a logical alien other than that they make noises and movements he does not make. And 
this in turn is to forfeit the resources to make sense of the very idea of a logical alien: , , 
for, as James Conant has noticed, 'creatures who moo and eat grass are not manifesting a 
logically alien form of thought'. 87 So psychologism cannot, within its own terms, make 
86 Frege (1967), p. 14. 
S7 7 
' Conant (1991), p. 14 . 
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sense of the very possibility - that there might be logically alien thought - which defmes 
itself against the Fregean view of logic. Now we might be tempted to interpret Frege's 
reinforced argument as a reductio ad absurdum, roughly as follows: 
(1) Psychologism admits the possibility of logical aliens. 
(2) The concept logical aliens is intelligible only on a normative conception of logic. 
(3) So, psychologism admits a normative conception of logic. 
(4) But, psychologism does not admit a normative conception of logic 
(5) So, psychologism both does and does not admit a normative conception oflogic. 
(6) No intelligible theory both does and does not admit the same conception of logic. 
(7) Therefore, psychologism is absurd. 
On this reading, (1) should be taken as 'assumed for the sake of reductio'. This 
assumption is putatively supported, however, by the observation that commitment to the 
possibility of logical aliens seems essential to the formulation ofpsychologism. For what 
else can capture the contrast implied by 'laws that bind those of a particular psychological 
constitution'? Premise (2) embodies the thought that the concept of logical aliens is 
hopelessly vague unless conceived in normative terms. For how else are we to distinguish 
between a logical alien and, say, a cow? And (4) is simply a statement of psycho log ism's 
commitment to a purely descriptive account of logic. For how can logic prescribe how we 
ought to think if it is merely a description of psychological processes? 
So far so good. The problems come when we consider what conclusions we are 
permitted to draw from these premises. Conclusions (3) and (5) seem innocuous enough-
though it's worth noting that these inferences, on a psycho logistic view, are nothing more 
than psychological processes. But (6) and (7) are obviously illicit. For these plainly rely 
on a normative conception of logic, in particular on the LNC. And it is open for the 
advocate of psycho log ism to simply deny (6) - for the issue whether there are some 
intelligible theories that do not conform to the so-called laws of logic is precisely what is 
at stake in the debate about logical aliens. (Notice that is also available to Frege's 
opponent to relativize 'intelligibility' to psychological constitution.) Indeed, perhaps in 
this respect Frege's opponent is living proof, not only that logical aliens are possible, but 
that logical aliens exist! As a matter of fact, Frege did not explicitly formulate his 
thought-experiment as a reductio. That decision was well motivated. 
Instead of using a reductio model, we might try to salvage some kind of quasi-
direct argument from Frege's thought-experiment by reading it as an argument to the 
conclusion that logical aliens are impossible. For example: 
(1) If logical aliens are possible then the concept logical aliens is intelligible. 
(2) If the concept logical aliens is intelligible then psychologism is false. 
(3) If logical aliens are possible then psychologism is false. (From (1) & (2». 
(4) Either psychologism is false or logical aliens are impossible. (From (3». 
(5) Ifpsychologism is false then logical aliens are impossible. 
(6) Therefore, logical aliens are impossible. (From (4) and (5». 
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Clearly (2) and (5) do the main work here. Again, (2) is the conclusion ofFrege's 
argument to the effect that his opponent both must and cannot give normative content to 
the concept logical aliens - he must because this is the only intelligible conception and he 
cannot because his theory does not admit normative concepts. And (5) is supported by the 
observation that, on any non-psycho logistic view, logic binds all beings and not just 
'beings like us'. Now, again, there are worries about the probative force of this argument 
for someone who does not accept the prescriptive force of the laws of logic (notice that it, 
too, relies on the LNC). But this formulation brings to the fore a rather different worry to 
that of question-begging. Frege's thought-experiment seems to have yielded the 
conclusion that a certain kind of being is logically impossible; i.e. a claim of the form: 
o --, (:3x) (Gx) 
This of course requires that the concept G ( ) is well formed. But notice that the relevant 
concept here is supposed to be logically impossible thought; for logical aliens are 
supposed to be thinkers who do not conform to the laws of logic. So the claim can be 
read: It is logically impossible that there is logically impossible thought. And this, of 
course, is just what the psycho logistic philosopher wants to deny - he maintains that it is 
(in some sense) possible that there is logically impossible thought. But if this claim means 
anything at all it is surely itself an instance ofa logically impossible thought: on Frege's 
own analysis, it is the thought that a particular logical impossibility - namely logically 
impossible thought - is possible. So it seems that Frege is guilty of self-contradiction: he 
wants to deny that there are any instances of logically impossible thought in order to 
refute what he wants to recognise as just that. 
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Perhaps Frege ought therefore to deny that the psycho logistic claim does mean 
anything at all; to deny its status as the kind of thing, to echo Frege's own phrase, for 
which the question of truth or falsity can arise at all.88 (Compare Wittgenstein's remark 
that it is not as it were the sense of a senseless utterance that is senseless. 8~ If this is the 
right way to interpret Frege's stance, however, it is clear that he cannot straightforwardly 
make any claim about the necessary non-existence of logical aliens. For on this reading, 
the putative concept logically alien thought is entirely contentless - and to dismiss a 
would-be concept as contentless is surely to say that nothing can be inferred from it. But 
if the notion of logical aliens is plain unintelligible rather than necessarily un instantiated 
it starts to look very unclear how Frege's thought-experiment is supposed so much as to 
get off the ground. For how can he expect his opponent to reflect on the content of, and 
imaginatively engage with, an unintelligibility? How, in particular, are we to take the 
claim that to adequately distinguish the piece of nonsense, 'logical aliens are possible', 
from the concept cow would require a normative determination of the former?! 
The prospects for Frege's argument do not appear good. If we read it as a 
reductio, it begs the question by assuming the absurdity of a logical contradiction. If we 
read it as an argument that it is impossible that there are logical aliens, it is incoherent 
because it implies that logically impossible thought is both impossible (in the case of 
logical aliens) and actual (in the case of the advocate of psycho log ism). And if we read it 
as an argument that the concept of logical aliens is unintelligible, it is hard to see how it 
can intelligibly appeal to this concept in supporting the claims it makes. 
These considerations highlight some general worries about how indirect strategies 
are supposed to work. For it is not necessary to detail Aristotle's argument to see that an 
indirect defence of the LNC - one that would show that an objection cannot be 
meaningfully stated - is subject to precisely similar constraints: (i) it must not assume the 
absurdity of a contradiction; and (ii) it must show how, ifnot via reductio, an argument 
can intelligibly appeal to the possibility or concept it reveals to be inconceivable or 
meaningless. In short it seems that in attempting, as it were, to reduce logical aliens to 
vegetative states, indirect strategists are in danger of succumbing to the same fate. 
88 cr Frege (1984), p. 355. 
89 Cf PI, §500. 
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4 The Rhetorica I Reductio 
Now as the journal entry cited above testifies, Kierkegaard saw a connection 
between the strategy of indirect demonstration and 'the leap'. And we are surely in a 
position to see what that connection is. For if, as I have argued, the chief purpose of 
applying the metaphor of leaping in the context of judgement is to emphasise the role of 
spontaneity, this suggests an understanding of indirect demonstration as an attempt to 
elicit spontaneous agreement. In turn, this suggests a diagnosis of the problems that 
appear to beset any attempt to silence the would-be denier of basic principles. The 
problems arise when we construe such arguments as direct arguments to indirect 
conclusions (such as the unintelligibility of certain putative claims). For, insofar as 
indirect methods aim to do what direct methods cannot do, and inasmuch as what direct 
methods cannot achieve is spontaneous agreement, such arguments are not indirect 
methods at all. The moral is that whatever philosophical interest 'indirect demonstration' 
may have this cannot reside in the promise of any kind ofjustijication of basic principles. 
To conceive the indirect method as a means of eliciting spontaneous agreement is 
thus to resist the temptation to construe this strategy in terms of the provision of any kind 
of quasi-direct argument whatsoever. Hence, perhaps, the shift in Kierkegaard's 
terminology from indirect demonstration to indirect communication. The question, of 
course, is how indirect communication - conceived as a strategy for eliciting spontaneous 
agreement in judgement - is supposed to work. At one point in the Postscript, Climacus 
offers the following insight into another pseudonymous book: 
... the book Repetition was called "an imaginary psychological construction". That this was a 
doubly reflected communication form soon became clear to me. By taking place in the form of an 
imaginary construction, the communication ... establishes for itself a chasmic gap between the 
reader and the author ... so that a direct understanding is made impossible. The imaginary 
construction is the conscious, teasing revocation of the communication, which is always of 
importance for existing persons, lest the relation be changed to that of a rote reciter who writes for 
rote reciters ... 
. .. Even in elementary education one distinguishes between "learning by rote" and an 
"intellectual exercise" .... The being-in-between of the imaginary construction encourages the 
inwardness of the two away from each other in inwardness.90 
90 CUP, pp. 263,264. 
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The basic contrast here is between a model of communication that involves the direct 
transmission of an author's views and one that denies its readers any such access. The 
first form, Climacus claims, encourages 'learning by rote' ~ the latter opens up the 
possibility of a more genuine 'intellectual exercise'. In other words, a text that deploys a 
strategy of indirect communication is one that aims to get the reader to spontaneously see 
something for himself As Climacus writes elsewhere: 'the secret of communication 
specifically hinges on setting the other free' .91 
So how can one ensure that an indirect communication will result in spontaneous 
agreement as opposed to disagreement? For Kierkegaard, this all depends on the artistry 
of the communication and will vary according to the subject matter at issue. But there are 
some general criteria. A Kierkegaardian indirect communication - with the aim of 
eliciting spontaneous agreement - will typically do two things. First it will appeal to 
certain forms of imaginative engagement (hence the rubric, 'imaginative construction') 
and will therefore involve the use of examples or paradigms (hence Kierkegaard' s own 
prolific use of pseudonyms, stories, parables, diaries and so on).92 And, second, it will 
display or manifest the incoherence of the views to be opposed (hence the prominent roles 
of parody, satire, irony, humour, in Kierkegaard's texts). The strategy is thus to 
communicate in such a way that is consistent with the Inseparability Thesis - where the 
aim is not to directly transmit an abstract meaning (as though meanings were 'real estate') 
but to engage the 'inwardness' of the thinking subject. 
Consider Annie.93 Annie used to consider herself 'cool and detached'. Until, 
during a conversation with Clarabel, she shouted out 'I don't care what you think!'. 
Clarabel, who had been looking for a way to correct Annie's self-image and had long 
given up on direct means (Annie was also stubborn), seized her moment. 'Well 1 don't 
care what you think either!' she screamed. In a flash, Annie saw her own behaviour 
reflected in another. She saw the incongruency between what she said and how she said 
91 Ibid., p. 74. 
9~ On the conception of imagination that ooderpins this strategy see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
93 The following illustration is adapted from an example given by Katherine Ramsland aimed to lay bare the 
stmctme of Kierkegaardian indirect communication. See Ramsland (1987), p. 333. 
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More generally, she saw the way her actual practice betrayed her considered self-
image. This little interaction has all the ingredients of a Kierkegaardian indirect 
communication. Clarabel offers herself as an example to engage Annie's imagination, an 
example that precisely manifests the incongruency between her self-image as 'cool and 
detached' and her tendency to be anything but that. In this way, we may suppose, 
Clarabel secured Annie's spontaneous agreement about her being a little less the person 
she thought she was. 
There are all sorts of things to be said about Kierkegaard and indirect 
communication, many of which pertain to the alleged peculiarities of communicating 
ethical or religious truth. In the interests of a better understanding of its formal structure, 
and the sense in which this central Kierkegaardian theme emerges out of Aristotle's 
strategy for demonstrating basic principles, however, I want to see whether we can make 
this skeletal understanding do any work in rescuing Frege's little discourse about logical 
aliens from the morass in which we left it. This was the situation: to the extent that Frege 
is not begging the question, he either implies that logical aliens are both impossible and 
actual or he is arguing from the normative content of a con tentless 'concept'. I would like 
to suggest, however, that Frege's argument can be broadly described in terms of a 
Kierkegaardian indirect communication. 
Recall that the advocate of psychologism thinks of himself as open-minded about 
logical aliens. Frege, on the other hand, thinks there is no such space for the mind to 
occupy - for, on his understanding his logic, the pseudo-concept logical alien is an 
oxymoron. But, as we saw, Frege recognises that this understanding cannot be directly 
demonstrated. Instead, he proposes a thought-experiment - in Kierkegaard's terms, an 
'imaginary construction' - in which, rather than directly argue for his view, Frege 
pretends that the concept of logical aliens is perfectly in order. That is, he pretends that 
psychologism is true: for, to reiterate, the only way he can begin to make sense of logical 
aliens is in terms of that theory. The point of this pretence seems to be by way of showing 
'q Compare Kevin Newmark's account of Kierkegaardian indirect communication in t~s a tension. 
between fonn and content: 'the fonn of communication (which is partly, though not entrrely_ a question of 
aesthetics since it is concerned with the outward fonn or sensuous appearance of the communication) and 
the meaning of the communication (which would at some point become religious truth as inwardness) are 
maintained indissolubly in a relationship of non adequation ' (Newmark, (1988), p. 9). 
that psychologism cannot make sense of logical aliens within its own tenns. But, as we 
also saw, this purpose is ill served by a fonnal reductio argument. 
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My proposal is that we see this argument rather as what I shall call a rhetorical 
reductio. Aristotle distinguished between the fonnal syllogisms of 'dialectic' and the 
infonnal arguments of 'rhetoric'. An important feature of the latter, he observed, is their 
capacity to affect decisions: 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the making of decisions - the hearers decide between one 
political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision - the orator must not only try to 
make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also ... put his 
hearers in the right frame of mind. 95 
So a rhetorical argument aims to elicit the decision to adopt a certain policy by affecting 
someone's 'frame of mind', over and above providing reasons to change their mind. (It is 
worth noting that Kierkegaard habitually associates the metaphor of leaping with 
'decision' or 'resolution' and explicitly links his indirect method with Aristotelian 
rhetoric. 96) A rhetorical reductio, in particular, is an argument which, rather than proving 
that a given assumption implies a contradiction, manifests the absurdity of the position it 
attacks by reduplicating or satirising it. The aim of a rhetorical reductio is to achieve in its 
audience a 'frame of mind' in which they will feel, as it were, pulled in different 
directions, in which the inconsistency of their view is perceived as an internal conflict. 
Clarabel deploys a rhetorical reductio against Annie by mirroring back the 
incongruency between what she says and how she says it, so as to secure her spontaneous 
agreement. And Frege can be seen to deploy a similar strategy by reflecting back to the 
psycho logistic logician the absurdity of wanting to mark a normative distinction without 
saying anything nonnative. If the argument works, Frege's opponent will come round to 
the Fregean view. Yet he will not have done so solely on the basis of reflection, but as a 
spontaneous 'leap' away from the anxiety of his own internal conflict. 
To briefly flesh this out: Frege pretends to seriously entertain (what he himself 
takes to be) an absurd proposal. (Just as Clarabel pretends to take Annie seriously by 
95 Bk II, Part I, l377b (Aristotle, (1952), p. 622). 
96 Cf. J P III VI A 33, n.d. (1845), 20: 'In the fmal analysis what I call a transition of pathos Aristotle called 
an enthymeme'. 'Enthymeme' is, of course, the name Aristotle gin~s to a rhetorical 'proof. Compare also 
Kierkegaard's rcfcren~e to the need for 'a new science' which would deYelop 'the Christian art of speaking 
to be constructed admodum Aristotle's Rhetoric' (cited in 1. Thomas (1992), p. 121). 
responding in kind.) This seems to lead Frege into the paradoxical business of denying 
there can be any instances of illogical thought in order to refute what he takes to be an 
instance of illogical thought. More generally, it draws him into an attempt to rule out 
logical aliens without saying anything normative, for he knows he cannot rely on 
normative distinctions without begging the question. So Frege wants to rule out logical 
aliens in a way that precisely mirrors his opponent's attempt to rule them in: both want to 
mark a normative distinction without saying anything normative. 
Frege, it seems, ends up reducing himself to silence. But that, I am suggesting, is 
precisely the point; namely, to bring his opponent to a spontaneous recognition of the 
form, "That's like me!". The hope is that, in this frame of mind - that of recognising 
himself in an incongruous position, of feeling pulled in different directions, of wanting to 
speak without having the resources to speak - the psycho logistic logician will change his 
mind. Clearly, this would disarm any objection to the effect that Frege's own talk about 
logical aliens is incoherent - for, on this reading, an incoherent impression is exactly what 
he's aiming for. In this way, Frege might be seen as putting into practice the 
Kierkegaardian wisdom that '[fJixed ideas are like cramp, for instance in the foot - yet 
the best remedy is to stamp on them'. 97 
The claim here is not that Frege's argument, qua rhetorical reductio, is in fact 
successful. Still less is there any suggestion of historical influence on the author of The 
Basic Laws of Arithmetic by the author of Concluding Unscientific Postscript! What I am 
proposing is that a Kierkegaardian reading of Frege's thought-experiment does give it 
half a chance of success where no other reading can - and that this reading displays the 
formal structure of an indirect communication. By way of a conclusion, I shall illustrate 
Kierkegaard's own use of rhetorical reductios against the Hegelians. 
5 The Beginning of Wisdom 
The indirect strategy is nowhere more evident in Kierkegaard' s works than in their 
critique of Hegel. As we saw in Chapter Two, Climacus takes Hegel's 'pure thought' to 
97 JP 6 Jul~' 38 II A 230 (Hannay), p. 97. 
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amount to nothing but an illusion of thought, a fantasy, a chimera. 98 As with the cases of 
Aristotle vis-a-vis Heraclitus, and Frege vis-a-vis psychologism, Climacus therefore finds 
himself confronted not with false doctrines to be directly refuted but with illusions to be 
indirectly dispelled. Thus Philosophical Fragments, for instance, is set up as an 
'imaginative construction' which aims to expose as illusory the Hegelian claim to have 
replaced both the classical scheme represented by Plato's Socrates and a 'mythical' 
understanding of Christianity. For this reason, warnings not to read such works as 
comprising direct arguments are salutary (see the Prologue to this thesis). Very plausibly, 
Fragments is designed to elicit from would-be Hegelian-Christians a 'leap' away from the 
internal conflict Climacus believes such a confused ambition ought to inflict. 99 
Short of showing how this strategy plays out in works as a whole, a passage from 
Either / Or may serve as exemplary. The section of the Diapsalmata entitled 'Either / Or: 
An ecstatic lecture' begins famously as follows: 1oo 
If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry you will also regret it; if you marry or if you 
do not marry, you will regret both; whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret both. 
Laugh at the world's follies, you will regret it; weep over them, you will regret it; if you laugh at 
the world's follies or if you weep over them, you will regret both; whether you laugh at the 
world's follies or you weep over them, you will regret both. Believe a girl, you will regret it; if 
you do not believe her, you will regret it; if you believe a girl or you do not believe her, you will 
regret both; whether you believe a girl or you do not believe her, you will regret both. If you hang 
yourself, you will regret it; if you do not hang yourself, you will regret it; if you do hang yourself 
or if you do not hang yourself, you will regret both; whether you hang yourself or you do not hang 
yourself, you will regret both. This, gentlemen, is the sum of all practical wisdom. 101 
Now this bleak wisdom will typically be subsumed under the rubric ofKierkegaard's 
poetic characterisation of the internal logic of an 'aesthetic life-view' .102 Yet this cannot 
be quite right. For, the Kierkegaardian notion ofa life-view (Livanskuelse) is an ethical, 
98 Climacus is quite insistent on this: 'pure thinking', he says 'is a phantom' (CUP, p. 314). 
99 Though I cannot argue for it here, I believe that the rhetorical telos of Philosophical Fragments is not, as 
is commonly thought, to elicit a leap to Christian faith but rather to elicit a leap to a proper understanding of 
and engagement with Christian concepts. For support, see the Epilogue to this thesis. 
100 The OED defmes 'ecstasy' as a 'morbid state of nerves in which the mind is occupied solely by one 
idea' as well as 'an c,alted state of feeling, rapture'. 
101 EO (Hannay). p. 54. 
102 Gabriel Josipovici makes ex:plicit the dubious assumption that is implicit in almost e\"er~1hing that has 
been mitten about Either / Or: 'In Either,l Or Kierkegaard set out two life-\"iews against each other by 
means of collage, forcing us to make Ollr choice between them ... ' (Josipo\"ici (1998), p. 124) 
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as opposed to aesthetic, qualification. 103 Roughly, to have a life-view is to consistently 
express in one's life a coherent project or ideal. For example, Judge William embodies 
and advocates the life-view of civic virtue in general, and marriage in particular. But the 
adoption of any such normative project is precisely what the aesthete declines - since he 
holds that regret is attendant upon any course of action, no course of action can provide a 
norm for him. In this sense, the notion of an 'aesthetic life-view' is a category confusion. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard's aesthete seems particular keen to preclude the impression that he 
has any positive view to offer: 
My practical wisdom is easy to understand, for I have only one principle, which is not even my 
starting point. One must distinguish between the successive dialectic in either / or and the eternal 
dialectic touched on here. In saying that I do not start from my principle, the opposite of this is 
not a starting-out from it, but simply the negative expression of my principle, the expression for 
its grasping itself in opposition to a starting-point or a not-starting out from it. I do not start out 
from my principle, because were I to do so, I would regret it. If I were not to start out from it, I 
would also regret it. 104 
Clearly, then, the aesthete represents less a certain kind of life-view than the rejection of 
any such attempt to express a coherent project or 'principle' through one's moment-by-
moment decisions. His is a retreat from the dilemmas of daily life - 'the successive 
dialectic in either / or' - to an 'eternal dialectic' in which no commitments are made 
whatsoever. But having marked his distinction between the dialectics of time and eternity, 
the aesthete draws a disarming conclusion. 'Therefore', he declares, 'if it seemed to any 
of my highly esteemed hearers that there was something in what I was saying, he would 
only prove that his mind was unsuited to philosophy'. 
At this juncture, any reading in terms of Kierkegaard' s presentation, through the 
voice of the aesthete, of a certain weltanschauung or life-view completely breaks down. 
To understand the aesthete's 'practical wisdom', he himself insists, is to understand that it 
literally amounts to nothing, that there is no sense to made of it, that it is plain nonsense, 
and that to think otherwise is to show a singular lack of philosophical acumen. In this 
light, one may well wonder what the import of the 'ecstatic lecture' is at all. 
\03 Commenting on Kierkegaard's critique of Romanticism in The Concept of Irony, Dayid Gouwens 
correctly observes, '[f]or Kierkegaard the concept of Livanskuelse is already oriented in an ethical and 
Christia"n direction, as suggested in his earlier polemic against Hans Christian Andersen in From the Papers 
of One Still Living' (Gouwens (1989), p. 71). 
104 EO (Hannay), p. 54-5. 
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That what is going on here is something like what I have called a rhetorical 
reductio is hinted by the aesthete's claim to have achieved an eternal perspective: 'I am' , 
he brags, 'constantly aeterno modo'. Now the first audience of the aesthete's lecture - his 
'highly esteemed hearers' - would have been very familiar with such boasts. For it was of 
course Hegel's claim to have transcended the either / or structure of the finite 
determinations of our ordinary modes of understanding by laying bare the eternal activity 
of thought itself Climacus satirises the legacy of this achievement as follows: 
As is well known, Hegelian philosophy has cancelled the principle of contradiction, and Hegel 
himself has more than once emphatically held judgement day on the kind of thinkers who remain 
in the sphere of understanding and reflection and who have therefore insisted that there is an 
either / or. Since that time it has become a popular game, so that as soon as someone hints at an 
aut / aut [either / or] a Hegelian comes riding trip-trap-trap on a horse ... and wins a victory and 
rides home again. 105 
According to Climacus, of course, the victory is illusory. And it is very plausible that the 
aesthete's claim to be aeterno modo - a claim he himself acknowledges amounts to 
nothing whatsoever - is supposed to mimic what Kierkegaard takes to be illusory about 
the Hegelian project. (Recall the objection to Frege's thought-experiment that, by Frege's 
own lights, 'logical aliens' is meaningless.) In case the Hegelian should miss his own 
reflection in the mirror of the aesthete's empty 'eternal dialectic', the screw is turned: 106 
On the other hand, for those hearers capable of following me, in spite of my not making any 
movement, I will now unfold the eternal truth whereby this philosophy remains in itself and 
admits of nothing higher. For if I started out from my principle, I would be unable to stop again; if 
I didn't stop, I would regret it; if I stopped, I would also regret it, etc. I can always stop, for my 
eternal starting is my eternal stopping. Experience has shown that it isn't at all difficult for 
philosophy to begin. Far from it: it begins with nothing. What seems so difficult to philosophy 
and the philosophers is to stop. This difficulty, too, I have avoided. For if anyone believed that in 
stopping at this point I really am stopping, he proves he has no speculative insight. For I do not 
stop: I stopped that time I began. My philosophy, therefore, has the advantage of brevity and 
irrefutability. For if anyone were to contradict it, I would surely be justified in pronouncing him 
insane. Philosophy, then, is constantly aeterno modo and does not have, like blessed Sintenis, just 
single hours which are lived for eternity. 107 
105 CUP, p. 304-5. 
106 Kierkegaard was fond of quoting the following from Lichtenberg: 'Such works are like mirrors: when an 
ape looks in, no apostle can look out' (see, e.g., SLW, p. 81). For a nice discussion of indirect 
communication as mirroring, see Pyper (1992). 
107 EO (Hannay), p. 55. 
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The irony is hardly subtle. The implication is that the philosophy which, in an Hegelian 
trope, 'remains in itself and admits of nothing higher' fails to transcend so much as the 
non-project of an ironic aesthete - let alone an ethical life-view or the faith of a Christian. 
More particularly, the implication is that the Hegelian injunction to begin without 
presuppositions is (given or taken) in the same spirit as the aesthete's refusal to make a 
start - in case he regrets it. Notice the parallels with the more direct arguments deployed 
in the Postscript. There, as we saw in Chapter Two, Climacus argues that Hegel's 
presuppositionless system can never get off the ground because if the beginning is truly 
immediate it never starts (because it is eo ipso 'thoughtless ') and if it is truly reflective it 
never stops (because reflection can never 'resolve itself into immediacy). Here the 
aesthete turns Hegelian inertia into a virtue - 'since I never start I can always stop' - and 
glories in the thought that this method 'has the advantage of brevity and irrefutability'. If 
the reductio works, the Hegelian thinker will see himself reflected in the absurd 'wisdom' 
of declining all decisive activity. But he will not have done so on the basis of any direct 
argument to the conclusion that the content of his thought is false or incoherent. lo8 
It is not that Kierkegaard has no direct arguments against Hegel. In the previous 
chapter, I defended one such argument. But I hope to have shown how the conclusions of 
that argument - that thinking requires spontaneous activity on the part of the thinking 
subject and that the notion of 'pure thought' is (therefore) illusory - imply the strategic 
necessity of indirection. Just as there is a certain sense in which the psychologistic view 
of logic cannot be directly attacked, so there is a sense in which Hegelianism is 
irrefutable. For Hegel, this is the sense that the 'eternal' perspective of speculation 
subsumes all other views within its systematic orbit. For Kierkegaard, it is the sense that 
to engage this speculation directly would already be to grant too much. 
108 My reading of this section of Either / Or is supported by Kierkegaard' s identification of the ideal of 
presuppositionless philosophy with romantic irony in his Masters' dissertation. For example, Kierkegaard 
quotes Solger's articulation of this ideal- 'It is surely certain that his science (the philosopher's) differs 
essentially from cvery other in that it is all-encompassing. Every other science presupposes something as 
given, either a specific form of knowledge as in mathematics, or a specific subject matter as in history, 
natural science and the like. Philosophy alone must create itself'. Kierkegaard comments: 'rSolger's] 
contemplativc irony now sees the [mite as the Yichtige, as that \yhich must be annulled' (el, p. 311). In a 
similar vein, Kicrkegaard ironically identifies Hegel's 0\\,11 definition of irony as 'infinite absolute 
negativity' with theconceptofan 'absolute beginning' (ibid. p. 312). 
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Attuning to Rules: 
The Role of Imagination 
The roles of IMAGINATION are themselves the \'er\' 
powers of growth and production. . 
(Samuel Coleridge) 
It is ridiculous to oppose judgement to imagination; 
for it does not appear that men have necessarily less 
of one as they have more of the other. 
(Samuel Johnson) 
The purpose of Chapters Two and Three was to explore how the PCS informs the 
criticisms of Hegel's project and the central notions of the leap and indirect 
communication in Kierkegaard' s work. On the view that emerged, there is a sense in 
which the paradox is insoluble, since it arises from distortions endemic to the process of 
philosophical abstraction and analysis. Yet I argued that this diagnosis does itself go some 
way to disarming the paradox, and that we can make good sense both of certain of 
Kierkegaard's texts and the notion of constrained spontaneity by endorsing an 
Inseparability Thesis about the relation between acts and objects of thought. 
Substantive issues remain, however, concerning how we are to understand our 
capacity to follow rules if not on the basis of rules. Just how is that we come to make 
spontaneous 'leaps' of judgement in this way? To what extent are such leaps 'blind'? 
How can they be understood as acts of rule-following rather than mere rule-conformity? 
In virtue of what, if not reflection on rules, are they performed non-arbitrarily? In this 
chapter, I will argue that Kierkegaard's work does suggest answers to such questions. In 
particular, I shall show how his texts invite and support an inquiry into the role of 
imagination in thinking and judging. 
Since there is a general worry whether any such inquiry is in the spirit of 
Kierkegaard's insistence that the role of spontaneity implies limits of explanation, I 
introduce the topic by drawing an analogy with a project he clearly does pursue in a far 
more sustained manner (Section 1). I then exhibit textual support for the claim that 
Kierkegaard's work invites an investigation into the role of imagination in judgement, 
13.+ 
and describe a typical response, namely, indirect imagism (Section 2). By canvassing two 
stock objections to this strategy, I argue that whatever else may be wrong with it, indirect 
imagism is ill-equipped to account for constrained spontaneity. 
This should motivate the search for an alternative approach. I argue that a 
reasonably cogent if unduly mystified alternative can be extracted from certain nineteenth 
century texts. I characterise this as direct imagism (Section 3). Returning to Kierkegaard's 
work, I show how passages in both Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The Sickness 
Unto Death articulate a qualified endorsement of direct imagism (Section 4). I then 
respond on Kierkegaard's behalf to a powerful general objection to this theoretical 
framework, to the effect that it fails to address certain sceptical worries (Section 5), and 
spell out the implications for debates about rule-following (Section 6). Finally, I sketch 
one way of developing an appeal to the role of imagination in rule-governed thought 
within the framework of direct imagism (Section 7). 
1. The Remit of Psychology 
The subtitle of The Concept of Anxiety is 'A Simple Psychologically Orienting 
Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin'. The book sets out to address the 
classical theological problem of how sin came into the world. By way of an answer, 
Vigilius Haufniensis offers the following formula: 
By a qualitative leap sin enters into the world, and it continually enters into the world in that 
1 way. 
As we have seen (in Chapter Three), the sense in which sin involves a leap for 
Haufuiensis is parallel to the sense in which logical thought involves a leap for Climacus. 
F or, in both cases, we are confronted with a capacity whose possession seems somehow 
prior to its acquisition. As Haufuiensis puts it, 'if [sinfulness] comes in by sin, then sin is 
prior to sinfulness' 2 - that is, we cannot ultimately reconcile the fact that my capacity to 
sin is acquired with the fact that any sinful act I might perform presupposes my having 
already acquired the capacity to sin. (Similarly, the PCS is generated by combining the 
1 CA, p. Ill. 
2 Ibid., p. 32. 
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thought that S's capacity to follow a rule R is acquired with the thought that any R-
governed act by S presupposes S's having already acquired the capacity to follow R.) 
Haufniensis goes so far as to declare, on these grounds, that there is something about the 
origin of sin that 'no science can explain'. 3 
This raises the question why an author who insists that the origin of sin is 
inexplicable should bother to write a book that purports to explain how sin comes into the 
world in terms of the concept of anxiety. Haufniensis makes space for himself by arguing 
that, whilst, from a 'scientific' (i.e. observational) perspective, there is something 
inherently paradoxical about the moment of one's acquiring the capacity to sin, we can 
nonetheless account from within that perspective for the psychological preconditions of 
this moment. In other words, he claims that we can describe and analyse the kind of 
psychological states and processes prior to 'the Fall'. 4 Haufniensis writes: 
The science that deals with the explanation is psychology, but it can explain only up to the 
explanation and must guard against the impression of explaining that which no science can 
explain ... Psychology must remain within its boundary; only then can it have significance. 5 
Haufniensis takes himself to be applying a general principle here to the specific context of 
the origin of sin. The principle is that 'the history of the individual life proceeds in a 
movement from state to state. Every state is posited by a leap'. He continues, 
As sin entered into the world, so it continues to enter into the world if it is not halted. 
Nevertheless, every such repetition is not a simple consequence but a new leap. Every such leap is 
preceded by a state as the closest psychological approximation. This state is the object of 
psychology. 6 
It is within this methodological framework that Haufniensis introduces and develops his 
psychological explanation of the state that is immediately prior to the acquisition of 
sinfulness, namely that of anxiety. Time and again we are given notice that the 
explananda of this account are the psychological preconditions of one's acquiring and 
exercising the capacity to sin, not moments of acquisition or application~ the run up to the 
3 Ibid., p. 39. 
4 As Ronald Johnson puts it, 'explanations can take us right up to the moment before the leap, but only that 
far; they describe the conditions under which sin becomes possible, but they cannot explain why sin 
becomes actual' (Johnson (1997), p. 163). 
5 CA, p. 39. 
leap, as it were, rather than the leap itself Towards the end of the book, for example, 
Haufuiensis reiterates, 
Here again I repeat that this is only the fmal psychological expression for the final psychological 
approximation to the qualitative leap.7 
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The premise of this chapter is that, although undoubtedly given less sustained attention 
than the question of the origin of sin, Kierkegaard's work invites an explanation of the 
psychological preconditions of judgement and rule-following. Such an explanation must, 
as with the case of The Concept of Anxiety, guard against the impression of having 
removed what is paradoxical about moments of acquisition and application - in this case, 
the PCS. But the explanation may nonetheless describe and analyse the conditions of the 
possibility of the occurrence of such moments. Where Haufuiensis develops the concept 
of anxiety in the service of his explanation of sin, this chapter aims to develop the concept 
of imagination in the service of an explanation of rule-following. 
2. Indirect Imagism 
Having articulated his puzzle about logical judgement, and applied the metaphor 
of leaping in this context, Climacus registers the following remark: 
In order to shed light on logic, it might be desirable to become orientated psychologically in the 
state of mind of someone who thinks the logical- what kind of dying to oneself is required for 
that pwpose, and to what extent the imagination plays a part in it. 8 
To what extent does imagination playa role in logical thought? How might such a role 
account for systematic spontaneity? 9 Unfortunately, Climacus is not moved by his own 
goad here but proceeds in typically sardonic vein to offer 'another meagre and very 
simple comment' . Yet the suggestion that imagination plays a part in logical thought -
where the latter is to be construed very broadly as encompassing our capacities for 
6 Ibid .. p. 113. 
7 ibid., p. 91. 
8 CUP, p. 117. 
9 Compare Kierkegaard's question in his journals, 'to what extent does imagination playa role in logical 
thought, to what extent the \yill; to what extent is the conclusion a resolutionT (JP III 3658 (pap. IV C 89) 
n.d. I X42-43). 
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forming and applying concepts according to rules - is far from idiosyncratic. Admittedly, 
philosophers have tended to focus on the relation between imaginary and perceived 
objects (in Husserl's terms, the 'neutrality-modification' of intentional objects lO). Yet the 
thesis that imagination performs a general cognitive function goes back at least as far as 
Aristotle's assertion that 'the soul never thinks without a mental image'. 11 
An orthodox way of cashing out this thesis is what I shall call indirect imagism 
(sometimes called Picture Theory or pictorialismI2). In order to count as a form of 
indirect imagism a theory must be committed to at least the following: (a) images are 
analogous to, or functionally equivalent with, physical pictures; and (b) images are mental 
particulars. The function of imagination is concomitantly defined, at least in part, as the 
mind's capacity to interpret (to 'see') these mental images (or 'quasi-pictures'). 
Thus an indirect imagist theory of the role of imagination in perception will 
typically make reference to three distinct moments: (i) picture-like sensory input (in 
Russell's terms, 'sense-data'); (ii) the copying and memorising of this input inside the 
mind; and (iii) the interpretation of these copies or models by 'the mind's eye'. In this 
way, the mind is viewed as relating indirectly to its objects via the interpretation of an 
inner image. 13 Even such a highly sophisticated pictorialist theory as Stephen Kosslyn' s 
contemporary work - which draws heavily on an analogy with computer graphics -
roughly adheres to this basic schema. 14 
What is more relevant to Climacus' proposal, an indirect imagist theory of thought 
and language will typically claim that concepts are built up from mental pictures, 
themselves innate and / or constructed from sensory input and memories, which are 
subsequently associated with words in a natural language. Locke gave canonical 
10 The problem here is essentially how to accOlmt for the fact that one and the same intentional object can 
figure in both perception and imagination. For a brief discussion see section 7 below. 
11 De Anima 431 a 15-20. Nigel Thomas comments that 'for Aristotle images play something very like the 
role played by the more generic notion of "mental representation" in modem cognitive science' (N. Thomas 
(2001), p. 2). 
12 In fact, Pictorialism is only one species of indirect imagism. Hume appeals, for instance, to reified 
'images' which, whilst not conceived on analogy with physical pictures, are conceived as internal 'faint 
copies' of perceptions. To accommodate this so-called 'Classic Perceptual Model' within our defmition of 
indirect imagism would, however, lead to unnecessary complications. 
13 Compare Alexander Gerard's description of the mind as 'Like a m!rr0~ it reflects faithful images of the 
objects formerly perceived by uS ... It is in its nature a mere copIer' (CIted m Abrams (1953), p. 160). 
I~ See, e.g., Kosslyn (1980). 
expression to such a view in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which he 
argued that 'the use of words ... stand as outward marks of our internal ideas', the latter 
being abstracted from our sensation of particulars and contemplated by an 'internal 
sense' .15 In his Autobiography, Einstein nicely articulates a similar view: 
l38 
What, precisely, is "thinking"? When at the reception of sense-impressions, memory-pictures 
emerge, this is not yet "thinking". And when such pictures form series, each member of which 
calls forth another, this too is not yet "thinking". When, however, a certain picture turns up in 
many such series, then - precisely through such return - it becomes an ordering element for such 
a series, in that it connects series which are in themselves unconnected. Such an element becomes 
an instrument, a concept. .. It is by no means necessary that a concept must be connected with a 
sensorily cognisable and reproducible sign (word) ... All our thinking is of this nature of a free play 
with concepts ... F or me it is not dubious that our thinking goes on for the most part without use of 
signs (words), and beyond that to a considerable degree unconsciously. 16 
F or Einstein, recognising patterns between mental pictures, to which words are 
subsequently attached, is of the essence of conceptual thought. Developing and defending 
this kind of claim would be constitutive of a response to Climacus' goad along the lines 
of indirect imagism. 
I take it that this framework has intuitive appeal, at least for those who have not 
been influenced by more recent philosophical trends. This is not least because it tallies 
with the familiar idea that thinking according to new conceptual schemes involves a 
creative use of analogy, metaphor and models in order to see patterns - an idea that is 
borne out by anecdotal evidence such as Einstein's. More generally, indirect imagism 
trades on the insidious notion that it is because humans have access to internal models of 
the world that they can handle it so competently. As K. 1. W. Craik once put it, 
If the organism carries a "small-scale model" of external reality and of its own possible actions 
within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react 
to future situations before they arise, utilise the knowledge of past events in dealing with the 
present and the future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safec and more competent 
manner to the emergencies which face it. 17 
Yet indirect imagism has of course suffered a less than enthusiastic reception in the 
twentieth century. Thinkers as diverse as Sartre, Frege, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Watson and 
15 Locke (1898), pp. 274; 207. 
16 Cited in Holton (1981), p. 380. 
17 Craik (1943), p. 61. 
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Dennett have all launched vigorous attacks on the plausibility, even the coherence, of its 
central claims. To be sure, these attacks are fought on different fronts and reflect different 
theoretical and polemical agendas. But I suggest that two key arguments - or families of 
argument - have loomed large in the revolt against indirect imagism. 
The first of these might be called Image-Concept Gap arguments. Their target is 
any attempt to account for conceptual thought in terms of mental images. The central 
claim is that concepts and images are categorically distinct, that they are just different 
kinds of beast. Ready support for this claim is the observation that there are some 
concepts that simply cannot be pictured. We surely cannot, for example, form images of 
abstract concepts like/acile or correct or connectives such as or. But it seems to follow 
that some concepts are not composed of pictures. Another way of forcing a wedge 
between images and concepts is to claim that the former operate at a level of generality 
the latter cannot. However 'fuzzy' my generic image of a horse may be, it arguably will 
always fall short of the concept of a horse in general. At any rate, the thought that images 
are somehow inadequate to concepts is supported by a further claim, namely, that private 
images cannot support the essentially public nature of conceptual thought. 
For it is surely an important feature of concepts that they are intersubjective. The 
fact that I happen to associate the image of my father's brief-case with the word 'case', 
for example, is of no help whatsoever in my grasping the concept case in a sentence such 
as, 'The point is easy to see in such cases'. The point is indeed easy to see in such cases 
due to the ambiguity of the word. But what such cases clearly mark is that my associating 
images with words is an altogether different kind of thing to my grasping and applying 
concepts. Cora Diamond illustrates the point in relation to the two sentences, 'Smith has 
Parkinson's hat' and 'Smith has Parkinson's Disease'. Diamond comments: 
... everything that one might want to think of as connected with the word "Parkinson" spoken in 
isolation could be present in both cases: that is, all the ideas we might associate with the word, all 
the acts of intention we might perform when we uttered it aloud or to ourselves. None of that help 
us get a grip on the work done by the word "Parkinson" in the fIrst sentence. 18 
Grasping the semantic role of a word - the work it does in a sentential context - is not 
reducible to any image one might associate with the word. Or, as Michael Dummett has 
18 Diamond (1991), p. 98. 
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it, 'Thought differs from other things also said to be objects of the mind, for instance 
pains or mental images, in not being essentially private'. 19 Very broadly, the form of this 
objection to indirect imagism appears to be as follows: 
(1) Concepts are intersubjective (or public). 
(2) Images are subjective (or private). 
(3) Nothing is both subjective (or private) and intersubjective (or public). 
(4) So nothing can be both a concept and an image. 
Such is one of the many motives ofFrege's 'anti-psychologism': logic and semantics may 
have no truck with 'whatever happens to run through our heads'. And, very plausibly, it is 
this kind of point Climacus invokes when he moots that 'the state of mind of someone 
who thinks the logical' - i. e the psychological preconditions of logically constrained acts 
- involves 'a kind of dying to oneself - i.e. a readiness to forego one's purely personal 
preferences and associations in conforming to intersubjective norms. I shall suggest 
below that there are reasons to deny (2), given that the notion of an image need not imply 
that which is 'private' or idiosyncratic. But given that the kind of theory generated by 
indirect imagism does hold that concepts are complexes of private images, Image-
Concept Gap arguments embody a powerful objection to such theories. 
The second genus of argument is closely related to the Regress of Judgements 
discussed in Chapter One. The target is less the attempt to assimilate concepts and images 
than the coherence of the kind of mental process postulated by indirect imagism. At one 
level, the objection simply invokes Occam's Razor. To postulate a 'private theatre' of 
mental images (Ryle) enjoyed by 'mental homunculi' (Dennett) allegedly performs no 
explanatory work in an account of human behaviours or cognitive functions?O Worse: not 
only is this ghostly interior unnecessary, it is also incoherent since it multiplies the very 
problems it is supposed to explain. To see the basic structure of this point, suppose 
someone tried to explain the familiar phenomena of having a word 'on the tip of one's 
tongue' by postulating little people inside one's head who are reaching for a sign but 
cannot quite get hold of it. Such an 'explanation' surely confounds the mystery, for we 
now have two characters who inexplicably can't quite get hold of a sign. Indirect 
19 Dummett (1978), p. 116. 
';0 Cf Ryle (1949), Ch. 8; Dennett (1978). 
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imagism, the objection runs, makes a subtler form of the same mistake, by pushing back 
the explanation of human phenomena such as perception and logical thought to the level 
of sub-personal inner processes. 
So, for instance, we have learnt from Wittgenstein to be suspicious of appeals to 
the role of 'abstraction' in conceptual thought. Very crudely, the story supplied by an 
indirect imagist framework is that I abstract a mental image of, say, a tree from perceptual 
experience which I can then check against a given object in order to classify it as a tree or 
otherwise. But, again, any problem I have with classifying this object with trees, I have 
also with classifying this object with this image and this image with trees. Interposing an 
image as an intermediary seems only to replace one concept-application with twO.21 
It is very noteworthy in this context that Climacus invokes the role of imagination 
precisely in the hope of 'shedding light on logic' in the wake of the paradox implicit in a 
regress of judgements (namely, the PCS). When combined with his insistence on the 
publicity of logical thought (in contrast to the alleged 'inwardness' of ethico-religious 
reflection), this fact is surely very strong evidence that Climacus would not be impressed 
by indirect imagism qua theory of the role of imagination in thinking and judging. 
(Indeed, Climacus' whole critique of his age in terms of the loss of inwardness attendant 
upon a misplaced objectivity depends on the assumption that objective thinking is 
essentially public, that it involves a kind of 'dying to oneself. 22) 
The force of both kinds of argument, combined with a general suspicion of' ghost 
in the machine' pictures of the mind, goes some way to accounting for the anti-imagist 
consensus that appears to have emerged, at least in the analytical tradition. According to 
this consensus, images play at most a subsidiary and relatively insignificant role in 
higher-order cognitive capacities. In the rubble of ambitious claims for the imagination, 
any continued interest is mostly focussed on how information is stored in the brain - in 
particular, whether these structures are best viewed as picture-like or sentence-like (the 
21 This way offonnulating the point is due to Susan Hurley (cf. Hurley (1998), p. 243. n. 22). 
22 Climacus makes this explicit when distinguishing between 'objecti\Oe· and 'subjectiye· reflection: 'The 
way of objective reflection now leads to abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of 
v~ous ki~ds. and always leads away from the subjective individual, whose e:-;jstence or non-e:-;jstence 
becomes, from an objec"tive point o{vicw, altogether properly. infmitely indifferent.. 0' (CUP, p. 193). 
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so-called 'analog / propositional debate'23). But few contemporary philosophers envisage 
a fundamental role for imagination in concept formation and application. 
It may appear therefore that we ought to give up Climacus' hope that an appeal to 
the role of imagination might help solve the PCS. ' Yet', Wittgenstein once remarked, 'the 
naIve theory ofJorming-an-image can't be utterly wrong,.24 
3. Direct Imagism 
Indirect imagism is a broadly mecho;nistic theory in that it conceives the function 
of imagination as an inner (perhaps unconscious) mechanism by means of which the mind 
or brain reflects on an inner picture. Kierkegaard was writing in different times. In his 
milieu, 'the imagination' served as a kind of catch-all for just that which is non-
mechanistic, immediate, spontaneous, intuitive, organic, holistic in human experience and 
cognition. In the writings of such luminaries as Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schiller, 
Schleiermacher, the Schlegels, Solger, Tieck, Novalis, the imagination takes the form of 
'a synthetic and magical power' - the epicentre of our cognitive capacities to be sure, but 
no less opaque, ineffable, mysterious for that. 25 Fichte captured something of the Zeitgeist 
when he paid homage to the imagination as the very 'basis for the possibility of our 
. I'£'. b' ,26 conscIOusness, our he, our emg. 
Exactly what such writers mean by 'the imagination' is indeed obscure. 27 Even 
such a rigorous thinker as Kant seems reluctant - at least in the First Critique - to bring 
to light the 'dark power' that presumably undergirds his entire project given its explicit 
status as the 'common root' of understanding and sensation?8 And there are of course 
23 For a brief synopsis, see 1. Thomas (2001), pp. 4-6. 
24 PR, II.12 (p. 58). 
25 Kant's doctrine of schematism was of course the point of departure for many of these thinkers. Cf. B. 
181: '[T]his schematism of the understanding in its application to appearances and their mere form is an art 
concealed in the depth of the human soul' (Kant (1933), p. 183). 
26 Cited in Kearney (1988), p. 178. 
27 The following formulation of Coleridge's is sufficient to illustrate the esoteric idiom: 'The primary 
IMAGINA nON I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition 
in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary imagination I consider as 
an echo of the former ... ' (cited in Abrams (1953), p. 282). 
28 Heidegger argued that Kant ultimately drew back from the 'abyss' opened up by this sens~ of the primacy 
of the transcendental imagination. Hcidegger writes: 
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many shifts in meaning as the concept of imagination is shaped by diverse philosophical 
and literary vocabularies. Nonetheless, I think the following five features display the 
salient connotations of what for convenience I shall call the Romantic View. 
(1) Empathy: 
On a Romantic View, the imagination facilitates a kind of empathy with one's (human 
and natural) environment. This notion of Einfiihlung (in-feeling or feeling-into) underpins 
the typically Romantic attempt to resist any sharp division between 'inner' and 'outer' 
worlds. 29 Thus Fichte, for instance, envisions imagination in terms of a 'hovering' 
between subject and object, and Coleridge in terms of a 'union' between perceiver and 
perceived. 30 Pace indirect imagism, to exercise imagination in relation to some object 0 
is to be sensitive to and sensible of 0 rather than to replicate an inner representation of O. 
Empathy takes both immediate and reflective forms. On a Romantic View, 
humans pre-reflectively empathise with immediate experience, from which they 
subsequently abstract (see below) in order to empathise with new points of view. Pre-
reflective empathy is thus typically conceived as analogous to a pre-conscious state of 
dreaming. The connection between imagination and empathy also suggests a close 
connection between imagination and emotion. For many Romantics, it is because humans 
experience such emotions as fear, love, longing and wonder that they are sensitive to and 
sensible of beings and objects other than themselves. 
(2) Abstraction: 
Like indirect imagism, the Romantic View accords an important role to 'abstraction', 
which it also conceives as a bridge from immediate imagery to genuinely conceptual 
thought. To abstract is to distance oneself from one's direct awarenesses by consciously 
attending to, reflecting upon, comparing and unifying these images. Thus Kant: 
Does not the Critique a/Pure Reason deprive itself of its own theme if pure reason is tran~fo~ed into 
transcendental imagination? Does not this laying of the foundation lead to an abyss? By hIS radIcal 
interrogation, Kant brought the 'possibility' of metaphysics before this abyss. He saw the unknown; he had 
to draw back (Heidegger (1962), pp. 162-6). 
29 On this theme see Wamock (1994), Ch. 1. 
30 Cf. Fichte (1970), p. 215. 
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To make concepts out of representations one must.. .be able to compare, to reflect to abstract...I 
see, for example, a spruce, a willow and a linden. By fIrst comparing these objects with one 
another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the 
leaves etc.: but next I reflect on that which they have in common amongst themselves ... and I 
abstract from the quantity, the fIgure, etc. of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. 31 
Pace indirect imagism, however, the Romantic View conceives abstraction as involving 
new ways of imagining the world, by selectively attending to certain aspects of our direct 
imagery, rather than the acquisition of internalised models. Thus the process of 
abstracting the form ofa tree involves (not the forming of an inner image but) coming to 
perceive something as a tree. The process of abstraction is therefore better understood as 
exercising a skill- broadly speaking, the skill of being able to regard particulars as 
instantiated universals - rather than an internal mechanism by means of which particulars 
are compared with universalised images. 
(3) Unification: 
By abstracting from immediate imagery, the imagination thus searches for commonality 
and pattern within and between different phenomena.32 As Kierkegaard has it: 
This is the eternal one of the imagination. Just like the eternal "once upon a time" of the 
imagination: then man goes out into the morning of life. 33 
Paradigmatic for the Romantics in this respect is aesthetic judgement, where this is 
conceived as dependent on our capacity to respond to art-works not as disparate 
collections of brush-strokes or notes or words or marks but as integrated wholes. Such 
responses to phenomena as displaying unity or integrity account for the distinctively 
aesthetic feelings of aptness or resonance, the feeling that an art-work hangs together in a 
particular and satisfying way. This notion of unification underpins Shelley'S typically 
Romantic contrast between reason as the 'principle of analysis' and imagination as 'the 
principle of synthesis'. And it is taken to support the typically Romantic claim - notably 
31 Kant (1992), p. 592. 
3:: Compare Charles Lamb's defrnition of the imagination as 'that power which draws all things to one" 
(cited in Abrams (1953), p. 179). 
33 JP I.4 VIII i\ 622 n.d., 1848. 
endorsed by Fichte - that imagination, by unifying disparate elements, can 'make sense 
of even that which reason finds contrapositional or paradoxical. 34 
(4) Perspicacity: 
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Due to its insistence on the immediacy of imagination - whether in the sense of pre-
reflective empathy or in the sense of the immediate and direct object of acts of selective 
(in)attention - the Romantic View connects imagination with non-discursive moments of 
insight, with 'genius'. 3S The notion of an immediate and direct insight undetpins both 
Schelling and Fichte's (otherwise somewhat different) conceptions of 'intellectual 
intuition' . 36 As Michael Vater reconstructs the common ground: 'Intellectual intuition is a 
knowledge or activity ... where the passivity or givenness of sensible intuition ... gives way 
to spontaneous manifestation or self-realisation'.37 Fichte's and Schelling's systems may 
be seen as different ways of pursuing (and enacting) the idea that forms of non-discursive 
insight are the bedrock on which human cognition and experience are founded. 38 
(5) Creativity: 
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the Romantic View is a shift from conceiving the 
operation of imagination as a passive contemplation of an image (as in indirect imagism) 
to an active and creative organ.39 In the process of abstracting and empathising, the 
34 Compare Coleridge's reference to the 'the power' that 'reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of 
opposite or discordant qualities' (cited in Abrams (1953), p. 118). And Schelling: '[W]hat we speak of as 
the poetic gift is merely productive imagination, reiterated to its highest power. It is one and the same 
capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able to think and to couple together what is 
contradictory - and its name is imagination' (Schelling (1978), p. 230). 
35 Compare Shelley: 'For the mind in creation is as a fading coal, which some invisible influence, like an 
inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness' (cited in Abrams (1953), p. 192). 
36 Joseph Lawrence comments: '[Schelling] counters the sceptical attack. .. by appealing to a primary, pre-
reflexive, knowledge that the self has of itself. Because it is non-propositional, this knowledge cannot be 
clarified through conceptual analysis' (Lawrence (1989), p. 191). 
37 Vater (2000), p. 213. 
38 Hence Schelling's famous claim that 'aesthetic intuition' gives the philosopher access to the holy of 
holies 'where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and history is 
rent asunder' (Schelling (1978), p. 231). 
39 Richard Kearney nicely summarises Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in approaches to the imagination in 
this respect (Kearney (1988), p. 156-7): 
Departing from the received wisdom of classical and medieval P?ilosoph.ers, ~~t rescued imagination . 
from its servile role as an intennediary faculty betwcen our scnsIble and mtelligIble c'pcncncc, declanng It 
imagination not only searches for unity but produces or constructs different possible 
interpretations. As such, the imagination is viewed as expressive of the will.40 
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It is easy, however, to over-simplify the Romantic concept of creativity. For the 
creative imagination is typically characterised in terms of a complex interplay between 
active construction and passive reception. In particular, to exercise the imagination is to 
act constructively in such a way as to become the passive receiver of the constructed 
image. The paradigm here is the process of artistic creation where the artist is viewed as 
initiating and participating in a process over which she does not have full control. Crudely 
speaking, artist creativity consists in setting in motion a self-perpetuating process such 
that the end result appears to have been received rather than created by the artist. 41 
(This idea clearly informs R. G. Collingwood's more recent theory of creativity. 42) Thus 
Fichte refers to imagination as a kind of 'active passivity' or a suspension between 
creativity and receptivity in which we encounter the unity we construct. 43 This aspect of 
the Romantic View is one of the most obscure. But that it is highly suggestive vis-a-vis 
the pes should be evident. 
It is not my purpose here either to develop the attribution of this sketch to 
particular figures or to defend the Romantic View as a whole. (Certainly the Romantics' 
reputation for obscurantism is not entirely unjust.) But I do want to suggest that it 
contains the germs of a genuine alternative to indirect imagism, and one that both avoids 
the stock objections and is far better equipped to accommodate the PCS. Of course more 
than a list of associated concepts is required to make this plausible. But the above can be 
to be the primary and indispensable precondition of all knowledge. Nothing could be known about the 
world unless it was fIrst perfonned and transfonned by the synthetic power of imagination. 
4°T 0 say that imagination is 'expressive of the will' perhaps avoids the misleading connotation that, as 
Malcolm Budd puts it, 'the existence and continuation of [any given] image is determined by the will' 
(Budd (1989), p. 105). 
41 Cf Kierkegaard's conception of his own authorship in tenns of 'Governance' (e.g. PV, pp. 71-90} This is 
a religious analogue of what Either / Or calls 'wanting rightly': 'To want rightly.' on .the ~ther han?, .1S. a 
great art, or rather it is a gift. It is what is inexplicable and mysterious about gemus, Just like the dlvmmg 
rod, to which it never occurs to want except in the presence of what it wants.' (EO (Hannay), p. 63). 
42 See Collingwood (1938). 
43 Compare Coleridge's description of the process of poetic production as a combination of spont~eous and 
constrained activity which 'must be reconciled and co-present. There must not only be a partnershIp, but a 
union; an interpen~tration of passion and of" ill, of spontaneous impulse and of voluntary purpose. ' (cited 
in Abrams (1953), p. 121). 
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taken as a first approximation to a direct imagist conception. These might be distilled into 
the following conditions a theory must meet in order to count as form of direct imagism: 
(a) The theory must hold that, for at least some acts of imagining, acts of imagining are 
analogous to acts of pictorial interpretation. 
(b) The theory must hold that, for at least some acts and objects of imagination, the 
relation between act and object is immediate and direct. 
Notice that both indirect and direct imagism appeal to an analogy between the activity of 
imagination and our responses to physical pictures. But whereas the former appeals to 
pictures as analogous to the mental particulars that it is the job of the mind's eye to 
interpret, the latter appeals only to an analogy with our responses to pictures. And the 
import of (b) is that direct imagism denies what indirect imagism asserts, namely that 
objects of imagination are necessarily mediated by images inside the heads of individual 
subjects. It denies, in other words, that successfully performing acts of imagining 
essentially involves reflecting on a mental content. 
It is worth noting that, although it does appeal to an analogy with pictorial 
interpretation, direct imagism is not vulnerable to certain powerful objections to the 
analogy with physical pictures. (Note that the two forms of objection outlined above were 
specifically targeted at the appeal to indirect imagism in an account of thought, not at the 
analogy with pictures per se.) One such worry is that whereas physical pictures have 
configurational properties, mental images do not. A physical picture has a certain size, 
shape, location, colour, and so on. But it is very plausible that we experience no such 
properties of our images, these being wholly transparent to consciousness. At any rate, it 
should be clear that direct imagism side-steps such objections. For the appeal here is to an 
analogy with our responses to pictures, not with pictures themselves. 
So just what are 'acts of pictorial interpretation'? Consider the following picture: 
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This is a picture of a Dalmatian. 44 But the fact that it takes most people a while to see the 
picture as of a Dalmatian suggests that this involves a particular kind of experience, over 
and above simply perceiving the marks on the page. Plausibly, the interpretation of any 
picture (and not just peculiar ones such as the above) involve this kind of experience, in 
addition to its merely visual impact.45 As Robert Hopkins describes it, 
Sometimes, when you look at a picture, you do not at first see what it depicts. You can see the 
patterned surface before you, and can see quite clearly what marls lie where. You may even be 
able to tell that something is depicted, from the obvious care with which the surface has been 
marked, but not what is. Then, in a moment, the way you see the surface is transformed. You can 
now see, let us suppose, that the picture is of a horse, that the strange shaped lump that had 
puzzled you depicts its head, those straggly lines of colour its legs, and so forth. It need not be 
that you now see any of those marks as lying differently from how they seemed to before. You 
44 'Dalmation dot dottogram'. Photograph by R. C. James, from Miller (1990), p. 188. 
45 To say that pictorial experience is 'over and above' any merely visual impact is not to say that, in nonnal 
cases, we fIrst perceive the marks as mere marks and then perceive the picture. Nonnally, we perceive a 
picture immediately. Nonetheless, it remains true that this capacity for immediate pictorial experience 
involves more than mere visual perception. (Wittgenstein expresses this distinction in tenns of first and 
third-person perspectives. From the fonner it would make no sense for the person who only sees the rabbit 
in Jastrow's picture to say "Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit"; 'Nevertheless someone else could have 
said of me: "He is seeing the figure as a picture-rabbit" (PI n:-:i. (p. 195)). 
need not think that you mistook or overlooked the position of some mark. It is simply that you 
now see the marks as organised in a particular way. 46 
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This distinctive pictorial experience may be said to be the product or object of acts of 
pictorial interpretation. As such, pictorial experience is the basis of more complex 
aesthetic responses to pictures.47 The key claim of direct imagism - and the assumption 
behind the Romantic View as a whole - is that the cognitive work of the imagination is 
best conceived on analogy with such responses. 48 The relevant conception of imagination, 
on this view, is our capacity for non-discursive acts of seeing-as or taking-as - what 
Wittgenstein called the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect.49 And it is to such responses that 
a direct imagist theory appeals when it claims a role for imagination in thinking and 
judging. 50 (Note that there is an ordinary usage of 'imagination' which is naturally read in 
terms of taking-as: Francis Dauer, for example, cites, 'I still imagine him to be (think of 
him as) a peanut farmer rather than the president'.51) 
46 Hopkins (1998), p. 15 
47 In fact, the analogy is with aesthetic experience more generally. I am focusing on pictorial experience 
only to bring out the distinction between mere perception and taking-as. But making sense of a piece of 
music, say, can also be seen to involve a distinctive experience of hearing a series of sounds as harmonious. 
This certainly seems to be the view of the aesthete in Either / Or who claims that' [t ]he ear is the most 
spiritually determined of the senses ... There is much in nature which addresses itself to the ear but what 
affects the ear is the purely sensual, and therefore nature is dumb. And it is a ridiculous fancy that one hears 
something because one hears a cow moo or, what has perhaps a larger claim in this respect, a nightingale 
sing; it is mere imagination to think that one hears something, mere imagination that the one is worth more 
than the other, for its all six of one and half a dozen of the other' (EO (Hannay), pp. 78-9). In other words: 
to hear the noises a nightingale makes as singing requires something over and above mere sensual hearing. 
48 Note that this does not commit direct imagism to the view that the imagination is actually at work in 
pictorial experience - though this is surely not implausible, it would take independent argument to 
demonstrate (for an attempt to show that it is, see Walton (1990)). 
49 Cf. PI ILxi, (p. 194). The contrast registered by 'continuous' is the 'dawning' of an aspect. On this 
distinction, see Mulhall (2001), pp. 153-163. Wittgenstein marks a connection between aspect-seeing and 
imagination in several passages. For example: 
The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it 
as ... ' is akin to 'I am now having this image'. 
Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is 
perceiving something in so hearing it. (PI I!. xi (p. 213)). 
50 Plain lv, in order for this analogy to work, something must take the role of pictures as the occasion of the 
imaginative responses allegedly involved in judgement. I shall claim below that this role is fulfilled by 
examples of judgements. Of course there are all sorts of things to say about pictorial experience beyond the 
mere observation that it involves seeing-as or (in Wollheim's terms) 'seeing-in', but this may be all that is 
required for the analogy to go through (cf. Wollheim (1987)). 
51 Dauer (1993), p. 265. 
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Now it is possible to gain from even this skeletal conception a sense for how 
direct imagism might avoid the problems that have beset direct imagist strategies. 
Consider first the 'Fregean' objection outlined above. The claim was that concepts and 
images are generically distinct because whereas images are private mental items, concepts 
are intersubjective. Now there is nothing in (a) or (b) to suggest that the objects of 
imagination are private or idiosyncratic. On the contrary, these entail that at least some 
acts of imagining do not involve reflecting on a private image. Of course there is work to 
be done to show that our direct images are in fact governed by intersubjective norms. But 
at least a general conception of imagination in accordance with (a) and (b) does not rule 
out the possibility of such an account. 
The other argument was to the effect that appeals to the imagination in an account 
of logical thought are vulnerable to a vicious regress. That objection was directed at the 
attempt to explain thought in terms of a prior process of interpreting mental images. But 
again, direct imagism is notprimajacie vulnerable to this attack. For given that the 
alternative model is committed to a notion of spontaneous aspect-perceptions that do not 
involve the prior interpretation of mental contents, no such incoherence is implied. Of 
course, there is work to be done to show just what role these direct responses play in 
logical thought. But at least direct imagism opens up the possibility of such an account. 
1. The Capacity 'Instar Omnium' 
In his Kierkegaard 's Dialectic oj the Imagination, David Gouwens helpfully maps 
out the main sites ofKierkegaard's 'two-front polemic' against Romanticism and 
Rationalism.52 On the one hand, Kierkegaard launches a very general attack on 'the 
Romantic spirit', which he views as involving a pernicious attempt to evade historical and 
ethical constraints. Kierkegaard rarely misses the opportunity to poke gentle fun at the 
excesses of Romantic outpourings - e.g. when one of his aesthetes mentions 'certain 
sensitive people' who seem to hold that the greatest significance of language is 'to 
produce inarticulate sounds,.53 But beyond this, Kierkegaard argues (often indirectly) that 
5~ Gouwens (1989), p. 95. 
'3 EO (Hannay), p. 76. 
the Romantic celebration of imagination can only lead to boredom, fragmentation, self-
stultification, stagnation - in short, an 'aesthetic stupor'. In the Concept of Irony, for 
instance, Schlegel's novel Lucinde is presented as a paradigmatic expression of the 
Romantic spirit, and is marshalled as powerful testimony to its degeneracy: 
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This (letting imagination alone prevail) is repeated throughout Lucinde. Now who is such a 
monster that he is unable to delight in the free play of the imagination? But it does not follow 
from this that the whole of life should be given over to the imagination. When the imagination is 
allowed to rule in this way it prostrates and anaesthetises the soul, robs it of all moral tension, and 
makes of life a dream. Yet this is essentially what Lucinde seeks to promote. 54 
Plainly, the kind of criticism Kierkegaard is engaged in here is concerned less with how 
the Romantics conceive the function of the imagination than with the ethical and 
existential significance invested in that conception. 55 
Yet on the other front ofKierkegaard's polemic - the attack on Hegelian 
rationalism - Romanticism becomes a key ally. This is nowhere more evident than in 
Climacus' remarks on philosophical beginnings in the Postscript (see Chapter Two of this 
thesis). There Climacus appears to side with Schelling that philosophical thought must be 
based on some kind of direct intuition over against the Hegelian attempt to absolutize 
'pure thought'.56 Climacus writes: 
When thinking turns toward itself in order to think about itself, there emerges, as we know, a 
scepticism. How can there be a halt to this scepticism of which the source is that thinking selfishly 
wants to think itself instead of serving by thinking something? When a horse takes the bit in its 
teeth and runs away, it would be all right, apart from the damage that might be done in the 
meantime, for one to say: Just let it run; it will surely become tired. With regard to thinking's self-
reflection, this cannot be said, because it can keep on for any length of time and runs in circles. 
Schelling halted self-reflection and understood intellectual intuition not as a discovery within self-
reflection that is arrived at by rushing ahead, but as a new point of departure. Hegel regards this as 
a mistake and speaks depreciatingly about intellectual intuition - then came the method. Self-
reflection keeps on so long until it cancels itself; thinking presses through victoriously and once 
again gains reality; the identity of thinking and being is won in pure thinking. 57 
54 CI, fn. p. 292 (trans. modified). 
55 And the Romantics certainly did present themselves as cultural iconoclasts. Compare Schlegel's so-called 
'manifesto of the young German Romantics' in which the 'aim and mission is, now to ... make life and 
society poetic' (cited in Gouwens (1989), p. 36). 
56 Climacus is building up to his claim that for 'the subjective thinker' - i.e. the Socratic exemplar held up 
as an alternative to the Hegelian 'pure thinker' - 'imagination, feeling, and dialectics in impassioned 
existence-inwardness are required' (CUP, p. 350). For discussion see Walsh (1990) . 
. <'7 CUP, p. 355. 
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Philosophers want to understand the relation between mind and world. Just raising this 
question clearly involves reflecting on our thoughts about the world. Now, 'as we know', 
such reflections can give rise to (e.g. Kant's) sense of the need for an internal 'critique' of 
the categories of our thought. But then further questions arise about the status of this 
reflexive inquiry. How can we be sure that philosophical reflection on the conditions of 
thought will tell us anything about the world? Does not Kant's project open up a chasm 
between human thought and the unknowable Ding an Sich? And so we move up (with the 
post-Kantian Idealists) to a third-order, meta-philosophical level of reflection. But the 
worry persists: for is not reflection loosing all contact with the world in this continual 
spiralling back on itself? In this way, Climacus suggests that a peculiar post-Kantian 
scepticism emerges due to the fact that thought 'selfishly wants to think itself. 
Climacus' point is that if this kind of scepticism is to be addressed, and the regress 
halted, there must be 'a new point of departure' - and that at least Schelling's insistence 
on the need for 'intellectual intuition' marks some kind of appreciation of this fact. 
Climacus views Hegel's 'presuppositionless' method, on the other hand, as depending on 
the curious notion that if thought continues far enough in reflection upon itself it will 
eventually, and of its own accord, make contact again with its proper object. 
The present point is simply to register Climacus' sympathy with the Romantic 
insistence that thought - even abstract, philosophical thought - begins with immediate 
and direct responses to the world. (The sympathy is evident as early as Johannes 
Climacus, in which Climacus favourably compares the Greek idea that philosophy begins 
with wonder with the modem idea that it begins with doubt - where this preference is 
justified by the fact that wonder is immediate in a way that doubt is not. 58) And sympathy 
with the further Romantic claim that it is imagination that is at work in such responses is 
surely manifest in the following passage from The Sickness Unto Death: 
As a rule imagination is the medium for the process of infmitizing; it is not a capacity, as are 
['feeling,' knowing, and willing '] - if one wishes to speak in those term~, it is the ~apacity in.sf~r 
omnium [for all capacities]. When all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowmg: and \nlhng 
a person has depends upon what imagination he has, upon how that person reflects ~lmself -:- that 
is, upon imagination. Imagination is infmitizing reflection, and ~erefor.e the elder F~chte .qw~e 
correctly assumed that even in relation to knowledge the categones denve from the ImagmatIon. 
58 Cf. JC, p. 145: 'Wonder is plainly an immediate category and involves no reflection upon itself. Doubt, 
on the other hand, is a reflection-catcgory·. 
The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is the rendition of the self as the self's 
possibility. The imagination is the possibility of any and all reflection, and the intensity of this 
medium is the possibility of the intensity of the self. 59 -
153 
The thrust of this dense passage is clear enough: viz. that the imagination is essential for a 
whole gamut of human capacities, including those of reflection and knowledge. 
Imagination is nothing less than the sine qua non of 'any and all reflection'. Again, the 
approving nod to a guiding light to the Romantics - this time to Fichte - intimates that, 
however polemically orientated against such thinkers, Kierkegaard shares their sense of 
the explanatory primacy of the imagination.60 
Note especially that Anti-Climacus concurs with the Romantic View that 
imagination is not a local 'faculty' such as the capacity to reflect on mental particulars, 
but a far more general way of engaging with the world (and oneself), if one wishes to 
speak in terms of capacities, a 'capacity for all capacities'. In this way, Anti-Climacus 
anticipates Sartre' s claim that images are not elements within consciousness but 
'complete consciousnesses', and that acts of imagining are modes of relating directly to 
reality rather than the means of an inner process of reflecting on mental images.61 
(Compare also Wittgenstein's remark that 'the image and the reality are in one space,.62) 
Romantic influences can also be detected in the elliptical phrase, 'the medium for 
the process ofinfinitizing'. I take it that this expression compresses features (1) to (5) 
above. That is, to engage in a 'process of infinitizing' is to creatively experiment with 
different perspectives in search ofa unified (apt, resonant) image. It is, in Kierkegaard's 
words, to 'try out [one's] mind as one tunes an instrument'.63 (The cognate of 'infinite' 
here is best understood on analogy with the infinite form of a verb as opposed, say, to its 
present tense. Thus one might say that to conceive a verb in abstracto is to infinitize it. In 
a nineteenth -century context, 'infinite' carries the primary connotation of the unity of a 
59 SUD, pp. 30-I. 
60 I wrote 'intimates' rather than 'implies' for of course the above passage is to be attributed to ~ti- . 
Climacus, not Kierkegaard. However, it will hopefully become clear in what follows that there IS suffiCIent 
agreement between the pseudonymous authors to warrant (at least) my references to a broadly 
'Kierkegaardian' view of the role of imagination. 
61 Sartre writes: 'An imaginative consciousness ... presents itseu,- to itself ~s an ~a?inati\'c co~sciousness. 
that is, as a spontaneity which produces and holds on to the object as an lmage (Sartre (199», p. 14.). 
6~ PR, III.38 (p 73). 
63 Cf POI " p. 82. 
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whole rather than the endlessness of a series.64) It is part and parcel of this process of 
mental attunement, I take it, that we come to imagine phenomena in certain ways: e.g., as 
tokens of types, parts of wholes, examples of patterns, intensions of extensions, instances 
of universals and so on - which is in turn a sine qua non of our subsuming particulars 
under concepts in judgement. Presumably, it is on such grounds that Anti-Climacus 
concurs with Fichte that the imagination is 'the possibility of any and all reflection'. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the wider context of Anti-Climacus' discussion 
of personal identity, which exploits the notion of infinitizing in connection with our 
capacity to imagine ourselves in different possible ways. Anti-Climacus details the ways 
in we confer unity, meaning and purpose on our lives by occupying different possible 
perspectives on ourselves and argues that such acts of self-imaging are essential for 
'becoming a self in the deepest sense. And there is no reason to suppose that this notion 
of infinitizing substantially changes in the contexts of knowledge and cognition (see 
Section 5 below). 
More formally, then, Anti-Climacus' claim for the role of imagination in 
performing judgements might be construed as follows: 
If S has acquired the capacity to perform judgements of type T, there must be some point 
at which S spontaneously made sense of examples of judgements of type T. 
The admittedly loose phrase 'made sense of is supposed to evoke the concept of 
searching for unity and finding certain images apt or resonant (for more on this see 
Sections 6 and 7 below).65 But the general import of the claim can be taken as a 
commentary on Kant's dictums that 'examples are the go-cart of judgement' and that 
'judgement can be practised but never taught' .66 Indeed, the picture is the very Kantian 
64 For a discussion of this distinction, see A. Moore (1990), p. 86. 
65 Compare here Christopher Peacocke's appeal to the notion of finding a certain transition in thought 
'primitively compelling' (peacock, (1992), p. 6): 
To say that a thinker fmds such transitions primitively compelling is to say this: (1) he fmds the~ 
compelling; (2) he does not find them compelling because he has inferred them from other prerruses and/or 
principles; and (3) for possession of the concept C in question ... he does not take the correctness of the 
transitions as answerable to anything else ... 
66 B. 171-2 (Kant (1922)). Compare also Wittgenstein: 'How do I explain the meaning of "regular", 
"uniform". "same" to anyone? - I shall c:\plain these words to someone who, say, only speaks French in 
means of the corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to 
use the words by means of examples and by practice. - And when I do this I do not communicate less to 
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one of an active, interrogative consciousness spontaneously unifying its objects. It should 
be clear that the requirement of spontaneity here implies a rejection of indirect imagism. 
To be sure, Anti-Climacus' remarks on the cognitive role of imagination are 
incidental to the main theme of Sickness Unto Death and Kierkegaard never really 
develops them. But there is surely sufficient evidence here for concluding that, despite a 
general orientation against Romanticism, Kierkegaard is sympathetic to direct imagism. 
And we may reasonably infer that when Climacus moots a connection between 
imagination and logical thought such that might help account for leaps of judgement, he 
envisages an account along these lines. 
2. Spontaneity in the Void 
In order to pursue this connection further it will be as well at this juncture to 
consider a very general misgiving vis-a-vis direct imagism. The worry is nicely expressed 
by John McDowell's reference to 'spontaneity as a frictionless spinning in a void,.67 
According to McDowell, a broadly Kantian emphasis on spontaneity and creativity is ill-
equipped to satisfy certain desiderata of any theory of judgement. In particular, we want 
to know that and how our concepts are justified. And the concern is that appeals to 
spontaneous acts of imagining violate this requirement. McDowell argues that, whilst it 
often leads down blind allies, we should nonetheless take very seriously our desire for 
'reassurance that when we use our concepts in judgement, our freedom - our spontaneity 
in the exercise of understanding - is constrained from outside thought, and constrained in 
a way that we can appeal to in displaying the judgements as justified'. 68 
In short, if Kant rightly rejected the so-called 'Myth of the Given' as a response to 
this desideratum - i.e. the picture of the mind as a passive receptor of externally given 
content - he is in danger of succumbing to what Susan Hurley has dubbed the 'Myth of 
the Giving' - i.e. the picture of the mind as imaginatively constructing its contents ex 
him than I know myself.' (PI §208). And Kierkegaard: 'Abstract concepts are just like the straight linc. 
invisible and only t~ be seen in their concrete instances.' (JP 39 II A 4% (Hannay), p. 105). 
67 McDowell (1994), p. 11. 
68 Ibid., p. 8. 
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nihi!o, unbridled by any external constraint.69 According to McDowell's revival of a 
Hegelian critique, neither myth is adequate to the demand for justification. For, where the 
former illicitly appeals to brute 'givens' (see Chapter Two of this thesis), the latter cannot 
make out our concepts to be answerable to the external reality it may nonetheless posit. 
Now whether or not Kant is vulnerable to McDowell's critique is not our concern. 
But we do need to consider whether Kierkegaard is, and whether any attempt at a direct 
imagist account must inevitably fail to satisfy the demand for justification. 
Kierkegaard is certainly sensitive to McDowell's kind of worry. Indeed, the 
spectre of 'frictionless spinning in a void' very aptly captures his antipathy toward many 
post-Kantian thinkers. Consider, for example, his general verdict on Fichte: 
But since Fichte ... in his ideal kingdom would have nothing to do with actuality, he achieved the 
absolute beginning, and proceeding from that, as has so frequently been discussed, he wanted to 
construct the world. The 1 became the constituting entity. But since the 1 was merely formally 
understood and consequently negative ... [Fichte's system]. ... accomplishes nothing because there 
is nothing to which it can be applied ... an exaltation as strong as a god who can lift the whole 
world and yet has nothing to lift. 70 
According to Kierkegaard, Fichte gives philosophical expression to the tendency of 
Romantic art and literature to loose touch with 'historical actuality' - where the 
celebration of imagination becomes 'a cowardly, effeminate ruse for sneaking out of the 
world. ,71 In particular, Fichte's fantasy of the world-constructing imagination ofa purely 
formal subject ('the 1') fails to engage with the lived world of actual, embodied, 
historically situated subjects. 72 In a similar vein, Anti-Climacus notes that in imagination 
one can 'go astray in all possible ways' and repeatedly warns against the degeneration of 
a healthy use of the imagination into mere fantasy. 73 
The position that thus emerges from Kierkegaard's 'two-front polemic' is roughly 
as follows. The Romantic View is right to afford a fundamental role to the imagination, 
conceived in direct imagist terms. As we have seen, Anti-Climacus goes so far as to 
69 Cf. Hurley (1998), p. 15. 
70 CI, p. 273. 
71 ibid., p. 329 (trans. modified). 
72 As Kierkegaard puts it elsewhere: 'Fichte threw the empirical ballast overboard in despair and capsized.' 
(Pap. I A 302 (p. 59) (1836)) 
73 Cf SUD, p. 37. 
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concede to Fichte that 'the categories' - i.e. our most basic ways of carving up the world 
- 'derive from the imagination'. On the other hand, the Romantic celebration of the 
untrammeled spontaneity of a disembodied subject fails to satisfy both the existential 
demand for a coherent life (it 'robs [the soul] of moral tension') and the theoretical 
demand for justification (,there is nothing to which it can be applied '). 
The pressing question is whether this position is internally consistent. That is: is it 
possible to maintain a direct imagist theory without succumbing to the Myth of the 
Giving? Can Kierkegaard keep his distance from what he sees as the empty formalism of 
much post-Kantian thought whilst allying himself with a strongly Romantic view of the 
cognitive role of the imagination? Is it possible to conceive the work of imagination in 
thought about the world as a constrained spontaneity? 
In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus is undoubtedly more concerned with 
the conditions of selfhood than of knowledge. Broadly, he argues that the self 'becomes 
fantastic' or unconstrained just when the process of infinitizing - of adopting different 
possible perspectives on oneself in search of a satisfying self-image - becomes an end in 
itself The picture here is of a subject who, so to speak, lives only in imagination and fails 
to relate to the possibilities he imagines as possibilities/or him (as what Gibbons calls 
afJordances, i. e., invitations to action).74 A memorable picture of such an 'idling' subject 
is provided in Repetition. Constantin Constantius accounts for the peculiar 'magic of the 
theater' in terms of our desire to try on 'all manner of differentiation's' of ourselves, to 
imagine ourselves in different roles. Constantius writes, 
[I]n such a dream of imagination the individual is not a real figure but a shadow, or rather the real 
figure is invisibly present and therefore is not content with casting one shadow, but the individual 
has a multiplicity of shadows, all of which resemble him and for the moment have an equal claim 
to be accounted himself The personality is not yet discovered, its energy announces itself only in 
the passion of possibility. 75 
74 Kierkegaard acknowledged his own tendency towards fantasy in this sense: 'My imagination and ~y 
dialectic constantly had material enough to operate with, and time enough, free fro~ all.bustle, to.be Idle. 
For long periods (have been employed with nothing else but the p~ormance of dialectIcal exercises ~\"l~ 
an adjunct of the imagination, trying out my mind as one tunes an mstrument - but I was not really h\'mg 
(PO~:', p. 82 (trans. modified)). 
75 REP (Lowrie), p. 58. 
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Whilst the occasions of self-experimentation afforded by the theater may playa valuable 
part in the process of maturation, therefore, to remain in the twighlight of shadows is to 
succumb to one variety of what Anti-Climacus will call despair. 76 
More positively, the possibility of constrained spontaneity, of a healthy 
imagination, is envisaged in terms of a subject employing his imagination in relation to 
his own 'historical actuality' - i.e. his having certain physical properties, being 
committed to certain promises and duties, having certain passions and goals, having failed 
in certain projects, participating in certain cultures, and so on. 77 It is, Anti-Climacus 
suggests, only when the imagination is inherited or appropriated in this way that the 
process of infinitizing has a chance of terminating in truthful, resonant, constitutive self-
images. The temporally situated creature who imagines himself as omnipresent would 
thus be paradigmatically fantastic in Anti-Climacus' sense. 
Anti-Climacus explicitly applies this account to epistemological contexts 
somewhat cryptically as follows: 
So also with knowing, when it becomes fantastic. The law for the development of the self with 
respect to knowing, insofar as it is the case that the self becomes the self, is that the increase of 
knowledge corresponds to the increase of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows the more it 
knows itself If this does not happen, the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a kind 
of inhuman knowledge. 78 
Now indirect imagism goes hand-in-glove with a certain view of what it means for a 
judgement (a belief, thought, image, representation) to count as knowledge: roughly, that 
we have knowledge if and only if our internal models resemble how the world really is. 
Such an epistemology is not available to direct imagism, however - for on this 
framework, there is no logical gap between images and what they resemble. But how then 
is direct imagism to account for the difference between knowledge and fantasy? The 
above quotation is plausibly read as articulating an answer to this question. 
76 Compare Climacus' description of the aesthete a~ one wh.o 'holds existence at b~y by the m,ost subtle of 
all deceptions, by thinking. He has thought everythmg pOSSIble, and yet has not eXIsted at all. (CUP, p. 
253). 
77 Compare Haufniensis' reminder that '[ e]ac~ indi~idual beg~s in a historic.al nexlls' and is cons~ained by 
'the consequences of nature' (C·L p. 73). Notmg Kierkegaard s sense of the Importance o~bccom~g . 
transparent to oneself, George Pattison refers to 'that process w~ereby ~e. sel~ takes c~gruzanc~ of all that IS 
by virtue of its immediacy: its historical., cultural and psychological f~~tI~lty, I.e., the tact that It IS born, has 
been brought up this way in this time With these talents and opportumtIes (Pattison (1997), p. 77). 
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Anti-Climacus would have us distinguish between an 'inhuman knowing' in 
which the imagination is a law unto itself, and a genuine or authentic knowing in which 
the process of infinitizing is situated in and limited by the historical (and especially 
ethical) constraints on a fmite subject's agency. Broadly speaking, this sensitivity to 
contextual conditions means resisting the temptation to impose one's own fantasies on 
reality, to create the world in one's own image. (This further explains Climacus' rather 
idiosyncratic use of the language of self-abnegation - 'a kind of dying to oneself - in 
connection with abstract thinking. Compare Iris Murdoch's distinction between a healthy, 
situated imagination and one that 'somewhat mechanically generat[es] narrowly banal 
false pictures (the ego as all-powerful)'79.) So whilst philosophers typically envisage the 
spectre of unconstrained spontaneity as calling into question whether our images are 
justified by the world, Anti-Climacus would shift our attention to the question whether 
our images of the world are justified by the role they play in our lives. 
An extreme case of 'inhuman knowledge' in Anti-Climacus' sense is the parrot 
reciting what in other mouths would be true sentences. The parrot's 'knowledge' plays no 
essential role in its life. 80 Even more surreal is Climacus' parable of the man who escapes 
from the asylum and tries to prove his sanity by declaring that the earth is round every 
time the ball in his pocket knocks against his back-side. We would, I think, be reluctant to 
say that these utterances express knowledge of the fact that the earth is round. The reason, 
again, is that the man stands in an entirely accidental relation to this fact, he mentions 
(rather than uses) it in an absent, detached, uncontextualised, arbitrary, unknowing way. 
In short, the image of the earth as round plays no essential role in this man's life. 
(Compare G. K. Chesterton's remark that the madman is not the one who has lost his 
reason, but the one who has lost everything but his reason. 81 For Climacus, the 'absent-
78 SUD, p. 31. 
79 Murdoch (1992), p. 322. 
80 Cf. CA, pp. 134-5: 'Then come the parrots, who despite their SUI"\"ey of world history unfortunatel~· ~ack 
all contemplation, and who know just as much about the ~?cepts as that noble youth knew about ~alsms, 
who when asked in the test for a grocers license where raIsms come from answered: We get ours trom the 
, 
protessor on Cross Street'. 
81 Cf Chesterton (19%), p. 17. 
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minded' obsession of his contemporaries with churning out 'objective truths' displays a 
similar pathology. 82) 
The lesson is that knowledge, as opposed to fantasy, requires that images of the 
world are rooted in the lives of subjects who are aware of themselves as historically 
situated. This explains Anti-Climacus' sense that genuine knowledge is possible just to 
the extent that there is a corresponding self-knowledge - that is, a clear-sighted view of 
which ways of imagining the world might playa vital role in one's life, given the 
conditions in which one finds oneself at any time. (The man in Climacus' story displays 
his lack of self-knowledge by associating himself with a perspective for which he has no 
essential use in the context.83) For Kierkegaard, too, this has the salutary implication that 
the one who would acquire knowledge must first know which of her 'judgements' are her 
own and which she has acquired in an accidental, fantastic way (e.g. by mere absorption 
of the latest intellectual fashions). As The Concept of Irony inherits its Socratic theme: 
'To know that one is ignorant is the beginning of coming to know'. 84 
A similar emphasis on the subjective conditions of knowledge and understanding 
characterises Haufniensis' concept of 'spirit', which he negatively defines as follows: 
Spiritlessness can say exactly the same thing that the richest spirit has said, but it does not say it 
by virtue of spirit. Man qualified as spiritless has become a talking machine, and there is nothing 
to prevent him repeating by rote a philosophical rigmarole, a confession of faith, or a political 
recitative. Is it not remarkable that the only ironist and the greatest humorist [i.e. Socrates and 
Hamann] joined forces in saying what seems to be the simplest of all, namelr' that a person must 
distinguish between what he understands and what he does not understand?8 
Compare Haufniensis' figure of the spiritless person as a 'talking-machine' with 
Wittgenstein's remark that 'speech with and without thought is to be compared with the 
playing of a piece of music with and without thought'. 86 One thing this suggests is that, 
82 In this connection, John Lippitt draws attention to Bergson's observation that a comic character is 
. generally comic in proportion to his ignorance of himself, a~d ~gues that similar considerations go some 
way to explaining Kierkegaard extensive use of humor (see LIPPItt (2000), p. 17). 
83 Cf. CUP, pp. 194-5. 
84 CI, p. 269. It is precisely because he views hi.s age as ch~acterised hy fantasy that Kierkeg~d sees an 
important role for Socratic irony: 'Particularly m our ~ge, !fony .must be co~.ended ... In our .loy. over ~e 
achievement in our age, we have forgotten that an achievement IS worthless If It IS not made one s em n. 
(ibid., p. 327). 
85 CL p. 95. 
86 PI §341. Compare also Wittgenstein's reference to humans as 'reading-machines' (cf PI § 157). 
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the infelicity of appeals to prior acts of interpretation notwithstanding, genuine thought 
and meaning involve more than absent conformity to rules. The Kierkegaardian 'more' is 
a creative, empathetic, imagination properly attuned to a subject's temporal conditions. (It 
may well be that the one who refuses to playa piece of music on the grounds that he 
cannot (yet) make full sense of the score is the better musician.) 
At least part of the answer to the question how one can consistently appeal to a 
fundamental role for imagination in thought and judgement, as conceived along direct 
imagist lines, and resist the conclusion that the latter are thereby rendered arbitrary or 
unconstrained thus invokes the Inseparability Thesis (see Chapter Three of this thesis). 
Images are unconstrained just to the extent that they are separated from the acts of 
contextually situated agents. Conversely, the possibility of judgement and knowledge 
depends on a subject being fully integrated with the objects of her imagining. 87 
Now all this may appear quite unsatisfactory from the perspective of the demand 
for justification. Philosophers want to know how our images of the world are related to 
how the world actually is, but Anti-Climacus seems only concerned with how we relate to 
our images of the world. And there surely is an important distinction between objects of 
imagination and actual objects (for one can of course imagine things that do not exist). 
Nothing has been done to show that it is impossible for one to be 'present in' one's 
judgements in the case that one is not in touch with reality. But philosophers want 
reassurance that our cognitive life is not 'all a dream'. 
At this point, one might attempt to defend on Kierkegaard' s behalf the claim that 
it is indeed impossible to be properly related to one's images in Anti-Climacus' sense in 
the case that one is not so related to reality. On a strongly 'anti-realist' view the fact that 
gods, gorgons, unicorns and the rest do not exist is because they have no resonance for 
us, play no essential role in our lives. (I take it that something like this explains 
Nietzsche's claim that God is dead - i. e. we no longer have a role for the image of God 
in our lives. Compare Climacus' claim that God 'comes into existence' for the one who 
87 In connection with the theme of integrity and transparency in Kierkega.ard, .~o~ Lippit~ df<l\\ s attention tn 
R. G. Collingwood's discussion of 'the corruption of consciousness'.' \\-hIch LIPPItt descnbcs as .-that s~nsc 
of alienation from one's O\\TI experience such that one fails to c:\penence that c:\penence us one s m\TI , 
Lippitt (2000), p- 30. 
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'rubs the lamp of freedom' .88) The products of a properly situated imagination would thus 
be viewed as strictly coextensive with 'reality'. As Kierkegaard picturesquely puts it: 
The imagination is whatyrovidence .uses .in order to get men into reality, into existence, to get 
them far enough out, or ill, or down ill eXIstence. And when imagination has helped them out as 
far as they are meant to go - that is where reality, properly speaking, begins. 89 
Nonetheless, I take it that direct imagism is also consistent with a more realist view 
according to which there is a 'preestablished harmony' between our spontaneous aspect 
perceptions and reality - or indeed, according to which there is no such harmony and the 
thing-in-itself is beyond our reach. In fact, the above entry surely goes some way towards 
the former kind of realism in its appeal to the role of divine' governance' in ensuring that 
human imagination is an adequate guide to reality 'properly speaking,.90 The picture here 
is of our being provided the means to fulfil a pre-ordained, God-given, and divinely 
directed task.91 (But note here that a willingness to talk of God or 'providence' is 
important in making sense of the notion of a pre-established harmony.) 
Plainly, however, any such appeal has very little anti-sceptical purchase - for it is 
utterly obscure how one would go about demonstrating that there is a preestablished 
harmony (or noumenal realm). And it would be quite perverse, given his deep-seated 
suspicion of arguments for the existence of God, to attribute to Kierkegaard an appeal to 
God as a move within an anti-sceptical strategy, a fa Descartes. Since, as C. Stephen 
Evans has amply documented, the textual evidence goes both ways vis-a-vis the realism / 
anti-realism debate, it is therefore safe to conclude that Kierkegaard was not concerned to 
develop either a realist or an anti-realist response to scepticism.92 
88 Cf. CUP, p. 138. 
89 JP (Dru), p. 243. 
90 There is also some evidence of the former, Kantian kind of realism in the corpus. Climacus, for instance, 
claims that human knowing can only 'approximate' to reality since 'the empirical object is not finished, and 
the existing knowing spirit is itself in the process of becoming' (CUP, p. 189). For a realist interpretation of 
Postscript, see Piety (1997). 
91 That Kierkegaard himself (and here there may well be a contr~t with Clim~cus) is realist at least about 
God is suggested by the following entry in his Joumals: 'The philosophers t?ink that all knowledge, even 
the existence of the Deity is something man himself produces and that only m a. fi~ratIv~ sense can there 
be talk of revelation, rather as one can say that rain falls from heaven though r~m ~s nothmg but mIst 
produced by the earth. But, to keep to the metapho~, the~ forget that in the begmnmg God ~arated the 
waters of heaven and earth and that there IS something hIgher than atmosphere (JP (Hanna)), p. 106). 
<>: See Evans (1998b). 
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More in the spirit ofKierkegaard would be to argue that, whilst it is all too 
possible to make of life a dream, what is needed to ward off this eventuality is not an anti-
sceptical argument. Here many tributaries converge: the sense that philosophers' doubts 
are often disingenuous (see Chapter Two of this thesis); the sense that genuine scepticism 
is a profound human condition such that it cannot be engaged by a merely intellectual 
approach
93
; the sense that 'being in touch with reality' is primarily an ethical rather than 
an epistemic qualification94; the sense that cherished epistemological ideals (e.g. that a 
perfect correspondence demonstrably exists between our images and reality) only gain 
their purchase on inadequate conceptions of what it means to think, to imagine, to judge, 
to believe. In short, since scepticism is most fundamentally a form of existential 
dislocation (or 'dissonance,95) no merely conceptual solution may engage it - here, as so 
often with philosophy, method and problem pass one another by. 
On a Kierkegaardian view, then, the' discovery that gives philosophy peace' - to 
employ the Wittgensteinian phrase with which McDowell characterises his own aims -
could only be realised by a subject who spontaneously finds certain images of the world 
apt or resonant and who establishes a vital role for these images in her life. 96 One thing is 
clear: such are prizes that could never be won by any formal argument. (Though it may be 
that an artfully designed text such as Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations or 
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments can serve as (re)orientation.97) 
93 Compare Kierkegaard's remark that 'the possibility of doubt is essential to existence, is the secret of 
human existence' (cited in Strawser (1994), p. 623). 
94 Compare Climacus' claim that 'the only actuality there is for an existing person is his own ethical 
actuality ... The actual subjectivity is not the knowing subjectivity because with knowledge he is in the 
medium of possibility, but is the ethical subjectivity' (CUP, p. 316). Many passages in Kierkegaard can be 
read as anticipating the contemporary interest in 'virtue epistemology', insofar as the latter aims not merely 
to draw an analogy between epistemic virtues and moral virtues, but also to analyze or explain the former in 
terms of the latter. Consider for example Kierkegaard's claim that 'that which upbuilds .. .is an aspect of 
knowledge that ought not to be ignored' (cited in Perkins (1990), p. 9). 
95 Compare the following from the Joumals: 'fu the end it's all a questio~ of ear. The rul.es of ~ammar end 
with the ear - the edicts of the law end with ear - the figured bass ends \nth ear - the phIlosophIcal system 
ends with ear - which is why the next life is also represented as pure music, as a great harmony - if only my 
life's dissonance may soon be resolved into that.' (JP Sept. 36 I A 235 (Hannay), p. 54). 
96 The following expresses what might be called an acute sense of epistemic prec~ousness: ~How near, 
besides is man to madness despite all his knowledge? What is truth other than to live for an Idea') 
Evervthing must in the final analysis be based on a postulate. But only when it no longer stands outside him 
but he lives in it, only then, for him, does it cease to be a postulate' (JP 35 I A 73 (Hannay) p. 33). 
97 Recall that the latter is called an 'imaginary construction'. That Kierkegaard's works can be read as 
'attunements' is indicated hy many of their subtitles Fear and Trembling, for instance, is suhtitled 
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To summarise the claims of this section: Kierkegaard's work is responsive to the 
anxiety that a direct imagist theory of thought about the world implies a 'spontaneity in 
the void', but locates the void in cases where images are idle, having lost their resonance 
for us and their grip on our lives. The upshot is that the only proper response to the 
scepticism that emerges from a dislocated imagination is to come back to ourselves. 
3. Images of Rules 
Now it is worth spelling out that Kripke's reading ofWittgenstein on rule-
following is structurally isomorphic with McDowell's critique of Kant. Kripke asks, in 
effect: if there is no fact of the matter that determines how one is to proceed 'in 
accordance with' a rule, beyond an individual's spontaneous acts of taking-as - if there is 
nothing to choose, say, between plus and 'quus' (where x quus y = x + y, ifx, y < 57; = 5 
otherwise) - how then can one be justified in proceeding in a particular way?98 In other 
words: How, on a direct imagist account, are we to distinguish between 'seems right' and 
'is right' in a given case? Again, the anxiety is that direct imagism hosts a particularly 
virulent form of scepticism. 
The general account I have called Kierkegaardian can be specifically applied to 
debates about rule-following in three ways. First, it excludes certain appeals to 'the 
community'. Second, it significantly qualifies the claim that our rule-following practices 
are 'blind'. Third, it significantly qualifies the claim that our rule-following practices are 
'unjustifiable'. I shall briefly consider these in turn. 
Firstly, then, a Kierkegaardian approach runs against the grain of certain popular 
appeals to 'the community' by way of an analysis and / or explanation of rule-following. 
Very broadly, on a 'socio-externalist' or 'communitarian' account, rule-following turns 
out to be essentially a matter of one's conforming to the paradigmatic behaviour of some 
'Dialectical Lvric' - a kind of philosophical poem or song - and, contains a section whose title Alastair 
Hannay transl~tes as 'Attunement' (sometime 'Prelude' or 'Exordium') .. Edward Mooney comments: 'If , 
nowhere else in his voluminous production, surely here Kierkegaard antiCIpates - and fulfills - NIetzsche"s 
call for a music-playing Socrates' (Mooney (1992), p. 346). 
98 Ktipke is another author who resorts to the metaphor ofleaping in thlS co~tc:\t: 'The sceptic ~gue~ that 
when I answered' 125' to the problem '68 + 51', my answer was an UllJustlhed leap m the dark (Kripke 
(1982), p. 10). 
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relevant community.99 This idea clearly informs Kripke's 'sceptical solution' to the 
problem of justification in lieu of truth-conditions. 'All that is needed to legitimise 
assertions that someone means something', he suggests, 'is that there be roughly 
specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game 
of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives'. 100 
Now an immediate concern is whether any such theory can account for rule-
following as opposed to mere rule-conformity. (Recall that it was a conclusion of Chapter 
One that this is a desideratum of any theory of judgement.) This worry is given graphic 
expression, by Haufniensis' reference to spiritless 'talking-machines'. Haufniensis would 
surely press the question: is mere conformity to social norms an adequate conception of 
what it means for humans to think? After all, the temptation to conceive rule-following as 
an essentially reflective activity is surely so powerful precisely because our concept of 
thinking requires more than mechanical conformity. (Consider the naturalness of such 
remarks as 'I wasn't really thinking, 1 was just responding automatically', 'Stop being so 
conventional and start thinking for yourself!', 'He merely paid lip-service to the thought 
that. ... ', 'The dog isn't thinking - it's been trained to do that'.) And it is this truth upon 
which Climacus' sustained satire on 'second-hand' thinkers (and Christians) so often 
trades. 101 For example: 
Or is it not the case that God is so unnoticeable, so hidden yet present in his work, that a person 
might very well live on, marry, be respected and esteemed as husband, father, and captain of the 
poopinjay shooting club, without discovering God in his work. .. by managing with custom and 
tradition in the city where he lived? Just as a mother admonishes her child who is about to attend 
a party, "Now mind your manners and watch other polite children and behave as they do" so he, 
too, could live on and behave as he saw the others behave. He would never do anything first and 
would never have any opinion unless he first knew that others had it, because "'the others" would 
be his very first. On special occasions he would act l~e som~one who does not know ~o~ to e~~~ 
a course that is served at a banquet; he would reconnOItre untIl he saw how the others dId It etc. 
99 For various versions of 'community view' see, e.g., Peacocke (1981)~ Kripke (1982)~ Malcolm (1989)~ 
Bloor (1997). For a helpful overview see Canfield (1996). 
100 Kripke (1982), p. 78. 
101 Cf ('UP, p. 308: 'If in our day thinking had not become something strange, something secondhand .... ' 
IO~ Compare}P 49 Xl 628 (Hannay), p. 407: 'One person talks ~n the ~aI?e<:~the century:- another in the 
t'the public another in the name of science. another hy nrtue ot his ottlce, and theIr hn~s are name 0 , . tho , 
everywhere guaranteed hy tradition, that 'others', 'the others' are domg the same mg. 
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As we have seen, it is characteristic of a Kierkegaardian view that, the misguidedness of 
appeals to prior acts of interpretation notwithstanding, genuine thought (like genuine 
religion) involves more than mere conformity to social norms. 
A further worry is akin to Kierkegaard's dismissal ofFichte's appeal to the world-
constructing activity of an abstract subjectivity as nebulous. lo3 For it is far from clear how 
the appeal to the rule-constructing activity of 'the community' is supposed to be a 
solution, even a 'sceptical' one. In particular, it is hard to see how communitarian theories 
can supply a criterion for distinguishing between 'seems right' and 'is right'. To see this, 
consider the case that two people who have hitherto applied a rule in conformity with the 
paradigmatic behaviour of a relevant community diverge in the way they apply the rule in 
a new situation, i.e. a situation that is new to everyone. The question arises: who applies 
the rule correctly? Any appeal to the paradigmatic behaviour of the community is clearly 
out of order here, for, ex hypothesi, there is no such behaviour. 104 
As several critics ofKripke have argued, and in several other ways, it appears 
therefore that mere appeals to assertability-conditions only serve to shunt the problem 
from individuals to communities: e. g. the problem becomes how 'the community' 
spontaneously acts in accordance with its own paradigmatic behaviour, before it is has 
established a paradigm. !Os Kierkegaard's general suspicion of ascriptions of agency to 
such abstractions as 'the public' or the transcendental ego is surely germane here. 106 
Secondly, a direct imagist appeal to the role of imagination in rule-following 
significantly qualifies the claim that our rule-following practices are 'blind'. To be sure, 
103 It is interesting to note in this connection that Fichte's 'ego' is often held to be intersubjective. See, e.g., 
Hohler, (1982). 
104 This scenario is envisioned by Alberto Voltolini (see Voltolini (2001),p. 92). 
105 Simon Blackburn, for instance, argues against metaethical appropriations of Wittgenstein's remarks on 
rule-following. Having outlined the view that standards of moral correctness ar~ reducible to communal 
consensus, Blackburn writes, 'IfWittgenstein leads us this way, however, he falls to allow for the 
possibility that goose-stepping along with everyone else can yet lead to m~r~l error' (Blackburn (1981), p. 
173). See also Blackburn (1984); McDowell (1984); Gillett (1995); Voltolml (2001). 
106 Consider, for example, the following passage in which Kierkegaard distinguishes between. g~uine 
community and 'the public': 'In community the single individual is the microcosm ~vho qualItatively 
repeats the macrocosm: here it is a case of unu~ nori~ omnes ~o~ one, ~ow all] m the good sense. In ~e 
public there is no single individual, the whole IS nothmg; here It IS I~possIble ~o say lmW~l n~r1S omnes. for 
here there is no One. 'Community' is no doubt more than a sum, but IS truly stIll a sum 01 unIts; .the puhh~ 
is nonsense: a sum of negative units, of units that are not units, that become uruts mth the sum, mstead ul 
the sum being a sum of units.' (JP 50 X 2 A 390 (Hannay), p. 465). 
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the process of infinitizing is not to be confused with the successful performance of 
judgements. On a Kierkegaardian account, however, this process is nonetheless a prior 
condition of such leaps. And, if the above interpretation was on the right lines, this 
process is far from blind, in at least two senses. For it requires a capacity for aspect-
perception - hearing words as meaningful, finding certain ways of imagining examples 
apt - and it requires a subject who is clear-sighted about what, at any given time, she can 
and cannot appropriate. 107 (Notice how natural it is to describe the work of imagination as 
a kind of vision.) Such might well be constitutive of the feeling, 'Now I can go on!,108 
Now someone with Wittgensteinian scruples may feel deeply uneasy about Anti-
Climacus' placing so much theoretical weight on a process of infinitizing. For was it not 
Wittgenstein's intention - unambiguously expressed, for example, by the remark that 
'when I follow a rule, I follow it blindly' - to reveal the utter bankruptcy of the notion 
that understanding consists in a mental process? It is worth noting in passing that, in 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects this characterisation of his 
aims. 109 Anticipating the charge that he is 'really a behaviourist in disguise', committed to 
denying any role for mental processes in phenomena like memory, Wittgenstein asks, 
'What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?': 
The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from setting our faces against the picture 
of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct 
idea of the use of the word "to remember". 110 
107 In connection with the notion of hearing words as meaningful, consider the following from Henrik 
Steffens, which Kierkegaard quotes approvingly in an early Journal: "The European languages are only 
sound: the letters, the syllables, the words, have meaning only for the ear. The sound fIxes on the innermost, 
liveliest, most labile existence, and above all that language which puts an emphasis on expression, where 
the sounds, rising and falling, emphasized or repressed, cling closely and lightly to the inner meaning of 
every changing mood, can rightly be called a Christian * language, and hints at the victory of love over law' 
(* what I call the romantic), (JP 28 Sept. 36 I A 250 (Hannay), p. 55). 
108 Cf PI § 179. Whilst I cannot explore the matter here, the relation between Wittgenstein's remarks on 
'aspect seeing' in the second part of Investigations and those on rule-following in the ~rrst deser\"es more 
attention than it usuallv receives. That these two sets of concerns are not unconnected IS suggested, for 
example, by the fact that Wittgenstein claims both that experiences of understanding and that experi~ces of 
aspect-perception are grounded in 'the mastery of a technique' (Cf. § 1.50 & II.Xl (p. 208).) For readmgs 
that emphasise this connection, see Mulhall (2001), pp. 163 -82; Guettl (1993). 
109 It is also worth noting that some commentators have argued that there is a serious mistake in .the 
Anscombe translation of the passage in which the 'blind' metaphor occurs. Stephen Mulhall clalffis that, 
due to Anscombe's mistranslation of the distinction betweenfolgen and befo/gen, 'where rWittgenstein] 
talks of blind Iv following a rule, Anscombe has him talking of blind obedience to it. This g.in~s his talk of 
blindness a rather cowardly or fearful cast, as it has when someone talks of 'merel~ obeymg orders' or of 
'blind terror' ... · (Mulhall (2001), p. 141). 
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To deny that the picture of a mental process provides an adequate conception of what it 
means to remember (or to follow a rule), Wittgenstein argues, is not to deny that mental 
processes are part of the surroundings of remembering (or following a rule). 111 (And note 
that Wittgenstein' s criticisms are targeted at the picture of an inner process.) 
More substantively, however, it is significant that the framework I have outlined 
does afford an important role for intersubjectivity. As we have seen, the imagination can 
fulfil its proper function, on a Kierkegaardian view, only to the extent that it is attuned to 
the 'historical actuality' in which one finds oneself - where this certainly includes 
participation in culture. (Recall Kierkegaard's remarks on the social nature of language 
quoted in Chapter Three.) Part of what it means to have a properly 'attuned' imagination 
therefore is that one establishes an essential role for one's images in one's life with 
others. Genuine thinking and understanding, on this view, involve more and not less than 
conformity to intersubjective norms, and are therefore not reducible to an individual's 
mental processes. To make explicit what has been in the background throughout: 
Kierkegaard's 'individualism' is very far from an 'absolutizing of the subject' (as Levinas 
would have it). 112 After all, Climacus finds himself using the language of self-
mortification to characterise the kind of appropriation appropriate to logical thought! 
It is also salutary to reiterate that the activity Anti-Climacus refers to as a process 
is to be seen as no more than a 'final psychological approximation' to the qualitative 
transition effected by the actual performance of a judgement. To say that understanding 
'consists in' the process ofinfinitizing would therefore be seriously misleading. More 
accurate would be to say that imaginative responses to examples are necessary but not 
sufficient for acts of thinking and judging that display understanding. James Guetti and 
Rupert Read get the emphasis right in this respect with the following analogy: 
110 Ibid. §305. 
111 PI §307. Cf. PI § 154: 'In the sense in w~ch. there are processes (including .m,ental p~ocess) which ar~, 
characteristic of understanding, understandmg IS not a mental process. / (A pam s grO\\mg more and less. 
the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes.)' 
112 Cf. Levinas (1988), p. 26. Compare also Louis Mackey: '[t.]he effect of the ~i~~egaar~i~ posit~on is to 
il~finitize the freedom a/the individual and thereby to absolutlZe human subjecllV1ty (Mackl::~ (196 .... ), p. 
615). 
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Let us c~nsider a game of chess, in which, for one reason or another, the players as they play have 
to hold m one hand - or to position beside the board - a table or chart of the possible moves of the 
game. Before any move they look back and forth from the game board to their charts. But when 
they actually come to moving a piece, they no longer do this, but give all their attention to the 
positions on the board. This model seems a fair picture of the relation between applications and 
~lles if the fo~er are c~nsidered to amount to "leaps" from the latter, since here applying a rule 
mvolves lookmg or turrung away from the rule-formulation. 113 
We might take the 'looking back and forth' between charts and board here as a metaphor 
for the work of the process of infinitizing in enabling one to regard the pieces on the 
board in the light of their possible positions. But the point is that no such process is to be 
confused with actually perfonning a move in the game. ll4 If rules can be understood 
backwards, they must be followed forwards. lls What Kierkegaard's work allows us to see 
- here and more generally - is the consistency of certain kinds of psychological 
explanation with a firm commitment to the spontaneity of human perfonnances. 
Thirdly, if the claim that learning to follow a rule essentially involves immediate 
responses to examples rules out discursive justifications of our rule-following practices, it 
does not rule out justification per se. Consider again the analogy with aesthetic 
experience. Having reported his transition from initial perplexity about a Jackson Pollock 
- specifically, Lavender Mists - to the kind of pleasure characteristic of an aesthetic 
response, David Bell reflects on what exactly this response consists in: 
Well, one wants to say that the painting has begun to make sense to me, or perhaps that I have begun to 
make sense ofit...Certainly [this] does not seem to be a conclusion - a judgement or a thought. And ifit is a 
feeling, it is an immensely complex one: at the most general level it has to do, for example, with the relation 
of parts to whole, and involves the feeling that the whole has an integrity, apoint, in other words that its 
elements and lines are not arbitrary but comprise a mutually and internally self-determining unity ... To come 
to feel that such aspects are not merely co-present but belong indissolubly together, for them to strike one 
as, in a quite particular way, right, is the beginning of a genuinely aesthetic response to the whole which 
b d· th 116 em 0 les em. 
113 Guetti & Read (1996), p. 47. 
114 In this sense, the connection Philip Dwyer makes between Wittgenstein and Sartre ~olds ju~t as \\e1.! 
between Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: 'It is this notion of being perp.etually engaged ~ a ChOIce by vIrtue 
of its being undetermined by anything that has gone before, that constItut~s the centrallink.hct\\~ 
Wittgenstein and Sartre.' (Dwyer (1989), p. 5~) - th~ugh 'act of freedom would be less mIsleadmg than 
'choice' here (see Chapter Three note 10 of thIS thesIS). 
115 This is of course a variation on the follo\ying famous remark: 'It is quite true what philosophy says: that 
life must be understood backwards. But then one forgets the principle: that it must be l.ivoo forwards. Which 
. I'ple the more one thinks it through, ends e:-.:actly with the thought that temporal life can nc\'er hc pnnc , ' h' h d th .. properly understood precisely because I can at no mstant find complete rest m W IC to a opt e pOSItIon: 
backwards' (lP 43 IV A 164 (Hannay), p. 161). 
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Whether or not these remarks furnish a complete description of aesthetic experience, it is 
surely correct that such feelings of aptness are not judgements, and therefore resist 
discursive justification. Yet it is also implicit in Bell's remarks that aesthetic responses 
are constrained and motivated by the art-work itself, for example, by the relations 
between its parts to one another and to the whole. To have an aesthetic appreciation of an 
art-work is precisely not to view such features as arbitrary or fortuitous. (It is perhaps 
significant that, even in the case of Pollock' s Abstract Expressionism, one equivocates 
between 'the painting has begun to make sense to me' and 'I have begun to make sense of 
it'. These are surely not mutually exclusive.) 
Moreover, it is primafacie plausible that aesthetic responses are such that they 
can be indirectly communicated. 117 That is, having achieved an aesthetic appreciation of a 
painting one might help another to achieve this same experience, not by directly 
transferring a conceptual content, nor yet by gesturing towards an ineffable content, but 
by describing the conditions under which the painting begins to make sense. One may, for 
example, advise another to stop focussing on the individual elements and try to see the 
painting as a whole, or stand at a certain distance and squint the eyes slightly or whatever. 
And the possibility of this kind of aesthetic education rests on our confidence that, if 
imagined in certain ways, certain objects will indeed elicit an aesthetic response. 
One aspect of the essay on Mozart in Either / Or is a meditation on what is 
involved in this kind of aesthetic education. Kierkegaard's aesthete sets himself the task 
of demonstrating that Don Giovanni is the apotheosis of musical achievement, since it 
uniquely expresses that which can only be properly expressed in music (rather than 
language or sculpture or painting). But this task, he notes, is problematic: for how can one 
say what can only be properly expressed in music? Confessing that he is no musical 
expert, and that he feels most at home with prose, the aesthete nonetheless hopes that he 
'may be able to impart some odd piece of enlightenment on the subject'.llS He goes on: 
116 Bell (l987b), p. 237. 
117 I am using the concept of indirect communication here in a. wa~ tha~ is included by. but hy no means 
exhausts, the Kierkegaardian concept. Here, indirect commUnIcation SImply means. C.g., supplymg 
e:o\arnples rather than interpretations. 
118 EO (Hannay), p. 76. 
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If I were to imagine two countries bordering on each other, with one of which I was fairly familiar 
and with the other was quite unfamiliar, and I was not allowed to enter that realm howeY~r much I 
wanted to, I should still be able to form some conception of it. I would travel to the boundaries of 
the kingdom I knew and follow them constantly, and as I did so my movements would describe 
the contours of that unknown land. 119 
This is clearly supposed to be a metaphor for the strategy the aesthete will adopt in order 
to demonstrate his claim that Don Giovanni expresses that which can only be properly 
expressed in music. By marking the limits of language from within, the aesthete would 
thereby show what music can express that language cannot. In this way, he aims to 
indirectly justify his claim - not by stating what it is that cannot be expressed by language 
(how could he?) but by communicating the conditions under which it is possible to 
experience Mozart's opera as the apotheosis of musical achievement. 12o 
The aesthete is particularly keen to stress, however, that this strategy does not 
commit him to the idea that there is something 'beyond' or above language - a 
mysterious, ineffable, kind of content that music can somehow get hold of in a way that 
language cannot. On the contrary, he insists that since language is a much richer medium 
than music, it is precisely that which is devoid of content that falls outside of its domain. 
This limit is a limitation, he says, only on the dubious assumption that "ugh!" is 'worth 
more than a whole thought' .121 To recognise limits of language, then, is not to commit 
oneself to a mystical notion of the ineffable or the need for a pregnant silence. (The 
aesthete explains that ifhe didn't try to justify the oft-asserted claim that Don Giovanni is 
masterful, the very 'stones would take to speaking in Mozart's honour, to the shame of 
. h·· k' 122) every human bemg to w om It was gIven to spea . 
So, whilst aesthetic responses resist discursive justification, they are neither 
arbitrary nor wholly incommunicable. And this at least makes space for an analogous 
claim in the case of judgement. According to the view I have attributed to Anti-Climacus, 
insofar as our capacities for judgement are acquired, they are acquired and exercised by 
119 Ibid., p. 76-7. 
120 In this connection, Vanessa Rumble emphasises the way the aesthete's language 't~es on a lyrical 
cadence which begins to approximate the music it describes. ~ythm and onomatopoeIa ro~l, and language 
itself seems to be pulled into a \'ortc:'\ in which signification dissoln~s mto a SImple gesture (Rumhle 
(1997), p. 100). 
l~l EO (Hannay), p. 80. 
122 Ibid., p. 82. 
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means of immediate and imaginative responses to examples. But such responses are 
constrained both by the reflection that surrounds them and by the examples themselves, 
and the kind of 'understanding' they afford can be communicated and justified by appeal 
to the conditions under which the examples begin to yield that experience. 
In teaching someone how to continue a series of numbers - to take the stock 
example - one may emphasise patterns visually or vocally, formulate explicit rules, 
physically guide the pupil's hand as he writes and so forth. 123 Such, plausibly, are the 
means by which a pupil's imagination is engaged. (To deny that the concept of rule-
following implies prior acts of reflection is not to deny that, as a matter of psychological 
fact, certain kinds of reflective activity - e.g. the formulation of hypotheses - may be part 
of the learning process in a given case.) But to communicate the conditions under which a 
series begins to make sense is, to echo Wittgenstein, a very different kind of justification 
to any direct attempt to justify a rule. 124 
What, then, are we to say about Wittgenstein' s awkward pupil, whose immediate 
response to an arithmetical series - what strikes him as 'in a quite particular way, right' -
is what strikes the rest of us in a quite particular way as wrong? 
To take seriously the appeal to imagination, as conceived by direct imagism, is 
indeed to bite the bullet that we have no access to a final discursive justification of our 
responses. And to conceive the work of imagination as a spring-board for leaps of 
judgement is to be unflinching in this respect. On this view, it is not hard to see why the 
teacher confronted by an awkward pupil is soon forced back on remarks of the order, 
'Can't you see! ,125 But to bite that bullet is very far from offering a 'sceptical solution', at 
least if that implies that there is nothing to choose between 'plus' and 'quus'. On the 
contrary, in so far as our way of continuing the series '+2' continues to strike us as right 
123 Stephen Mulhall has argued that Wittgenstein foc~ses on ari~etical example~ precisely ~ as to .., _ 
exemplify, in order to subvert, 'our tendency to sublIme the logIC of 0U: language (Mulhall.( ..... OO 1), p. IJ)) 
F or the attempt to conceive language per se ?n the .model of mathematIcs can be seen as. an mst~~e of that 
tendency. Mulhall thus questions whether anth~etI~al examples c.an be II?ade to generalIze (cf. IbId., p. 
228-9). Certainly, it is plausible that Wittgenstem auns to undenmne ~e unage of rules as. detached from. 
human interests and practices, even in cases wh~e we may. find that pIcture most compelhng. But I take It 
that this is consistent with the view that arithmetIc IS a partIc~lar clear case of the very general fact that 
'[r]ule-following is FUNDAMENTAL to the language-game (RF,\!, VJ-28.). 
1~4 Cf. PI §527. 
125 Cf. PI § 185. 
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(and other ways as wrong) - that is, in so far as reflection on the awkward pupil has not 
reflected us out of an immediate relation to our arithmetical practices - our confidence 
remains intact. l26 (After all, to be struck in a certain way is not to remain neutral.) 
In so far as philosophical reflection has undermined our confidence on the other , 
hand, what is needed is a 'new point of departure'. (There is no suggestion here of a mere 
retreat to 'ordinary practice' or 'common sense'. 127) To recall a distinction I introduced in 
Chapter Three, the puzzlement that results from 'looking at' our practices of arithmetical 
judgement can only be overcome by beginning again to 'look along' those practices. 
4. Imagination and Looking-For 
To summarise: having articulated the pes, Climacus moots an appeal to the 
imagination. One way of pursuing this suggestion - namely, via direct imagism - pivots 
on an analogy with aesthetic experience, but rejects any analogy between images and 
pictures. It is therefore not obviously vulnerable to the stock objections to an appeal to 
imagination. Anti-Climacus' qualified endorsement of this Romantic View offers a 
coherent way of responding to a different worry: namely, the spectre of 'spontaneity in 
the void'. Anti-Climacus takes this anxiety seriously and maintains that scepticism can 
only be overcome, and fantasy avoided, when particular acts of imagining are woven into 
the fabric of a subject's life with others. Moreover, the analogy with aesthetic experience 
displays a kind of immediacy that is neither blind nor incommunicable. 
126 It might be objected that the Kripkean scepticisms are untouched by this claim - viz. how an y finite set 
of examples is sufficient to represent a determinate rule. In this context, Philip Pettit points out that 
exemplification is a three-place relationship such that' it involves not just a set of examples and a rule but 
also a person for whom the examples are supposed to exemplify the rule' (pettit (1990), p. 9). This has the 
important implication that' although any fmite set of examples instantiates an indefinite nu~ber of ~Ies, for 
a particular agent the set may exemplify just one rule' (idem). On the present account, fmdmg certam ways 
of imagining examples apt or resonant is the subjective element of exemplification. 
127 Such is the impression one gets from many readings ofWittgenstein, i.e. that philosophers ought simply 
to stop asking silly questions and get on with '?rdinary' life. (Com~~e Kant's defmition of misology as a 
certain kind of intellectualism that starts 'envymg, rather than despIsmg, the more common stamp of men 
who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct, and .do not allow ~eir reason mu.ch. ~uence on. their 
conduct' (Kant (1946), p. 13).) A m.ore sensitive re~dmg wo~ld attnbute the p~c~hantles off~rm m . 
Wittgenstein's text - the numerous. mte~loc~tory VOl~s. the mhmate ~one, the picture-alhu~ presentatIOn. 
the ex1ensiYe use of metaphor, the lIDagmahve exerCISes - as a hard-tought attempt to proVIde \\hat 
Climacus calls a 'new point of departure'. Stanley Ca\"l!ll has done the most to develop such a reading: see, 
e.g., Cavell (1979); see also Mulhall (2001). 
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Hopefully, this discussion has brought out what is distinctive about a 
'Kierkegaardian' conception of the role of imagination in thinking and judging. And I 
hope to have given some indication of its philosophical appeal. Plainly, however, Anti-
Climacus' notion ofa 'medium for the process ofinfinitizing' is very far from a fully-
fledged theory. And many questions remain. In particular, one would like to know exactly 
what is involved in achieving a spontaneous 'making sense' of examples and just why it 
is imagination that is supposed to do this work. As always with Kierkegaard, one quickly 
bumps up against the fact that these texts, though richly suggestive, are less concerned 
with developing theories than applying them. What Kierkegaard offers is less by way of 
resources to describe our imagination than to engage it. 
By way of a conclusion, however, I shall briefly suggest how all this might be 
cashed out. It should be emphasised that the following is 'Kierkegaardian' only in the 
sense that it attempts to follow through Anti-Climacus' conception of the imagination 
against the background of Climacus' articulation of the PCS. 
In a recent book (conceived as a contribution to 'cognitive science') Ralph Ellis 
develops some ideas which, although not presented in these terms, may help to flesh out a 
direct imagist account. 128 Ellis begins by distinguishing between imagination and 
perception in terms of a distinction between 'looking for' and 'looking at'. According to 
this distinction, to perceive X is to look at X whereas to imagine X is to look for X. The 
motivation for this terminology is phenomenological. The claim is that an adequate 
description of our experience of images must appeal to something like the concept of 
looking-for. Ellis invites us to consider the case of one's being asked to imagine a pink 
wall as blue and offers the following description: 
It is almost as if, for a brief fraction of a second, I can 'see' the pink wall as being blue. But of 
course this is not an accurate description, because I know all the while that the wall is pink, and 
there is no possibility of my confusing this experience with one in which the wall really does 
become blue for a fraction of a second. A closer description of what is happening would be that. .. 
I focus on the wall as if trying to become intensely aware of any amount of blue that is or might 
be mixed in with the pink, almost as if I were to hypothesise to myself that perhaps there is more 
blue in the pink than I had originally thought, and then quickly reject that hypothesis as soon as I 
128 See Ellis (1995). In fact, Ellis often adycrts to talk o~ 'mental pi~tures', andtries.to get roun? thc stock 
obiections to an appeal to such items in concept-formatIOn, suggest~g that he IS qU1~e happy \\1thm an 
indirect imagist framework (sec. pp 67-87 and passim}. My use of hIS work IS therefore somewhat agamst 
its spirit. 
see that there is not. There is a sense in which I look for blueness in the wall and do not find it. 
(I.e., I look for blueness and fmd pink instead.)I29 
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So, according to Ellis, to imagine a pink wall as blue is best conceived as to 'prepare 
oneself for seeing blueness in the wall. On this basis, Ellis appears to draw a further 
contrast between perception and imagination. To perceive X, he suggests, requires that 
two independent conditions are satisfied, namely, that one is looking for X and that one is 
having a percept ofX. On the other hand, to imagine X requires only the activity of 
looking for X. There is nothing more to a state of imagining than this activity of looking 
for - the wall does not even have to appear to be blue to be imagined as such. In other 
words, the object of an act of imagining, unlike that of an act of perceiving, is wholly 
determined by the act itself 130 As Sartre put a related thought: 
In a word, the object of perception overflows consciousness constantly; the object of the image is 
never more than the consciousness one has; it is limited by that consciousness: nothing can be 
learned from an image that is not already known. 131 
The basic point here is that one important difference between objects of perception and 
imagination is that whereas the former outstrip our awareness of them, the latter do not. 
It is worth clearing up a possible source of confusion here. The confusion may be 
put in the form of an objection that Ellis' claim - that, unlike perception, imagination 
involves nothing more than acts of imagining - is inconsistent with our earlier claim that 
a spontaneous response to examples may be constrained by the examples themselves. For 
presumably 'the examples themselves' - e.g. those provided for the child by their parents' 
use of language, or the teacher's samples ofa numerical series - are, as such, independent 
of any response to them. The confusion, of course, resides in the conflation of acts of 
imagining per se (acts of vi sua lis in g), with imaginative responses to examples. To 
imagine a unicorn, or blue where there is only pink, are very different kinds of activity to 
responding to a picture or piece of music. And recall that direct imagism models the work 
of imagination in rule-following on the latter. Once this is properly acknowledged, the 
two claims are clearly consistent: Ellis' claim is that acts of imagining simpliciter are 
129 Ibid., p. 37. 
DO This goes some way to explain why, as the Romantics knew, imagination is under the control of the will 
in a wa~' that visual perception is not. 
131 Srutre (1995), p. 12. 
sufficient to determine their objects; our claim was that imaginative responses to 
examples are constrained by the examples to which they respond. 
176 
Nonetheless, the kind of activity involved in responding to examples does have a 
mental object (as distinct from the examples themselves). Indeed, this is the salient 
feature of the analogy with the kind of activity involved in pictorial interpretation. Whilst 
physical marks are the occasion of acts of pictorial interpretation, the product of these 
acts consists in the experience of seeing the picture as a depiction (rather than as a mere 
arrangement of marks on a surface). And this product is quite properly described as the 
mental or 'intentional' object of the response. So a version of Ellis' claim still applies: 
viz. provided acts of pictorial interpretation are appropriately constrained by the pictures 
to which they respond, these are otherwise sufficient unto themselves. l32 
In order to get a genuine contrast with perception, then, Ellis needs to show that 
the intentional objects of perception (i. e. 'percepts'), unlike those of imagination, are 
onto logically dependent on the actual objects they present: in other words, that 'percepts' 
are independent of acts of perception; or again, that it is not the case that in order to 'have 
a percept of' X one need only to lookfor X. Since we are not concerned with the case of 
perception, however, the important point here is that, provided acts of infinitizing are 
appropriately constrained by (e.g. causally related to) whatever examples they infinitize, 
they are sufficient to fix their intentional objects. Indeed, this is a further way of making 
sense of the notion ofa constrained spontaneity. (A picturesque way of putting it would 
be that the process of infinitizing is constrained at the point of departing with actual 
examples but spontaneous at the point of terminating with a satisfying image. l33) 
Ellis' definition of the imagination, then, is that it necessarily involves acts of 
lookingfor such and such. It follows that an 'image' is just whatever it is that is being 
looked for: e.g. to have an image of a unicorn is to 'prepare oneself for seeing unicorns. 
132 I am avoiding any attempt to spell out what 'appropriately constrained' means here. This is for strategic 
reasons: since the analogy I am after appeals only to the basic structure of pictorial experience - taking X as 
Y _ I do not need to get bogged down in discussions of how this structur~ is filled out in pictorial 
experience. For an interesting account in terms of ~ese~bl~ce see Ho~kms (1998). What \\'?uld?e . 
required, however, in order to properly defend a drrect unagIst theory~ IS an accou~t of?ow lI~agma~Ive , 
responses to e:-.:amples are constrained hy the. exampl~s themselves - I.e. why one s takmg X m the lIght of 
Y is response to X rather than, say, Z. I take It ~at thiS may well be a mcrd~ caus~l ,matte:. .. 
m Compare Francis Dauer's claim that imaginmg-as 1IL-'S somewhere between belIef and fantasy, smce It 
outstrips any discursi\'c justification but is not wholly unconstramed (see Dauer (1990)). 
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Now the most familiar acts of imagination involve looking for something rather precise, 
such as a unicorn or a blue wall. But such acts might be seen as only the most explicit 
expression of the capacity instar omnium, i. e. the capacity for 'looking-for' rather more 
general 'objects' (= targets) such as meaning, purpose, unity, integrity and so on. 
Consider again pictorial experience. It is highly implausible that my seeing a 
picture of a dog as such, for example, requires that I first have to look for a dog in the 
picture. For this implies that I have to know what a picture depicts before I can see it as a 
depiction of that thing. (This knowledge may be helpful in unusual cases, such as puzzle-
pictures, but it is certainly not required even then.) What is far more plausibly required is 
a capacity to look for meaning, purpose, unity, in a picture - i.e. the capacity to 
experiment with different ways of organising the marks on the surface in search for a 
coherent, satisfying, resonant image. (Recall Kierkegaard's metaphor of 'trying out one's 
mind as one tunes an instrument'.) Of course, this capacity may be more or less required 
by different pictures. Making sense of (say) a Picasso may demand interrogation of a far 
greater intensity than seeing a Constable as a landscape. But the point is that, across the 
board, looking-for is a prerequisite of seeing-as. 
My suggestion is that to the extent that Ellis' claim that imagination is best 
conceived as a kind of looking-for is plausible, this lends support to Anti-Climacus' claim 
that exercising the imagination qua 'medium for the process of infinitizing' is essentially 
involved in performing judgements. Consider the following simple argument: 
(1) To look/or such-and-such essentially involves the imagination. 
(2) Necessarily, ifhumans did not look for meaning (coherence, unity, integrity) in their 
lives and the world they would not reflect on themselves or on the world. 
(3) So imagination is essential for 'any and all reflection'. 
This surely captures Anti-Climacus' claim that imagination is essentially involved in 
performing judgements. And a similar argument could be run for particular acts of 
acquiring and exercising the capacity to judge according to given rules or systems. 
Premise (2) is surely promising, though it would perhaps be hard to demonstrate. 
Certainly, Ellis' general account of the nature of imaginative activity supports (1). And, at 
the very least, this displays one reason why Kierkegaard, following the Romantics, 
ascribed a fundamental role to imagination in the spontaneous activity that must, for 
reasons now familiar, be at the heart of rule-governed thought. 
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One final point: the notion of looking-for goes some way to explain the 
connection, on a Romantic View, between imagination and emotion and will. For it is 
predictable that what one looks for, and the intensity with which one searches, will reflect 
one's interests, concerns, desires. 134 Thus, in claiming an important role for imagination 
in perception, Ellis invokes the idea of 'feedJorward loops - meaning that we first look 
for something, and what we receive [in perception] is largely selected in accordance with 
what we are looking for ... I.e. we select what is important to focus our attention on for the 
emotional-motivational purposes of the organism, rather than passively receiving 
information to which we react' .135 A parallel claim for the role of imagination in thinking 
and judging would capture much of the view I have attributed to Kierkegaard: viz. that 
constrained spontaneity depends on our capacity for imaginative engagement with 
examples, as situated within a broader context of human interests and concerns. 
* * * 
Notwithstanding the cliched inadequacies of certain forms of imagism, I have 
argued that Climacus' suggestion that an appeal to imagination might help to 'shed light 
on logic' in the wake of the PCS is well-motivated. Plainly, there is work to be done to 
properly defend the framework outlined here. But the promise is ofa way of respecting 
the role of spontaneity in our rule-following practices without either reducing these to 
mere social conformities or inflating them to private mysteries. 
13~ And here perhaps we can glimpse why Anti-Climac~s c~ sa~ th~t the 'int~sity' of imagination is the 
'possibility of the intensity of the self - i.e. given that rrnagmatIve mterrogatIon ~an be more or less. , 
intense, in the case that this intclTogation is applied to oneself, the relatIn~ mtens~ty wIll he ~ c\:presslon ot 
hO\\ keen one is to make sense of oneself which in tum will rct1cct how much of a self one IS. 
IJ' Ellis (1995), p. 84. 
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General Conclusion 
In the body of this thesis, I have studiously avoided any discussion of what are 
undoubtedly Kierkegaard's central concerns, namely, ethical and religious concepts. The 
aim has been to explore a general problem for the theory of judgement: viz. the role of 
spontaneity in logically constrained thought. I argued that the biting satire of Hegel in the 
Postscript pivots on this issue, and that Kierkegaard' s sense of the inseparability of 
human spontaneity and logical constraints, and the importance of an existentially situated 
imagination, are valuable insights. In the process, I tried to show how these 
considerations both anticipate and can be used to interpret certain ofWittgenstein's 
remarks on rule-following. One implication is that anyone interested in what thoughts are, 
and what it means to think, might profit from a reading of Kierkegaard. 
It seems likely, however, that anyone who is not interested in what faith is, and 
what it means to have faith, would scarcely find it worth the effort. And, inasmuch as a 
secondary aim of this thesis has been to contribute to an understanding of Kierkegaard' s 
work, lowe some account of how the peripheral themes explored here bear upon the 
more prominent concerns. The following Epilogue is an admittedly abbreviated response 
to this demand. But I hope to give some indication of the indirect relevance of this thesis 
to any accounting ofKierkegaard's treatment of the concept of faith. 
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Epilogue 
Faith and Judgement: 
Parallels and Disanalogies 
... would that powerfully equipped men came forward 
to restore the lost power and meaning of words, just 
as Luther restored the concept of faith for his age. 
(Soren Kierkegaard) 
How can I get a man who has 
forgotten words to have a word with him'? 
(Chuang Tzu) 
Several commentators on Kierkegaard have noticed certain methodological 
parallels with Wittgenstein. 1 For both authors seem less concerned with advancing 
substantive theories than with exploring and clarifying concepts. And, in both cases, the 
purpose of these conceptual investigations is in some sense to provide reorientation in the 
face of certain kinds of bewilderment. Famously, Wittgenstein remarked that a 
philosophical problem has the form, 'I don't know my way about' - and viewed this as 
symptomatic of the propensity of our language to 'go on holiday'. 2 For his part, 
Kierkegaard characterised his age in terms of a 'confusion of language': 
... a rebellion, the most dangerous kind of all, of the actual words which, out of human control, 
crash as though despairingly into one another, and from this chaos a person snatches, as from a 
grab-bag, the fIrst and best word to express his so-called thoughts. 3 
Kierkegaard believed that this 'unholy confusion' was largely due to the philosophical 
revisions of Christianity that were so fashionable, and culturally pervasive, in his day. 
And his work is plausibly read as an attempt to liberate Christian concepts from their 
newfound roles in the philosophers' systems.4 Or, as he put it: 
I See, e.g., Cavell (1969); Hustwit (1978); Cloeren (1985); R. H. Bell (1988); Creegan (1989); Conant 
(1989a); Conant (1993); Conant (1995); Hannay (1990); Phillips (1992); Hall (1993); Barrett (1994); 
Mulhall (1994 ); Ferreira (1994)~ Roberts (1995). 
~ PI§l23~cf §38 . 
.1 JP 36-7 I A 328 (Hannay), p. 66. 
I cr CI. p. 78: 'Cannot at times an entire Christian terminology be seen to degenerate into ruin by some 
pretentious ~"ptX;ulator's treatment?'; CUP, p. 363: 'The whole Christian terminology has been confiscated 
hy speculatin~ thought... ' . 
The old Christian dogmatic terminology is like an enchanted castle where the loveliest princes 
and princesses rest in 5a deep sleep - it needs only to be awakened, brought to life, in order to 
stand in its full glory. 
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Now one of the many means by which both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein aim to restore 
concepts to us is by retracing the connections between them, and showing up the 
differences. 6 Given that the kind of disorientation characteristic of philosophy is partly 
due to the temptation to impose a kind of false unity on our concepts, getting clear about 
these precise connections and differences becomes critical. 7 In this essay, I shall outline 
the subtle ways in which the concept of judgement and the concept of faith are compared 
and contrasted in Kierkegaard's work. 
1. First and Second Immediacy 
A central, if often overlooked, Kierkegaardian theme is to correct what Climacus 
diagnoses as 'the confusion in recent speculative thought that faith is immediacy'. 8 The 
concern here is to preserve a distinctive role for the concept of faith. For if this concept 
simply designates a natural and spontaneous response to the world, it cannot designate a 
specifically religious -let alone Christian - response. As Johannes de Silentio puts it: 
Modem philosophy has permitted itself without further ado to substitute in place of "faith" the 
immediate. When one does that it is ridiculous to deny that faith has existed in all ages. In that 
way faith comes into rather simple company along with feeling, mood, idiosyncrasy, vapours, 
etc.9 
5 JP 37 II A 110 (Hannay), p. 86. Compare the following from Postscript: 'Just as an old man who has lost 
his teeth now munches with the help of the stumps, so the modem Christian language about Christianity has 
lost the power of the energetic terminology to bite - and the whole thing is toothless 'maundering'.' (CUP, 
p. 363. Cf BA, p. 166). 
6 In Wittgenstein's terms, a grammatical investigation involves eliciting the 'criteria' we have for 
distinguishing between concepts. As Cavell puts it, 'Wittgensteinian criteria are appealed to when we 
"don't know our way about", when we are lost with respect to our words and to the world they anticipate' 
(Ca\'ell (1979), p. 34). 
7 Compare the motto of The Concept of Anxiety: 'The age of making distinctions is past. It has been 
\'anquished by the system. In our day, \\hoever loves to make distinctions is regarded as an eccentric ... ' 
(unpaginated). 
"CUP, p. 500. 
c) FT (Lomie), p. 59. Compare Kierkegaard: 'What Schleiermacher calls "religion" and the Hegelian 
dogmaticians "faith" is, after all, nothing but the fIrst immediacy. the prerequisite for e\'ervthing - the vital 
lluid - in an emotional-intellectual sense the atmosphere \\ e breathe - and \\ hich therefore cannot properly 
be charactensed with these words' (JP 36 I A 273 (Hannay). p. 56). 
182 
It may turn out that all instances of so-called faith are, in fact, feelings, moods and so on. 
De Silentio's point is certainly not to rule out an argument to this effect. It is simply that 
the conclusion of such an argument would be that the concept of faith is un instantiated, 
not that it is of the same genus as feelings, moods and so on. But to assimilate these 
concepts, without further ado, is to misunderstand the concept of faith. 
According to Climacus, for example, faith presupposes relinquishing one's 
relative goals for the sake of an absolute goOd.lO Such tasks are reflective rather than 
spontaneous; they involve reflecting on and prioritising one's projects. According to the 
New Testament, for another example, the way to faith is narrow and those who find it are 
few. 11 Again, as Kierkegaard remarks in his Journals: ' ... most people never reach faith at 
all. They keep on living in immediacy, and finally manage some reflection; then they 
die' . 12 I take it that this is less an empirical observation than an expression of the view 
that it is internal to the concept of faith that faith is difficult to attain. 
The worry about conflating faith and immediacy is thus an instance of the general 
misgiving that philosophers distort religious concepts by abstracting them from their 
proper applications. In the following passage, Freud nicely articulates this anxiety in both 
its general form and particular manifestation in the confusion of faith with spontaneity: 
Where questions of religion are concerned, people are guilty of every sort of dishonesty and 
intellectual misdemeanour. Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they scarcely retain 
anything of their original sense. They give the name of 'God' to some vague 
abstraction ... [and] ... even boast that they have recognised a higher purer concept of God, 
notwithstanding that their God is now nothing more than an insubstantial shadow and no longer 
the mighty personality of religious doctrines. Critics persist in describing as 'deeply religious' 
anyone who admits to a sense of man's insignificance or impotence in the face of the universe, 
although what constitutes the essence of the religious attitude is not this feeling but the next step 
after it, the reaction to it which seeks a remedy for it. The man who goes no further but humbly 
acquiesces in the small part which human beings play in the great world - such a man is, on the 
contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word 13 
10 Sec. for example, CUP, p. 431. 
11 See Matthc\\ 7: 13-14. Cf. CUP, p. 585: 'the narrow gate to the hard \yay of faith'. 
1~.Ip 48 VIII I A 649 (Hannay), p. 299. 
\J Freud (1991), p. 214. 
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Philosophy in general- or the 'recent speculative thought' to which Climacus specifically 
refers I4 - mayor may not have an inherent tendency to devalue religious concepts. But it 
is surely incumbent on any philosophical treatment of faith at least to do justice to how 
this concept is actually used in authentic contexts. 15 
Faith presupposes reflection. On the other hand, acts of faith are not performed on 
the basis o/reflection. Hence de Silentio's notion ofa 'second immediacy': i.e. a kind of 
spontaneous act or state that presupposes a process of reflection. 16 I shall have something 
to say about the motivation for this insistence on the spontaneity of faith below. But the 
present point is that the basic analysis of faith developed in Kierkegaard' s work is 
accurately formulated in terms of immediacy and reflection. To be a little more precise: 
An act A, performed by a subject S, is an act of faith only if (i) S has previously 
performed certain relevant kinds of reflection; and (ii) A is not performed on the basis of 
any reflection whatsoever. 
This, I take it, is the bare bones of that vexing' definition of faith' in The Sickness Unto 
Death: 'In relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in 
the power that established it' .17 That is, faith is the culmination of a certain kind of 
process of reflecting on oneself in an immediate and direct relation to God. 
So iffaith is contrasted with 'the immediate instinct of the heart.IS, it is also 
contrasted with reflective judgement. Clearly the positive conception that emerges is 
subtle, even paradoxical. Faith turns out to be a kind of act or state that is in some sense 
the culmination of a process of reflection but that does not itself reflect back on that 
process. But this situation is made even more problematic by the fact that Kierkegaard's 
treatment of judgement seems to preclude any straightforward contrast with faith in terms 
14 As Reidar Thomte notes, the polemic against a conflation of faith and immediacy is less directed at 
I legel, who criticized F. H Jacobi on precisely these grounds, but against the Danish Hegelians, Rasmus 
Nielsen and H. L. Martensen (cf CA, p. 224, note 15). 
15 I take this point to stand entirely independently of any commitment to the idea, most often associated in 
the philosophy of religion with D. Z. Phillips, that truth or standards of justification are relative to 
'incommensurable' conceptual schemes. On these issues see, e.g., Tessin & yon Ruhr (1995). 
16 Cf. FT, p. 8. Compare Kierkegaard: 'faith is immediacy after reflection' (JP 48 VITI I A 649 (Hannay), p. 
299). 
17 SUD, p. 14. 
18 FT (Lowrie), p. 38. 
of the relation between immediacy and reflection. The following excerpt from The 
Concept of Anxiety amply illustrates this further complexity: 
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Faith loses by being regarded as the immediate, since it has been deprived of what lawfully 
belongs to it, namely, its historical presupposition. Dogmatics loses thereby, for it does not begin 
where it properly should begin, namely, within the scope of an earlier beginning. Instead of 
presupposing an earlier beginning, it ignores this and begins without ceremony, just as if it were 
logic. Logic does indeed begin with something produced by the subtlest abstraction, namely. what 
is most elusive: the immediate. What is quite proper in logic, namely, that immediacy is eo ipso 
cancelled, becomes in dogmatics idle talk. 19 
Hopefully, this thesis has gone some way to indicate what a Kierkegaardian author might 
mean when he says that immediacy is 'eo ipso cancelled' in logical thought, and how this 
differs from what a Hegelian might mean by it. For we have seen how both Climacus and 
Kierkegaard insist on the role of spontaneity in acquiring and exercising capacities for 
logically constrained judgement. In short, the Hegelian requirement of immediacy is 
extended to the thinking subject. This suggests the following contrast with faith: 
Whereas judgement is a kind of reflective activity that presupposes spontaneous activity 
(first immediacy), faith is a kind of spontaneous activity that presupposes reflective 
activity (second immediacy). 
Here, then, we have a rather complex relation between the concepts of judgement and 
faith. In what follows, I shall try to spell out what parallels and disanologies are implied 
by this schema. 
2. Parallels 
It is important to be clear that the relevant sense of 'presupposes' in the above 
formula is temporal (rather than logical or metaphysical) priority - as indeed is 
emphasised by the terms, 'first' and 'second' immediacy. As I showed (in Chapter Three) 
Climacus is committed to the claim that it is senseless to ascribe logical or ontological 
priority to either immediacy or reflection in judgement since these stand in a relation of 
mutual determination. Similarly, to say that having faith presupposes that one has 
undergone a process of reflection on one's life such that, for example, one comes to view 
19 CA. p. 10. 
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oneselfas a sinner (what Haufniensis calls the 'historical presupposition' offaith), is not 
to claim that this is logically or metaphysically prior to a direct encounter with God. 
Here, then, is a crucial analogy: faith, like judgement, is 'both gift and task'. To 
emphasise at the expense of the other either the importance of a direct encounter with 
God (faith as gift) or the roles of ethico-religious reflection and striving (faith as task), is 
to misunderstand faith. In more theological terms: to emphasise our responsibility for 
righteousness at the expense of God's sovereign grace or vice versa is to do justice to 
neither. (Compare my claim that Kierkegaard opens up the possibility of rejecting a 
rationalist notion of logical necessity without endorsing a Romantic notion of 
untrammelled spontaneity.) Kierkegaard's strategy in this respect, like Wittgenstein's and 
unlike Hegel's, is less to offer a theoretical alternative than, by means of a careful 
investigation of the way the concepts of grace and responsibility operate in a believer's 
life, to undermine our sense that there is an intellectual problem here. Given that one 
wants to have faith, the real prob lem is how to live out one's life as both gift and task. 20 
1 have characterised Climacus' 'no-priority' claim about the relative roles of 
immediacy and reflection in judgement in terms of an 'Inseparability Thesis' (see Chapter 
Three). According to this thesis, the relation between acts and objects of thought is 
inseparable in the sense that, whilst these are qualitatively distinct, the one cannot be fully 
identified or articulated independently of the other. In other words: the spontaneous how 
of judging is essentially related to the logically constrained what. Now this claim has 
some very important implications for Climacus' treatment of what he calls 'the ethico-
religious'. (I shall say more about this category in Section 3 below. For now we can 
simply take it as encompassing matters of a broadly ethical or religious nature.) In its 
most general form, the implication is this: 
F or any act of thinking about ethics and religion, that act is essentially (rather than 
externally) related to the object of thought. 
This is indeed a direct consequence of the Inseparability Thesis - it simply applies to 
ethico-religious reflection what, according to that thesis, holds true of all thinking. 1 
:::0 For much fuller discussions that arrive at similar conclusions see Barrett (1994); and Ferreira (1991), p. 7 
and passim. See also Julia Watkin's discussion of Kierkegaard' s sense of the mutually corrective nature of 
Catholic ,md Protcstant vicws of grace and works (Watkin (1997b), pp. 34-5). 
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believe that this claim is central to the thesis that 'truth is subjectivity' as this is 
expounded in the Postscript. Since, as I shall argue, this notorious thesis can only be 
properly understood by reference to certain disanalogies between ethico-religious and 
other kinds of judgement, I shall pick up the theme in the next section. For now, it is 
important to note that, whatever special character Kierkegaard might want to ascribe to 
ethico-religious reflection, the contrast with other kinds cannot be absolute. For a general 
commitment to act-object inseparability rules out any simple-minded contrast between, 
say, the purely objective status of empirical propositions and the merely subjective status 
of religious perspectives?l 
Perhaps the most obvious parallel between the Kierkegaardian conceptions of 
faith and judgement, however, is that both are said to involve 'leaps'. Now I have argued 
(in Chapter Three) that the point of this metaphor in the context of judgement is to 
acknowledge the essential role of human spontaneity without collapsing the distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity. Leaping is a figure for unmediated activity that 
nonetheless accomplishes a qualitative transition. As such, the metaphor is supposed to 
bring out what is paradoxical in logically constrained thought - viz. the sense that 
acquiring capacities for logical thought involves exercising those very capacities - and 
implies limits to explanation and justification. 
Supposing that this structure survives the transposition to contexts offaith would 
give us something like the following. The point of the metaphor here is to allow an 
important role for human spontaneity in faith without collapsing the distinction between 
God and humans. As such, the metaphor is supposed to bring out what is paradoxical 
about faith - viz. the sense that faith presupposes itself - and implies limits to explanation 
and justification. Does this analogy go through? 
Consider first the claim that there is a qualitative distinction between God and 
humans. This is surely a profoundly Kierkegaardian claim.22 Whatever we take to be the 
21 That this positivistic contrast utterly fails to capture the distinction between 'objectivity' and 
'subjectivity' in Kierkcgaard's works could be demonstrated in many other ways. For example, Climacus' 
claim that 'the empirical object is not finished, and the existing knowing spirit is itself in the process of 
becoming' (C UP, p. 189), hardly encourages a split between a stable realm of objcctive facts and the nux of 
SUbjectivity. 
~2 Merold Westphal has perhaps done the most to make the case for Kierkegaard as providing a 
'theological critique of ontotheology'. \\here he follows Walter Lowe in defining the latter term as 'any 
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ultimate import of Philosophical Fragments, it seems clear enough that the concept of 
alterity is center stage. 23 (This is an important theme whether or not one accepts Stephen 
Mulhall's claim, for instance, that Climacus mimics the very anthropomorphism he 
attacks by treating 'the god' as a product of human reason's confronting its own limits. 2.t) 
Witness Climacus' characterisation of the subject-matter of his 'thought-project' as that 
which 'no philosophy (for it is only for thought), no mythology (for it is only for the 
imagination), no historical knowledge (for it is only for memory) has ever had ... ofwhich 
in this connection one can say with all multiple meanings that it did not arise in any 
human heart'. 25 If Fragments is a playful treatment of the hypothesis that 'the god is 
absolutely different from a human being,26, the same distinction is marked more 
straightforwardly by many entries in the Journals. 27 For example: 
Yes, certainly God is unchangeable, but what good is that to me? Do I really have what it takes to 
deal with an unchangeable being? For a poor fickle human it is the greatest strain, the pain I have 
to endure here far greater than anything I can suffer from another person's inconstancy. 28 
The human is the relative, mediocrity; human beings feel good only in mediocrity. God is the 
unconditioned. 29 
The philosophers think that all knowledge, indeed even the existence of the Deity, is something 
man himself produces and that only in a figurative sense can there be talk of revelation, rather as 
one can say the rain falls from heaven though rain is nothing must mist produced by the earth. 
But, to keep to the metaphor, they forget that in the beginning God separated the waters of heaven 
and earth and that there is something higher than atmosphere.30 
effort or tendency to think of God and the fmite order in llilivocal tenns' (Westphal, (1994), P 31, n. 7). See 
also Westphal (1995). 
23 Louis Mackey claims that 'Philosophical Fragments is obsessed with alterity' (Mackey (1986), p. 102). 
Similarly, Steven M. Emmanuel advances a reading of Fragments in tenns of' the total 
incommensurability between an infmite God and a fmite human intellect' (Emmanuel (1991), p. 279). 
24 See Mulhall (1999); Mulhall (2001). Compare Vanessa Rumble's characterisation of Fragments as a 
'narrative which displays the very practice being criticized' (Rumble (1997), p. 99). 
25 PF, p. 109. 
26 Ibid., p. 46. 
27 Compare also Climacus' reference to the tendency to 'confuse Christianity with something that has arisen 
in man's, that is, humanity's heart, confuse it with the idea of human nature and forget the qualitative 
difference that accentuates the absolutely different point of departure: what comes from God and what 
comes from man' (CUP, p. 580). 
2R jp 51 X 4 A 311 (Hannay), p. 527. 
29 jp 54 XI A 445, ibid., p. 606. 
30 jp 39 II A 523, ibid., p. 106. 
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Against philosophical redescriptions of God as 'self-consciousness' (Hegel) or postulate 
of practical reason (Kant) or plug for epistemological gaps (Descartes) or whatever, 
Kierkegaard aims to 'strictly uphold the relation between philosophy (the purely human 
view of the world - the humanist standpoint) and Christianity' .31 We are to distinguish, 
with Pascal, between the 'gods of the philosophers' and the 'God of Abraham'. 32 The 
most salient difference is that whereas the former are controlled by the demands of our 
theories and can be approached with detached contemplation, the latter makes demands 
on our lives and must be approached with 'fear and trembling'. 
Secondly, consider the claim that human spontaneity plays an important role in 
faith. Again, many texts could be cited in support of such a claim. In the following entry, 
for instance, Kierkegaard gives an ironic twist to Climacus' critique of Hegel's 'absolute 
beginning' : 
The condition for a person's salvation is the faith that there is, everywhere and at every moment, 
an absolute beginning. When someone who has egoistically indulged himself in the service of 
illusions is to start upon a purer striving, the crucial point is that he believes absolutely in the new 
beginning, because otherwise he muddies the passage into the old. Similarly with conversion in 
the stricter sense: faith is the possibility of the new, the absolute beginning, otherwise it remains 
essentially the 01d.33 
If faith presupposes certain kinds of reflection and striving, it nonetheless constitutes a 
complete break with such processes - 'old things are passed away~ behold, all things are 
become new'. 34 If this were not so, the concept of faith would be assimilable to that of 
ethical striving - as embodied, for example, by Judge William's exhortations to self-
choice and virtue. An important implication of this insistence on the spontaneity of faith, 
on its radical discontinuity with any prior process of reflection, is that faith is an 
inherently risky adventure. Thus, for example, Kierkegaard censures contemporary 
theologians for giving the impression that exercising faith is like getting on 'a steam 
31 JP 37 II A 77, ibid., p. 85. 
3~ Cf. Pascal's 'Memorial' worn on a parchment around his neck which includes the words: 'God of 
Abraham, God ofIsaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers' (cited in J. M. Cohen's introduction to the 
Pensees (pascal (l %1), p.15)). Compare Etienne Gilson's remark that ' ... the God of Descarks was a 
stillborn God. I Ie could not possibly liyc because, as Descartes had conceived him, he was the God of 
Christianity reduced to the condition of philosophical principle, in short, an infelicitous hybrid ofreligious 
fai th and of religious thought ' (Gilson (1941 ), p. 86, cited in R. Stem (1991), p. 173). 
J.' JP 50 X 2 A 371 (Hannay), p. 463. 
31 II COIinthians 5: 17. l'f. PF (I I annay) , p. X2: ' ... faith begins precisdy where thinking lean~s otr. 
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engine going down a railway track with its head of steam fired up by the Apostles'. 35 As 
with rule-following, faith is not a matter of simply getting on the tracks laid out in 
advance of any particular act of faith. 36 And there is a sense in which faith is 'blind'. 37 
Thirdly, consider the claim that faith presupposes itself and therefore implies 
limits to justification and explanation. Some such claim surely informs the criticism of 
arguments for the existence of God in Philosophical Fragments, for instance.38 The 
general form ofClimacus' objection to apologetic arguments is that 'if..the god does not 
exist, then of course it is impossible to demonstrate it. But ifhe does exist, then it is 
foolishness to want to demonstrate it'. 39 One reason why it is foolish to want to 
demonstrate the existence of the god, even in the case that he does indeed exist, emerges 
when Climacus turns his attention to the teleological argument in particular: 
Or are the wisdom in nature and the goodness or wisdom in Governance right in front of our 
noses? Do we not encounter the most terrible trials here. and is it ever possible to be finished with 
these trials? .. Therefore, from what works do I demonstrate [the existence of the god]? From the 
works regarded ideally - that is, as they do not appear directly and immediately. But then I do not 
demonstrate it from the works, after all, but only develop the ideality I have presupposed; trusting 
in that, I even dare to defy all objections, even those that have not yet arisen. By beginning, then, 
I have presupposed the ideality, have presupposed that I will succeed in accomplishing it, but 
what else is that but presupposing that the god exists and actually beginning with trust in him.-to 
35 JP 35 I A 62 (Hannay), p. 21. 
36 In Climacus' famous metaphorics, to have faith is to be "out on 70, 000 fathoms of water" (CUP, p. 
204). John Lippitt has suggested a comparison in this connection with the following from Stanley Cavell: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to 
project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the 
grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and 
understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of sharing routes of interest and 
feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, 
of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation - all the whirl of organism 
Wittgenstein calls 'forms oflife'. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing 
more. but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because 
it is) terrifying. (Cavell, (1969), p. 52, cited in Lippitt (2000), pp. 168-9.) 
Philip Dwyer draws attention to the same celebrated passage in making his case for a link between 
Wittgenstein on rule-following and Sartre's sense of the 'anguish' of freedom (See Dwyer (1989), p. 60-1). 
37 Cf JP 50 X 6 B 79 (Hannay), p. 460: 'The weaker faith has to watch out and speculate, just like the 
wcaker love which lacks the courage to become entirely blind'. 
38 Some such claim also informs Climacus' distinction between 'speculative doctrines' and 'existence-
communications' (d. CUP, pp. 379-80). John H. Whittaker comments, 'Existence communications arc not 
hypotheses ... They cannot be left for evidence to decide or justify, as if they might be c,"aluated in the light 
of speculative arguments or independent evidence' (Whittaker (1988), p. 174). 
39 PF, p. 39. 
10 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Climacus' misgiving about the teleological argument is that the view of nature as 
displaying the wisdom and design of a divine creator is not given immediately and 
directly in experience - far from it - but depends on whether one does or does not have 
faith. As Evans puts it, 'it is not the proof that is the basis of the person's faith in God. It 
is rather the person's faith in God, which guides the interpretation, that is the basis of 
proof.41 And Climacus goes on to characterise the logical gap between the conclusion of 
a sound apologetic argument and faith in God as a 'leap'. In other words, the metaphor of 
leaping in the context of faith signals the extent to which faith presupposes itself and 
therefore cannot be proved, justified, demonstrated.42 
If this sketch is along the right lines as a characterisation of the basic role of the 
figure of 'the leap' in the context of faith, certain other interpretations are wrong. Most 
obviously, given the importance of spontaneity, 'the leap' cannot be a matter of deliberate 
choice. This alone is sufficient to seriously undermine the persistent idea that the 'theory 
of the stages' is an attempt to get us to choose the life of faith over against other lifestyles 
- as though Kierkegaard were saying, in John Elrod's words, "My dear reader, these are 
the existence possibilities open to you; take your choice".43 For how could the 
spontaneous life of faith result from a process of deliberating on the relative merits of 
existence-possibilities? 
Secondly, given that Kierkegaard upholds a qualitative distinction between God 
and humans, 'the leap' cannot mark an attempt to reduce faith to a human enterprise. The 
rather fashionable attempt to mine Kierkegaard for novel humanistic revisions of 
traditional theological concepts is therefore quite against the spirit of his work. (It will be 
recalled that nothing but 'old-fashioned orthodoxy in its rightful severity' is supposed to 
emerge from a proper reading of Fragments.) 
~l Evans (1998), p. 120. Compare Merold Westphal's discussion ofClimacus' 'hermeneutical skepticism' 
(Westphal (1994), p. 16). 
I~ In this respect Climacus' use of the metaphor of leaping owes much, of course to Lessing's emphasis on 
the logical gap between faith and reasons (see, e.g., Hannay (1997)). For instance, Lessing presses the 
question: . [ r on historical grounds I have no objection to the statement that Christ himself rose from the 
dead, must I therefore accept it as true that this risen Christ was the Son of God? (Lessing (1957), p. 5'+). 
Ronald Green has argued that the metaphor also owes much to Kant (see. e.g., Green (1989), p. 405~). 
U Elrod ( 1975), p. -+ 
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In many ways, the view outlined here supports M. J. Ferreira's sustained and 
careful examination of 'Kierkegaardian leaps,.44 And her work suggests a further analogy 
between faith and judgement. It will be recalled how (in Chapter Four) I made out the 
Kierkegaardian case for an important role for imagination injudgement. Similarly, 
Ferreira emphasises the role of imagination in the kind of 'transforming vision' she 
claims (on Kierkegaard' s behalf) is constitutive of ethical and religious transitions. In this 
context, Ferreira, too, appeals to the notion of aspect-perception and further draws an 
analogy with the role of metaphor in affecting decisive shifts in perspective. 
Short ofa detailed discussion of Ferreira's claims, it is worth drawing attention to 
one prima facie difference in emphasis between her appeal to the role of imagination and 
my own. I argued that, on a Kierkegaardian view, the infinitizing role of imagination can 
only be the 'final psychological approximation' to leaps of judgement, whereas Ferreira 
seems to identify the notion of a leap with that of transforming vision. Though I cannot 
argue the case here, it may be that to conceive the work of imagination as constitutive of 
faith is to fail to do justice to Kierkegaard' s sense that, ultimately, acts of faith are 
'blind', unmediated by any prior understanding, imaginative or otherwise. 45 Nonetheless, 
as I also argued in connection with judgement, Ferreira is right to draw attention to the 
way the role of imagination significantly qualifies that claim. 
A final analogy is the following. We saw (in Chapter Three) how Kierkegaard 
deploys what I called rhetorical reductios against the systematic pretensions of the 
Hegelians. Despite the methodological reservations I raised in connection with form-
based approaches (in the Prologue), the work of James Conant and others has gone some 
way to showing how such arguments are at work in Kierkegaardian treatments of 
religious concepts. Consider the following passage from Fragments, in which Climacus 
qualifies his claim that being around at the same time as an incarnated god puts one at no 
particular advantage in respect of what it means to be a 'follower': 
Ifwe assume that centuries elapsed between that event [i.e. the god's appearance in time] and the 
one who comes later. then there presumably will have been a great deal of chatter among men 
about this thing, so much loose chatter that the untrue and confused rumours that the 
contemporary (in the sense of immediacy) had to put up with did not make the possibility of the 
44 Scc. e.g., Ferreira (1991)~ (1998). 
4) Ronald Johnson has criticized Ferreira on similar grounds (see Johnson (1997), p. 167 -8). 
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right relationship nearly as difficult, all the more so because in all human probability the 
centuries-old echo, like the echo in some of our churches, would not only have riddled faith with 
chatter but would have eliminated it in chatter, which could not have happened in the first 
generation. 46 
Climacus claims that if there is any advantage in being physically contemporaneous with 
the god incarnate, this advantage consists in the fact that contemporary followers would 
not have had been distracted by the interference of intervening gossip. But we also have 
here a clear intimation of what Fragments takes itself to be combating~ namely, the 
elimination of faith in 'chatter' - i. e. religious talk that has become separated from the 
acts of historically situated subjects (see Chapter Four).47 Now this sheds a certain light 
on the repeated complaint, registered by Climacus' interlocutor, ofplagiarism.48 Just two 
pages earlier this curious figure had interrupted the argument in full flow: 
Stop a moment. If you go on talking in this way, I cannot get a word in edgewise. You talk as 
though you were defending your doctoral dissertation - indeed, you talk like a book and what is 
unfortunate for you, like a very specific book. Once again, wittingly or unwittingly, you have 
introduced words that do not belong to you ... 49 
This surely gives more than a hint that Climacus' own philosophical reproduction of 
Christianity can itselfbe seen to 'echo' back to us chatterers about religion the various 
ways in which our words do not belong to us, the ways in which our fascination with 
'looking at' the concept of faith, say, distracts us from 'looking along' the life of faith. 50 
3. Disanalogies 
All these parallels are surely striking, given the popular idea that Kierkegaard 
went all out to drive a wedge between faith and reason. Nonetheless, there are 
~6 PF. p. 7l. 
~7 According to Peter Fenves, 'Kierkegaard offers an incomparable point of departure for an investigation 
into the category of "chatter'" (Fenves (1993), p. 9). 
·18 Stephen Mulhall hangs his 'self-subverting' reading of Fragments on this charge of plagiarism (see 
Mulhall (1999); Mulhall (200 I)). 
19 PF, p. 68. 
50 This reading is supported by the fact that, in his Joumals, Kierkegaard personifies 'Echo' as a 'grand 
master of irony': 'you who parody in yourself what is highest and deepest on earth: the word that created 
the world, since you givc only the lattice, not the filling - ah yes, Echo, avcngc all that sentimental tosh that 
lurks in \\ nods and meado\\s, in church and theater. and \\-hich once in a while breaks loosc there and 
altogethcrdeafens me' (JP 36-7 I A ~33 (Hannay), p_ 70). 
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disanalogies. These are nicely summarised by Kierkegaard' s remark that 'faith is not an 
intellectual but an ethical category, signifying the personal relationship between God and 
man,.51 It seems we need to get clear about the difference between the intellectual and the 
ethical- or, as I shall say, between 'logico-aesthetic' and 'ethico-religious' categories 
(the point of this terminology should become clear in what follows). 
Consider Chekhov's short story, The Bet. 52 An elderly banker recalls a party he 
had given several years earlier. The event had been 'attended by a good few clever 
people ... including numerous academics and journalists' and a hotly contested debate 
about capital punishment soon ensued. The banker had pronounced that 'to judge a priori, 
I find capital punishment more moral and more humane than imprisonment. Execution 
kills you once, whereas life imprisonment does it slowly' - adding, however, that he had 
sampled neither. A young lawyer retorted that ifhe had to choose between these equally 
immoral options, he would choose the life sentence, since' [a lny kind of life is better than 
no life at all'. Impassioned by the argument, the banker had then proposed a bizarre bet: 
'two million you won't last five years in solitary confinement'. 
The lawyer agrees, bragging he would do fifteen years. The banker, 'then a spoilt 
and fri yolous person', is thrilled and has him put in one of the lodges in his garden. At 
first the captive plays the piano and reads light novels, then literary classics, now he just 
mopes around, then he is seen writing incessantly at night. In the sixth year, he devours 
books on languages, philosophy and history. Then he reads only the Gospels, theology 
and religion. In the last two years, he reads quite indiscriminately, suggesting 'someone 
swimming in the sea, surrounded by the wreckage of his ship, and trying to save his life 
by eagerly grasping one spar and then another'. Then the eve of freedom dawns. 
But the banker has fallen on hard times and to pay up would be his ruin. With the 
intention of murdering his captive, he ventures into the lodge. The lawyer is asleep next 
to a paper on which he has penned some lines. These include the following: 
51Jp 54-55 XI 2 A 380 (I-lannay), p. 641. Compare the following from the Postscript: 
Faith, then, is not a lesson for slow learners in the sphere of intellectuality, an asylum for dullards. But faith 
is a sphere of its 0\\'l1, and the immediate identifying mark of every misunderstanding of Christianity is that 
it changes it into a doctrine and draws it into the range of intellectuality (CUP, p. 327). 
5~ Sec Chekhov (1991 ), pp. 11 ~ -119. 
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T despise your books, T despise al1 the blessings and the wisdom of the world. Eyet:thing is 
worthless, fleeting, ghostly, illusory as a mirage. Proud, wise and handsome you may be, death 
will wipe you from the face of the earth along with the mice burrowing under the floor . Your 
posterity, your history, your deathless geniuses - all will freeze or burn along with the terrestrial 
globe. 
You have lost your senses and are on the wrong path. You take lies for truth, and ugliness for 
beauty. You would be surprised if apple and orange trees somehow sprouted with frogs and 
lizards instead of fruit, or if roses smelt like a sweating horse. No less surprised am I at you who 
have exchanged heaven for earth. I do not want to understand you. 53 
As a 'practical demonstration of my contempt for what you live by', the lawyer concludes 
by renouncing his claim to the money. The banker leaves, filled with remorse. 
Chekhov's story can, I think, be read as an exploration of the categorical 
difference between logico-aesthetic and ethico-religious reflection. The frivolousness of 
the initial debate about capital punishment, the glib claim that 'any life is better is than 
none' and the banal bet are juxtaposed against the lawyer's ultimate sense of the 
transience, mediocrity and pettiness of human life, and the banker's coming to see 
himself as contemptible. To be sure, the pontifications of the party-goers about capital 
punishment involved no logical mistake: concepts were correctly applied, thoughts had, 
meanings conveyed, conversations continued. But all this is indeed 'illusory as a mirage' 
from the perspective of the end of the story. Plausibly, Chekhov wants us to distinguish 
between idle' chatter about ethics' and genuine ethical reflection. 
Can we make this distinction more precise? Recall that objective reflection, for 
Climacus, involves a kind of 'dying to oneself (see Chapter Four). This is a picturesque 
way of saying that confonning to intersubjective nonns requires forgoing one's purely 
personal preferences and associations, and resisting the temptation to form the world in 
one's own image. And it is arguable that this kind of disinterestedness is also involved in 
aesthetic experience. As Kant argued, in order to appreciate an object aesthetically one 
ought not to treat it as, say, a financial investment. Plausibly, an attitude of disinterested 
contemplation is quite proper in such contexts. Climacus claims that reflection on matters 
of ethics and religion, however, ought flot to display this kind of attitude. On the contrary, 
he thinks it is quite proper that, in this sphere, one's passionate interest is directed 
towards how one is to live in the light of whatever perspective one is reflecting upon. 
53 Ibid., p. 118. 
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At one level, then, Climacus simply wants to mark a category distinction, and to 
expose the confusions that result from its violation. Now to treat that which is logico-
aesthetic as though it were ethico-religious is readily seen to involve a kind of mistake. 
Agonising over the role that modus toll ens would have on one's life if one adhered to it is 
simply irrelevant to following that rule. Or suppose someone thought that in order to 
really appreciate a Jackson Pollock they ought to live their life in as random a way as 
possible. Detached contemplation rather than existential involvement surely is the proper 
attitude for judging in accordance with logical or aesthetic criteria. (A work of art may 
elicit quasi-religious feelings, but such would not fall under Climacus' category of the 
ethico-religious.) But it is the opposite confusion that Climacus emphasises. And this is 
undoubtedly harder to take, at least for those of us weaned on philosophy courses that 
embody the assumption that performing ethical judgements is a matter of churning out the 
practical implications of whatever theory is judged the most rational. 
Yet there surely is a good sense in which the characters in Chekhov's story make 
a kind of mistake in their hotly contested debate about capital punishment. For whilst they 
take themselves to be discussing a matter of ethical gravity, the whole tenor and context 
of their discussion suggests glibness, folly, triviality. Chekhov gently brings out the 
comedy in this situation by having the banker, 'younger and more excitable in those 
days', getting carried away, banging the table with his fist and proposing his absurd bet-
and having the lawyer respond with a no less absurd gesture: 'You stake your millions 
and I stake my freedom'. And perhaps we should not overlook the detail that the 
assembly comprised 'numerous academics' . 
Notice, moreover, that there is no implication here that the mistake involves 
talking about ethical matters in a dispassionate tone - on the contrary, the debate is highly 
animated. And it is significant that the lawyer's note is not merely a piece of eloquent, 
sober-minded prose but contains a very concrete demonstration of the perspective it 
articulates. 54 Kierkegaard clarifies this kind of point in his Journals when he formulates 
the contrast in terms of the distinction between the 'what' and the 'how': 
'\-1 Note, howc\'er, that this is not proof that the Lawyer's later perspective is in earncst in a way that his 
earlier declarations wcrc not. After all. he shomxi himself willing to carry through some \'cry serious 
practical consequences of that debate. The moral is that actions, no k'Ss than words, can bc fri\'olous 
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In life, the difference is not what is said, but how .... 
'How' here is not the aesthetic, the declamatory, whether in flowery language or simple 
style, whether with sonorous chords or with a screeching voice, whether dry-eyed and unfeeling 
or tearful, etc. No, the difference is whether one speaks or one acts by speaking, whether one 
simply uses one's voice, expression, arm movements, a threefold, perhaps fourfold, stress on one 
word, etc., whether one makes of things like this to exert pressure, to stress a point, or whether to 
exert pressure one uses one's hfe, one's existence, every hour of one's day, makes sacrifices, etc, 
The latter is a high pressure that changes what is said into something quite other than when a 
speaker says the same thing verbatim. 55 
Roughly, then, the disanalogy is this: whereas in logico-aesthetic judgement, the thinker's 
attention is wholly absorbed by the object of thought, in ethico-religious reflection, the 
thinker's attention is directed towards his own relation to the object of thought. 
Now one might well accept that there is an important distinction here, and 
acknowledge that ethical thinking can be more or less in earnest, without conceding 
anything so exotic as the thesis that truth is subjectivity. For that thesis, as I understand it, 
makes a further claim: namely, that it is impossible (and not merely undesirable or 
improper) to think about matters of ethics and religion in a logico-aesthetic way. Consider 
a famous passage in which Climacus attempts to motivate his thesis: 
If someone lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea of God, the 
house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and if someone lives in 
an idolatrous land but prays with the passion of infmity, although his eyes are resting on the 
image of an idol- where then is more truth? The one prays in truth to the true God although he is 
worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore worshipping an 
idol. 50 
Much ink has been spilled defending such passages against the threat of relativism. But it 
is not clear to me that relativism is so much as a threat here. For Climacus' claim that 
there is 'more truth' in the pagan's situation than in the 'Christian's' (where, as Climacus 
says, the objective reality of the Christian God is assumed for the sake of argument), is 
quite naturally read as follows. Since the 'Christian' is not praying with ethico-religious 
passion, he is not praying at all. But at least the pagan is praying. The difference between 
them is therefore akin to that between nonsense and falsehood: given an aim for truth, 
both are undesirable - but the former fails to achieve even the status of the kind of thing 
55.!p 50 X 2 A 477 (Hannay), p. 474. Cf. CUP, p. 450. 
56 CUP, p. 201. 
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that could be true or false. A false sentence is closer to the truth than a piece of nonsense; 
a true prayer to a false god is closer to the truth than an illusion of prayer. 57 
If this is along the right lines, the key assumption is that the 'Christian', just by 
virtue of praying in the wrong spirit fails to pray at all. More generally: to attempt to think 
about ethics and religion in a logico-aesthetic way is to fail to think about ethics and 
religion. The mode of one's thinking (or praying) is essentially involved in fixing what 
one is thinking about (or whom one is praying to). But this is just the claim I derived 
above from the Inseparability Thesis, namely: 
F or any act of thinking about ethics and religion, that act is essentially (rather than 
externally) related to the object of thought. 
If the Inseparability Thesis is defensible, it seems the truth-is-subjectivity doctrine ought 
to be no less so. On this interpretation, the latter says no more, but no less, than that a 
suitably qualified subjectivity is a sine qua non of grasping ethico-religious truths. 
The implication is that it is not merely that the characters in Chekhov's story are 
thinking about an ethical subject in a shallow, glib, trivial way but that they are not 
thinking about an ethical subject at all. Since they stand in the wrong kind of relation to 
the propositions about capital punishment they debate, these propositions simply fail to 
attain the status of ethical perspectives for them. To be sure, the characters are not just 
speaking nonsense - they do think and speak according to logico-aesthetic criteria. But, 
insofar as they take themselves to be discussing an important ethical topic, they are under 
an illusion of thinking, speaking, judging. 58 This is an ambitious claim, but it is certainly 
not the silly idea that ethical or religious truth is whatever you want it to be. 
A more apposite worry, however, is as follows. Surely not just any ethical or 
religious perspective is edifying. But it seems to follow from this that one ought to reflect 
in a disinterested, objective way before one becomes existentially involved. (Note the 
similarity with the dialectic of rule-following: the objectivist maintains there must be 
57 Admittedly, this way of formulating the contrast is more cautious than Climacus' suggestion that the 
pagan is praying to the true God,just in virtue of his praying truly. But the important point is clear in the 
follmving from Kierkegaard's Joumals: 'The person who may have an incorrect conception of God, but 
Ilcn~rthelcss observes the self-denial this incorrect conception requires of him, has more spirit than the 
person \\ hose knmdedge of God may in scholarly and speculative respects be the most correct but which 
c\:crts absolutely no power over his life' (JP 51 X 3 A 736 (Hannay), p. 512). 
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some kind of prior reflective activity.) After all, the pagan would surely have been in an 
even better position if he had first got clear who the true God is, and then prayed with 'the 
passion of infinity'. Indeed, Kierkegaard himself seemed to concede as much when he 
wrote in an early journal, 'I certainly don't deny that 1 still accept an imperative of 
knowledge, and that one can also be influenced by it, but then it must be taken up alive in 
me, and this is what 1 now see as the main point'.59 If the main point is existential 
involvement, Kierkegaard nonetheless seems to accept here that this is posterior to the 
mundane business of acquiring true beliefs about ethics and religion. 
Climacus' commitment to the stronger claim that it is impossible to judge matters 
of ethics and religion unless one thinks in an ethico-religious way is clearly inconsistent 
with this picture.60 But recall that inseparability relations are supposed to be mutually 
determining (see Chapter Three). This means that whether one is having a thought about a 
matter of ethics or religion is determinate of, as well as determined by, whether one is 
thinking in an ethico-religious way. ('Only the truth that edifies is the truth for you', is 
not equivalent to, 'whatever you happen to find edifying is the truth for you'.) So to deny 
that there can be a prior process of reflection on abstract ethical or religious doctrines is 
not to accept that one can think in an ethico-religious way in the absence of ethical or 
religious content. The point is that we cannot ultimately say what ethical or religious 
content is, and we therefore cannot judge between competing perspectives, without 
thinking in an ethical or religious way. 
Nonetheless, it is consistent with this that one can partially identify ethico-
religious perspectives in abstracto. (I argued a parallel point more generally in Chapter 
Three.) One does not have to be thinking ethically or religiously to see family 
resemblances between one ethical perspective and another, or between ethical and 
religious concepts, for example. And 1 take it that Kierkegaard's distinction between 
intellectual and ethical categories can itself be understood intellectually. (Compare 
58 Cf. JP 54 XI 2 A 117 (ibid.), p. 623: ' ... as if one had a relation to the ethical just by talking about it'. 
59 JP 35 I A 76, ibid., p. 33. 
60 This need not be taken as evidence of a disagreement between Climacus and Kierkegaard. That the 
mature Kierkegaard endorsed the stronger view that existential inyolvement is essential for thinking about 
ethics and religion is surely evident in a later entry in his Joumals: 
All Christian and all ethical knowledge in general ceases tt) be what it is when outside its situation. 
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Climacus' claim that one does not have to actually be a Christian to understand what 
Christianity is. 61} Again, the point is that although it is possible to minimally identify an 
ethical or religious perspective without thinking ethically or religiously, to do so is not to 
regard those perspectives as ethical or religious.62 
Plausibly, moreover, ethico-religious reflection involves both existential 
engagement and moments of 'taking stock', in which we treat our commitments 
critically.63 Kierkegaard' s sober call to self-examination is hardly an invitation to repress 
our critical faculties. The point, however, is that this 'taking stock' is of a particular (for 
example, non-prudential) kind. In ethico-religious reflection we must fight self-deception, 
prejudice, laziness, and this requires such virtues as honesty, integrity, courage as well as 
those of humility, obedience, commitment. (But note that obedience is sometimes the 
right way to respond to a demand on one's life.) What Climacus does preclude is that 
existential involvement is only warranted once the true ethical or religious doctrines have 
been discovered by means of a prior process of disinterested reflection. 
Admittedly, however, matters are not quite so straightforward. For, later in the 
Postscript, Climacus seems to advance a yet further claim, namely that to have afolly 
developed ethico-religious subjectivity just is to grasp the objective truth. (This claim is 
clearly consistent with the above, but should be seen as a further claim.) To understand 
what 'fully developed' might mean here, one would have to retrace the steps of what 
Merold Westphal has called Climacus' 'existential phenomenology' - that is, his 
exploration of the ways in which the experience of resignation, suffering and guilt figure 
A situation (namely actuality, or the fact that one expresses one's knowledge in actuality) is the 
conditio sine qua non for ethical knowledge (JP 49 X I A 610 (Hannay), p. 406). 
61 Cf. CUP, p 372: 'That one can know what Christianity is without being a Christian must, then, be 
answered in the affIrmative'. 
62 In a seminal paper, James Conant argues that Climacus' own 'aestheticism' - his abstract, disinterested 
approach to the problem of what it means to be a Christian - involves a kind of performative paradox (see 
Conant (1995»). It seems to me that Conant overlooks the distinction between being able to think about an 
ethical or religious perspective as such and thinking according to the distinction between the categories. 
Climacus position is best understood as the claim that whereas the former requires ethico-religious 
retlection, the latter does not. And this leaves open that Climacus' attempt to clarify the categories is, as 
Paul L. Holmer puts it, 'itself oflogica1...significance' (Holmer (1957), p. 40). Nonetheless, it may well be 
that Climacus can be seen to dist011 ethical and religious perspectives by not engaging with them himself. 
63 Compare Kierkegaard' s remark that 'the real task is to become objective towards oneself (JP --l7 VllI I A 
165 (Dru), p. 126). The point is that critical reflection on matters of ethics and religion is more demanding 
than logico-acsthctic rctlection, not less. 
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in a religious life. 64 But the basic argument is that, since a fully developed subject would 
experience herself as wholly incapable of ethico-religious fulfillment, and therefore as a 
sinner, as 'nothing before God', she could only find fulfillment by receiving the gift of 
grace that is the atoning work of Christ. In other words: faith is the culmination of a 
certain process of reflecting on oneself in an immediate and direct relation to God. 
But what justification is there for thinking that Christianity is uniquely suited to 
fulfil the role of the objective correlate of a fully developed form of religiousness? The 
following passage from Kierkegaard's Journals may shed some light of what many 
commentators on the Postscript have found a bizarre twist in Climacus' argument: 
It seems to me that Christian dogmatics must be an explication of Christ's activity, the more so 
since Christ established no teaching but was active. He didn't teach that there was a redemption 
for man, he redeemed man. A Muhammadan dogmatics (sit venia verbo) would be an explication 
of Muhammad's teaching, but a Christian dogmatics would be an explication of Christ's 
activity. 65 
The connection I have in mind is this: given that, as Climacus suggests, a fully developed 
subject would have recognised her systemic failure to realise her own ethico-religious 
ideals, the last thing she would need is more teaching. For it is not ideals she lacks, but 
the resources to realise them. Rather, she would need redemption; that is, she would need 
redeeming. And that is just what Christianity - more precisely, Jesus - offers. 
Now all this might be construed as a kind of apologetic for Christianity, along the 
lines that nothing short of faith in Christ can make sense of our deepest experience of 
ourselves. (It is interesting to note in this connection that Kierkegaard took the later 
sections of the Postscript to be especially significant in protecting Climacus from the 
charge of subjectivism.66) But to attribute such an argument to Kierkegaard would be 
against the spirit of his claim that 'faith is not an intellectual category', that one's having 
64 See Westphal (1996), pp 150-51 and passim. 
65 JP 34 I A 27 (I-iannay), p. 14. 
66 Cf. JP 49 X 2 A 299 (ibid.), pp. 449-50: 
In all of what people commonly say about Jo. Climacus being mere subjectivity, etc., it is quite overlooked 
that, besides all that testifies in any case to him being a real-life figure, in one of the last sections he points 
out that the remarkable thing is that there is a 'how' with the characteristic that when it is precisely stated, 
the '\,hat' is also gi\'\.~n, that this is the 'hlm" offaith. Here inwardness, at its "ery maximum, pron~s to be 
objectivity again, after all. And that is a t\yist to the subjectivity principle which to my knowledge has never 
been pertormcd or accomplished. 
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faith is not assimilable to one's being persuaded by any apologetic argument, 
metaphysical or existential, formal or rhetorical. Plausibly, Kierkegaard's work should be 
taken as a 'contribution to fixing the [Christian] concept of faith' rather than a defence of 
faith.67 As such, it is surely both subtle and illuminating. 
I have not done justice to the themes touched on in this Epilogue. But a firm 
conclusion is this: expositors ofKierkegaard on faith would do well to examine the 
relationship between this concept and Kierkegaard's treatment of judgement. To that 
extent, this thesis has been an indirect contribution to 'fixing the concept of faith'. 
67 Cf. JP 34 I A 44 (Hannay), p. 16. The preceding is not intended to preclude that Kierkegaard's work has 
dcvotional ,·alue. Of course, the signed discourses are most naturally read as devotional (rather than 
philosophical) tex.is - though these may also offer many contributions to an invcstigation of religious 
concepts. Nor do I wish to rule out apologetic uses of Kierkegaard 's work. It seems to me that Kierkegaard 
otTers much to support thc "ic\\'. for c:\ample, that religious concepts are uniquely apt or resonant in certain 
c:\isll.,l1tial situations The point is that, insofar as we wish to be faithful to the te:\ts. wc should rcspect 
Kil-lkcgaard's broadly anti-apologctic stancc (cL for e:\amp1c. PC, p. 144. WL, p. 193) 
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